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ABSTRACTS

The "Lessons" of Vietnam and Soviet Foreign Policy

By W. ZIMMERMAN and R. AXELROD

This study systematically identifies the Soviet lessons of Vietnam as presented in eleven Soviet newspapers (specialized and regional as well as the central papers) and eight journals. Altogether, 1,585 citations were coded, representing more than 70 different lessons. A predominant finding is that the most common lessons the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam differed from their American counterparts: the Soviet lessons would not have warned the leadership about the dangers of military intervention in Afghanistan. A left/right scale was constructed, based on such issue clusters as why the communists won in Vietnam, the nature of imperialism, and the implications of Soviet policy in the Third World. Substantial variation was found among the media examined, many of which are linked to specific Soviet institutions. The implication is that Soviet foreign policy is contingent upon individual choices, institutional interplay, and changing contexts. This, in turn, suggests that Western policy makers should not lose sight of their capacity to influence the Soviet policy dialogue, and hence Soviet policy choices.

Tilting Toward Thanatos: America's "Countervailing" Nuclear Strategy

By L. R. BERES

America's current nuclear strategy seeks to improve deterrence with a counterforce targeting plan that exceeds the requirements of mutual assured destruction. This "countervailing" nuclear strategy codifies an enlarged spectrum of retaliatory options. The author argues, however, that the countervailing strategy is based upon a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions, and that it actually degrades the overriding objective of genuine security. For many reasons, the Soviet Union is not apt to assign a higher probability of fulfillment to American counterforce threats; under certain conditions, current policy confronts our adversary with a heightened incentive to pre-empt. The conclusion identifies an alternative strategy for the avoidance of nuclear war, a network of doctrines and obligations that calls for a return to minimum deterrence, a comprehensive test ban, and a joint renunciation of the right to the first use of nuclear weapons.

The Emerging Image of U.N. Politics

By W. J. DIXON

Empirical research on the United Nations has been characterized as fragmented, noncumulative, and lacking in the coherence necessary for conceptual integration—a condition at least partly due to the variegated nature of the institution itself. Yet in some important respects the research literature projects a rather homogeneous image. This image is shaped by a prevailing research perspective that treats the U.N. as (1) an arena for the political maneuvering of member states rather than an actor in its own right, and (2) as a resultant of exogenous forces governing world politics rather than as a source of influence affecting the larger world community. One or both of these traits may be found in 36 of 41 research articles published between 1970 and 1977. This perspective probably derives from numerous factors, including the state-centric orientation dominating our discipline and the tendency to view the U.N. as a convenient source of data for the study of world politics.

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Post-Keynesian Economics and Politics: Toward an Expectationist Theory of Democracy?

By N. J. VIG

Recent economic theory places growing emphasis on the importance of psychological expectations in economic behavior and policy implementation. This article reviews four recent books on political economy which analyze failures in Keynesian macroeconomic management in light of social and political pressures in advanced democratic nations (especially Britain and the United States). Public choice theories focusing on the myopic behavior of voters and structuralist interpretations stressing class or corporatist conflict are discussed; but the author concludes that political as well as economic response to uncertain conditions is best understood in terms of how future expectations shape current preferences. James Alt's pioneering research on British public opinion suggests that expectational adaptation may hold the key to democratic stability as well as economic adjustment.

Imponderables of the Holocaust

By H. L. MASON

Recent literature, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, has provided insights into some of the most perplexing imponderables of the Nazi annihilation of the Jews. These are, first, the development of consensus among the various German elites for the purposes of the Final Solution; second, an incremental kind of German decision making which led to the efficiently implemented mass annihilation of the Jews; and third, the passive mood toward the disasters befalling the Jews on the part of the entire universe of bystanders. (In the case of the Netherlands, this resulted, in spite of an unusually low degree of anti-Semitism, in an unusually high degree of Jewish victimization—in contrast to the so-called Danish reversal.) Fourth, because of the unimaginable predicament experienced by the victims and their "governments," the Jewish Councils (such as the Amsterdam *Joodsche Raad*), they never had a chance to develop workable responses to such a catastrophe.

Democratic Development, Breakdowns, and Fascism

By P. H. MERKL

Theories of democratic development have to account for breakdowns, fascist and other, and to consider phases of incomplete democratization as well as mass democracy. To this end, they may need to relate structural changes to social and political mobilization, explain different kinds of revolution—not only the "true revolution" of leftist ideology—and different types of military coups. "Developmental dictatorships," fascist or not, are unlikely midwives of liberal democracy. Democratic development can also be related to broad cultural and religious patterns of political civilization that may shape the course of revolutionary or non-revolutionary change.

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THE "LESSONS" OF VIETNAM AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

By WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN and ROBERT AXELROD*

Introduction

THE Vietnam War has had profound consequences for American foreign policy. Its impact on the attitudes of American elites and the attentive public was especially great. With the exception of Munich, perhaps no other single event has done so much to galvanize and shape American opinions about U.S. foreign policy, and about the place of the United States in the world, the efficacy of military power, and the nature of social change in the Third World. However, the lessons derived by Americans reveal no fundamental consensus. Supporters of the war concluded that one should avoid graduated escalation, that the Soviet Union was expansionist, that the "domino theory" was valid, and that one must honor alliance commitments. Critics inferred that one should avoid involvement in national liberation wars, that the press was more likely to tell the truth about foreign policy than the Administration, that one should avoid excessive reliance on military advice, that Third-World revolutions are nationalistic, and that the United States should scale down its world role.[1]

The war in Vietnam also had significant effects on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The American bombing of North Vietnam during Premier Alexei Kosygin's trip to Hanoi (February 1965) had demonstrably influenced Soviet attitudes, prompting the resurgence of highly traditionalist assessments of the U.S. that contrasted sharply with the dominant themes of the last years of Khrushchev's rule and the first months after his ouster. Détente was initiated by President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in spring of 1972—a visit that took place despite the ongoing American blockade of Haiphong and the bombing of Hanoi. The signing of the truce in January 1973 was an important backdrop to Leonid Brezhnev's trip to the United States that year, and an essential element in the further development of détente.

* We would like to thank our research assistants and coders, Mark Baskin, Steven Buss, William Reisinger, Martin Tatuch, and J. Pat Willerton. For helpful comments, we would like to thank, without implicating, Hannes Adomeit and Amy Saldinger. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Ford and Earhart Foundations.

[1] From Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," *World Politics*, XXXII (October 1979), 1-56.

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It has been argued that the aftermath of the war in Vietnam contributed to the low state of Soviet-American relations at the beginning of the 1980s. Variations on this theme abound. A relatively simple version is that the experience in Vietnam engendered a reluctance in the United States to become engaged militarily in the Third World—first evidenced in Washington's decision not to interfere in Angola, and then elsewhere in Africa. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is alleged to have been encouraged by its successes in Vietnam and the weakened global role of the U.S. Consequently, the Soviet Union accelerated its adventures in the Third World—first in Angola, then in Ethiopia and South Yemen, and, in December 1979, in the military intervention in Afghanistan. This invasion further contributed to the deterioration of Soviet-American relations; many Western analysts have regarded it as constituting (potentially at least) the Soviet Union's Vietnam. The putative links between the Vietnam War and subsequent Soviet-American relations and the ironic notion that there is some kind of path that leads from the U.S. debacle in Vietnam to a possible Soviet "Vietnam" provide the subject of this paper: the "lessons" that the Soviet Union learned from Vietnam.

An assessment of the Soviet lessons of Vietnam also illuminates how one's perceptions can be influenced by one's experiences. There is a human tendency to expect that others will draw the same inferences from important events as we do, even though the events may have had a very different meaning to them.[2] Because Vietnam was so traumatic for many Americans, they expect that Soviet elites will see an analogy between the United States' position in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's own potential position in Afghanistan.

Another reason for studying lessons learned by the U.S.S.R. is that the Soviet Union has a political culture that is permeated by the notions that "history teaches," that "life itself shows." Consequently, we expect Soviet commentators to use an occasion such as Vietnam to address issues of public policy. Indeed, Soviet pronouncements have emphasized the importance of understanding the lessons of Vietnam and their implications for Soviet foreign policy in general. Writing in the spring of 1973, one Soviet author declared that "the question of the lessons of the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against imperialist aggression has great, principled significance for an understand-

[2] Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 6.

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ing of the further development of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist struggle."[3]

Most important, the deterioration in American-Soviet relations and the growth of the Soviet Union's ability to project force far from its borders has prompted a renewed public discussion in the United States, and in the West more generally, about the nature of Soviet foreign policy. Throughout the post-World War II period, the questions asked about Soviet foreign policy have changed very little. The following are still relevant: What are the goals of the Soviet Union? How much is the answer to that question contingent on, for instance, identifying the particular leader or leaders of the Soviet Union? How homogeneous is the Soviet elite and attentive public at any particular moment? How purposive is Soviet policy? To what extent are the roots of Soviet foreign policy primarily internal in origin, and to what extent are Soviet actions a reaction to external events, notably to the behavior of the United States?

In the early 1970s, a consensus emerged on these perennial questions about Soviet foreign policy as a result of the research of many scholars, changing approaches in political science, the general improvement in the East-West political climate, and changes in the U.S.S.R. itself. Soviet foreign policy was thought to be reactive not only to "the logic" of force, as George Kennan had suggested in his famous "X" article of 1947,[4] but also to positive gestures by other states and the general level of threat. Scholars have asserted that the Soviet Union's decisions with respect to the arms race, for instance, were prompted by the acts of other states, notably the United States and the People's Republic of China. Nor were these reactions narrowly tactical.

Rather, there was an assumption that the Soviet Union not only reacts, it learns. This learning can be thought of both in an everyday sense and in the sense of social learning in the cybernetic paradigm.[5] With respect to the image of the Soviet political process, the dominant strand in Western thinking about post-Stalinist foreign policy has emphasized the extent to which terms like "oligarchic" and perhaps even "polyarchic" ("institutional pluralism"), rather than "monolithic,"

[3] Iu. Iukhanov, "Pobeda V'etnama" [Victory of Vietnam], *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (May 1973), p. 28.

[4] Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), 566-82; it has been republished in many places, for instance, Charles Gati, ed., *Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 9-20.

[5] John Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

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were appropriate. This holds true even though virtually all students of Soviet politics would agree that, of the sectors of public policy, foreign affairs have been least susceptible to direct involvement by the general population.[6] Such conceptions of Soviet politics have presumed the persistence of conflict and attitudinal differences among Soviet elites and attentive publics, whether the issue at hand be the nature of the threat posed by the United States, the nature of the American policy process, or the nature of politics and social change in the Third World.

However, as East-West relations deteriorated in the late 1970s and at the outset of the 1980s, this consensus has come under fire, especially because of its emphasis on learning, adaptation, and internal conflict at the expense of the unchanging, unitary-actor, purposive dimensions of Soviet foreign policy. Once again, themes stressing Moscow's purposiveness—its "grand strategic design," its cohesiveness, and the continuity of its actions over time, have gained a considerable following in Western policy-making and academic circles.[7] As a result, the time is ripe for examining anew the questions that have been central to the study of Soviet foreign policy, and for an examination of Moscow's reactions to the lessons of Vietnam in this respect.

Methods and Sources

The source for Soviet lessons of Vietnam is the Soviet press. But our analysis of the Soviet press is not limited to traditional Kremlinological procedures for analyzing the media. It combines a systematic and quantitative study of the lessons of Vietnam with the more traditional use of carefully selected examples.

Careful textual analyses of the Soviet press often produce subtle insights into Soviet politics. Even the best Kremlinological efforts, however, must confront the issue of representativeness: all too often, after a thorough examination of Soviet media, one is left with the feeling that

[6] See Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine, 1980), 36-49.

[7] For examples emphasizing the geopolitical basis of Soviet actions, see Hedrick Smith, "Russia's Power Strategy: Reflections on Afghanistan," *ibid.*, 737-47, and Kenneth Maxwell, "A New Scramble for Africa," *ibid.*, 515-34. The theme of continuity is well argued by Charles Gati, "The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Stephen F. Cohen and others, eds., *The Soviet Union Since Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). Another example in this vein is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58 (April 1980), 797-834.

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one example can lick another.[8] Without precise definitions of concepts and categories, the "measurements" are unreliable; two people looking at the same textual material may well see very different things in it.

The procedure we have adopted for analyzing the Soviet media addresses the problems of representativeness and reliability. It consists of the identification of each "lesson" in a predetermined set of Soviet newspapers and journals published over a specified period of time. We examined the following publications:

(a) the two central party and government newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*;
(b) six other major papers (published respectively under the auspices of the Komsomol, the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the Writers' Union, and the trade union, as well as the major papers of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic [RSFSR] and the Ukraine): *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, *Krasnaia zvezda*, *Literaturnaia gazeta*, *Trud*, *Sovetskaia Rossia* and *Pravda Ukrainy*;
(c) three minor Republic newspapers (from Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Georgia respectively): *Sovetskaia Litva*, *Kazakhstanskia Pravda*, and *Zaria Vostoka*;
(d) eight journals: *Kommunist*, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnaia otnosheniia (MEMO)*, *Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, *SShA*, *International Affairs*, *New Times*, and *World Marxist Review*.

All articles on Vietnam, and all sections in general articles that dealt with Vietnam, were examined. The 855 coded articles included all types of material, such as speeches, declarations, editorials, signed commentaries, and straight news stories. Only the most pedestrian material was excluded: unsigned Tass news dispatches and signed Tass news dispatches of less than six column-inches.

[8] Sometimes, of course, differences in the Soviet press are so transparent as to satisfy any inter-ocular strike test. Note, for instance, the following passages: "The Americans are now strenuously emphasizing that they did their best to talk their Chinese friends out of extensive military operations on the border with Vietnam. *That is probably so.* For the Americans realized that China's attack on Vietnam, particularly after Deng Xiaoping's visit, would place Washington and all Western appeasers of China in an extremely ambiguous and politically vulnerable position" (A. Bovin, *Izvestia*, February 20, 1979; emphasis added). "Having completed its military preparations, the Beijing leadership endeavored to secure political support for its aggression from the United States. The American capital alleges that these endeavors were unsuccessful and that the Americans tried to persuade Beijing not to attack Vietnam. *But not even the U.S. press believes this.*" (Col. A. Leontiev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 21, 1979; emphasis added.)

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The period covered extended from December 13, 1972, immediately after the breakdown of the private peace talks in Paris, through the intense Christmas bombing and the signing of the Paris peace agreement on January 27, until the end of February 1973, when the war began to escalate again.[9] Soviet commentators considered this period to be the climax of the war, culminating in an agreement they perceived as a tremendous victory for them and their friends in Vietnam. Thus, there are ample and varied occasions for observing the lessons the Soviets drew from Vietnam, both during the intense bombing and after the signing of the Paris agreement.

A lesson is defined as "an explicit policy-relevant statement that is based on experience that has at least an implied applicability to later events." The identification and categorization of lessons achieve a good level of reliability. We used two independent coders to identify the lessons contained in an article; a third person resolved any disagreements between the first two. Each initial coder found 86 percent of the items that were determined to be lessons. Consequently, we are confident that more than 90 or even 95 percent of the lessons contained in the articles were actually found by one or the other coder.[10] Each coder marked a few items that were determined not to be lessons, but on average, these constituted only 6 percent of the total for each coder. Therefore, the number of items that were incorrectly identified by both of the two independent coders is probably negligible.

The categorizations of the lessons also proved to have a high degree of reliability. The two independent coders agreed on the precise categorization of a lesson 81 percent of the time. When they disagreed, it was often on a minor point. For example, in a test sample of 102 lessons that were included in our left/right scale, the independent coders never once disagreed about which side of the scale the lesson belonged.

Findings

As expected, lessons were a common mode of discourse. Including double-counting for the same lessons reproduced in several newspapers,

[9] The newspapers were coded from December 13, 1972 to February 28, 1973. The journals were covered for a comparable period as defined by the rule that the article must have been signed to press on or after December 13, 1972, and it must have been prepared for printing before February 28, 1973.

[10] If the oversights of the two coders had not been correlated, we would have identified 98% of the lessons: the second coder would have found 86% of the lessons missed by the first coder, or a total of $.86 + (.86 \times .14) = .98$. A more realistic estimate would allow for the fact that the oversights are probably correlated. Conservatively, one may estimate that the second coder would find at least half of the lessons missed by the first coder; this would produce a total of 93% or 96%.

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we found 1,585 lessons: 1,358 in newspapers and 227 in journals, or an average of 1.6 per newspaper article and 7.6 per journal article. (Slightly more than half of the lessons in newspapers were in articles that appeared in more than one source.) There was a considerable variation in frequency among the newspaper articles. Some—speeches by Brezhnev and Gromyko, for instance—contained as many or more lessons than did the average journal article. Other articles did not carry any lessons.

More significantly, the variety in applications of lessons was substantial. As indicated in the Appendix, many of the lessons took the form of statements that explained why North Vietnam won. These statements were often ritualistic: various segments of the press repeated *ad nauseam* that with will and courage, and supported by the socialist camp, a people could triumph over the imperialist forces (*1*-A-2 and *1*-C-1). At the same time, a sizable portion of the lessons was related to the broader implications of the victory. Vietnam became a springboard for discussing virtually all aspects of Soviet foreign policy,[11] for assessing American foreign policy and the nature of imperialism, and for evaluating changes in the Third World or in the world generally.

The differences in focus, moreover, often were obviously policy-relevant. Many lessons were concerned with the implications of Vietnam for the use of force. For some commentators, Vietnam showed that the Soviet military needed to be strengthened (2-E). There were also several assertions that U.S. force was less effective than it had been (*3*-I-1). Other writers drew the more limited conclusion that the U.S. leadership was rethinking the use of force in international politics (*3*-I-2). Still others employed a much broader formulation. They asserted that force in general had lost its previous utility (*6*-C-1). The policy implications diverge widely: it is one thing to write, as Maevskii and Strelnikov did, that "the policy of militarization and military adventures has borne tragic fruits for the Americans," and that progressive forces in the U.S. have realized that these are "the lessons of history."[12] It is another thing entirely to assert that "Vietnam has shown persuasively enough that in the contemporary epoch the application of armed force cannot achieve resolution of other conflict situations as well."[13]

In specific instances of this kind, it was relatively easy to illustrate

[11] An interesting exception was that practically no mention was made of China during this period. Only two statements were encountered that could be called lessons about China (Appendix, *4*-A).

[12] *Pravda*, January 31, 1973.

[13] Iu. Mikheev, "Istoricheskoe znachenie prekrashcheniia voiny vo V'etname" [The Historical Significance of the End of the War in Vietnam], *SShA* (April 1973), 11.

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the differences in various media by the traditional methods of textual analysis. But in view of the volume of the lessons and their dispersal across 19 newspapers and journals, we had to aggregate the data in a way that made sense in light of our knowledge of the issues about which communists have historically diverged. This was most appropriately accomplished by developing an overall left/right scale that tapped several important aspects of the Soviet dialogue.

Students of Soviet politics have long observed the existence of two enduring strands in communist thought—one "leftist" and the other "rightist." These competing orientations have been used to periodize Soviet foreign policy, to describe differences within the Soviet ruling group at a particular time, and to differentiate among the parties and states in what used to be called the world communist movement. Leftist perspectives in communist thinking emphasize the uniqueness of communism. These strands are goal-oriented and optimistic about the prospects for revolutionary advance. They stress the dialectic and the functionality and inevitability of conflict. Persons taking a leftist stance prefer partisanship over expertise ("reds" over "experts") and advocate narrow alliance strategies. Advocates of rightist orientations, by contrast, emphasize the universality of communism. At a given time, they tend to be pessimistic about readiness for revolutionary advance, and to be more immediately task-oriented. They see change for the better within noncommunist states as representing historical progress, whereas leftists argue "the worse, the better." The rightists stress the avoidability of conflict and the noninevitability of war, and recognize a significant role for expertise. Their coalition strategies embrace quite broad noncommunist elements.[14]

In coding the lessons of Vietnam, an operational measure of left and right was developed consistent with the notion that rightist orientations emphasize economics and determinism, while leftist ones stress politics and will.[15] We treated as leftist those statements that emphasized the role of military aid to Vietnam and the significance of military and political doctrine in the North Vietnamese victory; as rightist those statements that stressed economic and material support. Similarly, our right dimension picked up those lessons that stressed the role of First-World progressives even in the United States, and a broad class

[14] The best brief discussion of right and left in Soviet foreign policy is Dallin (fn. 6), on which the above paragraph draws heavily.

[15] We decided not to include one lesson of this type on the scale, because it was used so often by all media as to be almost entirely ritualistic—that Vietnam won because of its will and courage (*1*-A-2). We did, however, compute the scale with and without *1*-A-2. No major differences in interpretation result.

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alliance within Vietnam. Leftist lessons were, in this instance, those that emphasized the role of the communist party within Vietnam, rather than broad support within the country. With respect to imperialism, we treated assertions that the United States would be likely to be more aggressive the weaker it became as leftist (a classic leftist posture), that the nature of imperialism had not changed, and that U.S. basic strategy had not changed. Rightist perspectives on the United States affirmed that the U.S. would become more reasonable and accommodating as it weakened, that the U.S. leadership was aware of the costs of intervention, and that the U.S. was engaged in a fundamental rethinking of its basic strategy, or of the use of force. Finally, we classified as leftist those statements that drew optimistic prospects for national liberation movements as a lesson of Vietnam, and treated as rightist those that saw the Vietnam truce as portending the possibility of peaceful settlements elsewhere. The categories of lessons in terms of our left/right scale are presented with textual examples in Table 1.

The left/right positions of all papers examined are shown graphically in Figure 1 (column A). The placement of *Pravda* can be taken as a guide: on our scale, *Pravda* is just to the right of center because it mentioned lessons of the right slightly more often than lessons of the left. For those who expect the central party paper to set the tone for the Soviet media, it is a surprise that all but one of the other newspapers are to the left of *Pravda*. The minor regional papers in our sample are quite far to the left of *Pravda* in their reporting, with 62 percent of their scaled lessons on the left, compared to *Pravda*'s 44 percent. At the other extreme, *Literaturnaia gazeta* is far from the pack, with only 15 percent of its scaled lessons on the left.

Differences of less than 10 points on the scale cannot be taken too seriously in substantive terms. But the data do show that the leading newspaper of the Soviet Union did not necessarily hold what amounts to the average position of the other newspapers; nor did the other papers reproduce *Pravda*'s mix of lessons with fidelity. Moreover, *Literaturnaia gazeta* was marching to a different drummer than were *Pravda* and the other newspapers. The fact that the central party organ, *Pravda*, is to the right of all newspapers (save *Literaturnaia gazeta*) suggests (but hardly proves) that in 1973 Brezhnev was somewhat ahead of other members of the Soviet ruling group in advocating improved U.S.-Soviet relations, and that his position was not merely reflecting a consensus within the leadership.

The diversity in the Soviet press can be better appreciated by distinguishing the various kinds of articles that appeared in the media.

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TABLE 1

LEFT/RIGHT SCALE WITH EXAMPLES

Category of Lesson	*Left Position*	*Right Position*
EXPLANATIONS OF WHY VIETNAM WON	POLITICAL AND MILITARY "The socialist system and Marxist-Leninist Party armed the defenders of the D.R.V. with a clear understanding of the goals of the struggle, gave to it a wide scope, bravery and persistence, inspired its participants to massive heroic deeds."	ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT "Speaking about the victory of the Vietnamese people over the forces of imperialist aggression, the leaders of the government of D.R.V. and P.R.G. R.S.V. [Vietcong] invariably mention the large significance of the moral and material aid of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries."
APPROPRIATENESS OF SOVIET POLICY	NATIONAL LIBERATION "Socialist internationalism is a mighty force cementing the unity of people fighting for the revolutionary remaking of the world."	PEACE POLICY "This [the Paris peace agreement] is graphic confirmation of the vital force and reality of the Peace Program proposed at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in which one of the most important tasks was securing the end of the war in Vietnam."
NATURE OF IMPERIALISM	AGGRESSIVE IMPERIALISM UNCHANGED "Despite the well-known warming of the international climate, we cannot forget that the aggressive essence of imperialism remains unchanged."	IMPERIALISM IS NOW MORE REASONABLE "The policy of the cold war and the notorious 'policy of force' . . . has suffered complete failure. Realistically thinking circles of the capitalist states have become increasingly conscious of the necessity for peaceful coexistence with the socialist countries."
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD	OPTIMISM ABOUT NATIONAL LIBERATION "The failure of American aggression in Vietnam convincingly affirms that the capabilities of the imperialists have sharply narrowed in our time, and the revolutionary, national liberation movement has gained unprecedented scope."	OPTIMISM ABOUT PEACE "The lessons of peaceful settlement in Vietnam distinctly show that with the application of good will on [both] sides even the most chronic hotbeds of tension can be put out."

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	NARROW	BROAD
ALLIANCE STRATEGY WITHIN VIETNAM	"No other political force, except a Marxist-Leninist party, could arm a struggling people with such a clear understanding of the goals of the struggle and so inspire it to massive heroic deeds."	"The victory of Vietnam points to the fact that it is impossible to conquer a people struggling for independence, and leaning on the mighty support of its class brothers, and all of the revolutionary and progressive forces in the country."
IMPLICATIONS FOR VIETNAM	ACCELERATION OF UNIFICATION "We are convinced that the patriots of South Vietnam will surmount all the obstacles in the path to the complete triumph of their just cause."	PREVENTION OF REVERSE "There is no force that could turn back developments in South Vietnam. . . ."
INTERNATIONAL CLASS ALIGNMENTS	NARROW (No examples found)	BROAD "The attainment of the agreement is convincing proof that in our day, no power is able to break the will of a people struggling for its inalienable rights and enjoying the support of all progressive forces of the world."

Note: The positions are subscales of specific categories in the Appendix;[16] the quotations are examples of typical lessons.[17] Translations are by the authors.

[16] The subscales are taken from the following categories of the Appendix:

	Left	*Right*
Explanation of why Vietnam won	*1*-A-3, *1*-B-2	*1*-B-2
Appropriateness of Soviet policy	*2*-A-3, *2*-B-3	*2*-A-2, *2*-B-1
Nature of imperialism	*3*-B, *3*-E, *3*-F, *3*-H, *3*-I-1, *6*-F	*3*-A, *3*-C-1, *3*-C-2, *3*-G, *3*-I-2, *6*-C-1, *6*-C-2
Implications for policy in the Third World	*5*-C	*5*-A, *5*-B
Alliance strategy within Vietnam	*6*-D-2a	*6*-D-2b
Implications for Vietnam	*7*-A-1	*7*-A-2
International class alignments	No examples found.	*1*-C-5, *6*-D-3c

[17] The sources for the left positions are, in order: *Kras. zvezda*, February 2, 1973; *New Times*, February 1973; *Izvestia*, February 23, 1973; speech by Shcherbitsky in *Pravda Ukrainy*, December 16, 1972; *Kommunist*, January 1973; and *Kras. zvezda*, February 15, 1973. The sources for the right positions are, in order: *Pravda*, February 13, 1973; speech by Gromyko in *Pravda*, February 28, 1973; *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 6, 1973; *SShA*, March 1973; *Pravda*, January 31, 1973; speech by Gromyko in *Pravda*, February 28, 1973; and *Kommunist*, January 1973.

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

A. All Material

B. Items by Foreigners

C. Domestic Reprints

D. Domestic Unreprinted

E. Journals

*Fewer than ten scaled items

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Authoritative items may be identified as statements by the government or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, editorials, and speeches by Brezhnev. The lessons in these authoritative statements tend to be somewhat to the left when compared to lessons from all other Soviet sources (.47 as compared to .36).

The Soviet press also published items by foreigners—usually statements by visiting dignitaries. These materials provided some real contrast to the other items in the Soviet press. During the time of our study, the foreign material on Vietnam was overwhelmingly by Vietnamese sources (84 percent), and overwhelmingly leftist in its orientation. (If the Vietnamese had been the only sources counted, the material would have been even more to the left.)

A glimpse at the implications for the future reveals that the foreign authors did not see things in the same way as did the Soviets. As Table 2 indicates, foreign communists found the settlement in Vietnam cause for optimism with respect exclusively to the outlook for the national liberation movement elsewhere. Soviet commentators spread their optimism more or less evenly across the various possibilities: prospects for peace pure and simple, prospects for a just peace (compatible with Soviet interests elsewhere), and prospects for national liberation.

TABLE 2

LESSONS OF VIETNAM ABOUT THE THIRD WORLD
(AS STATED IN THE SOVIET PRESS)*

Optimism about prospects for:	*Soviet Author*	*Foreign Author*
5A. peace elsewhere	35	0
5B. just peace elsewhere	22	0
5C. national liberation	28	17
	85	17

*Excludes domestic reprints.

On many other topics as well, the lessons drawn by foreigners in the Soviet newspapers were substantially to the left of the material by Soviet authors.[18] For example, the material in *Pravda* by foreigners was rated 72 percent left, while *Pravda* as a whole was rated only 44 percent left (Figure 1, column B). The other newspapers displayed a comparable emphasis on the left in their material by foreigners. The lessons

[18] During the period surveyed, the journals carried no articles that cited lessons of Vietnam by foreigners.

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drawn by the Vietnamese had a consistency that was sufficiently distinctive to increase the overall diversity of the Soviet media. One of the ironies of trying to hold together a heterodox global coalition is that its differences diversify the internal Soviet dialogue.

A factor that tended to distinguish one newspaper from another was the selection of domestically originated material it reprinted. About one-third of the lessons scaled were from articles that appeared in more than one publication. They included editorials, speeches by leading figures, and other, less authoritative items. As can be seen in Figure 1 (column C), there was considerable variation in the left/right positions of the various media in the material they reprinted. In other words, while some items (such as a key speech by Brezhnev) were sure to be reprinted in all of the daily newspapers, other items were reprinted in some papers but not in others. And these optional reprints were selected in quite different ways by different newspapers. For example, the domestic reprints in the government's newspaper, *Izvestia*, were only 36 percent left, but the domestic items reprinted in the trade union paper, *Trud*, were 60 percent left.

The variety among papers was also evident in the domestically originated material unique to each paper (Figure 1, column D). The difference between *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, for example, was substantial: material unique to *Pravda* was 32 percent left, but material unique to *Izvestia* was 47 percent left. *Krasnaia zvezda* (Red Star) was consistently more than 10 percent farther to the left than *Pravda* on all dimensions (Figure 1, columns A through D).

An additional way in which the newspapers differed becomes apparent in analyzing the domestically originated material unique to each paper. There are too few lessons here to assess systematically whether it was the newspapers themselves or the individuals contributing the articles that made for the differences across newspapers. *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, *Trud*, and *Krasnaia zvezda* were the four newspapers in which lessons of Vietnam appeared most frequently. Particular authorship seemed to matter least in *Trud* and *Krasnaia zvezda*. In *Izvestia*, it sometimes mattered substantially who the author was: among the individuals whose articles contained multiple lessons, Anatolyi Gromyko's contribution, with 2 of 7 lessons on the left (29 percent), contrasted with V. Kudriavtsev's articles published at approximately the same time, in which 9 of 13 (69 percent) lessons were on the left. The variation across authors was even more noticeable in *Pravda*.

The journals displayed as much variation as the newspapers. Those

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on the right—*International Affairs*, *Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, *World Marxist Review*, and *SShA*—had only 20 to 30 percent of their scaled lessons on the left. *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, with its lessons scaled 63 percent left, was somewhat in isolation from all the rest. What this means substantively can be appreciated by contrasting the lessons that were most prominent in various journals. *Kommunist* presented mostly standard fare. Half of its 52 lessons were statements explaining that North Vietnam won because of its will and courage, its political and military doctrine, and general aid from various international sources. The next most prominent lesson of Vietnam (although there were only four citations) was that it encourages optimism about the prospects for a just peace. In the military journal *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, roughly half of the lessons (18 of 40) referred to the D.R.V.'s will and courage, and to general aid from various sources. Eleven of the other lessons pointed out the role of North Vietnam's political and military doctrine or economic and military assistance, asserted that elements in the U.S. have not altered their aggressive behavior, and concluded that the victory in Vietnam encourages optimism about future national liberation struggles. In *SShA*, the Academy of Sciences' journal focusing on the United States, again roughly half the lessons (12 of only 27) referred to broad forms of international or Soviet aid, and to the D.R.V.'s political and military doctrine as factors explaining why North Vietnam won. The most prominent other themes, though, were that the role of force in international politics is decreasing in overall utility, that one cannot turn back history, and that Vietnam is cause for optimism regarding the prospects for a just peace elsewhere.

A comparison of the lessons enumerated in the Soviet Union and the United States yields a striking combination of agreement about the reasons for the communist victory, and some equally striking differences about the implications. Concerning the former, Americans tended to emphasize the dedication of the communist forces, the aid provided to them by the Soviet Union and China, and the lack of popular support for the Saigon regime.[19] Similarly, the Soviet commentators stressed the will and courage of the communist forces and the aid given them by the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. Al-

[19] Holsti and Rosenau (fn. 1), 14-17. Two collections on the American lessons of Vietnam are Anthony Lake, *The Vietnam Legacy* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), and W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976).

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though Soviet commentary did not mention the lack of popular support for Saigon, they did cite the appeal of the communist side, and what they saw as its correct political and military doctrine and its fighting for a just cause.

The implications of the Vietnam experience were perceived very differently by elites in the United States and the Soviet Union. As shown by a sampling of the American elite, the following lessons were common after the war.[20]

1. "Avoid graduated escalation." This was one of the lessons of Vietnam most frequently cited by Americans of varying stripes, ranging from consistent supporters of the war to those who turned against it. Nothing like it appeared in any of the Soviet newspapers or journals.

2. "The U.S.S.R. is expansionist" is another lesson that many American leaders drew from the Vietnam War. Obviously, Soviet commentators would not put it this way. The closest the Soviet press came to this theme was to debate whether it was appropriate to support national liberation movements rather than to pursue a peace policy. In addition, the Soviet media, when discussing the character of the enemy, argued over the nature of imperialism: whether its aggressive nature was unchanged, or whether the American failure in Vietnam would cause it to be more reasonable in the future.

3. "Third-World revolutionaries are nationalistic" is one of the lessons learned by American critics of the Vietnam War. But the connection between the success of revolutionary activity and the power of nationalism itself was not asserted by anyone in the Soviet press.

The attention that the Soviet Union paid to the strengths of the communist side rather than to the weaknesses of the Saigon regime is attributable to the U.S.S.R.'s basic propensity to see the lessons of Vietnam as universally relevant. This propensity was so strong that the Soviets did not cite a single lesson concerning the impact of culture, the role of geography, or even the nature of class conflict in Vietnam. The fact that the war in Vietnam was largely one of peasants against city and town dwellers never appears in our data as a lesson of Vietnam. For Marxist-Leninist commentators, the complete lack of any lessons using a class analysis of the conflict was a strange omission. By evaluating Vietnam in universal terms, both the leftist and the rightist sides of the Soviet debate wished to demonstrate that their conclusions from the war would be widely applicable in the future. But as a result, the lessons that were drawn from the victory tended to suggest that communist forces in other places and at other times could be expected to

[20] Holsti and Rosenau (fn. 1).

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overcome great handicaps regardless of the local features of the struggle. Consequently, when the prospects of the communist forces in Afghanistan were being assessed, Soviet analysts were not well served by their rosy lessons of Vietnam.

Implications for Soviet Foreign Policy

Optimism about Soviet-American relations currently does not run high among Western elites. However, their expectations should not contaminate a scholarly assessment of Soviet foreign policy. As we have seen, many of the lessons deal explicitly with Soviet policy preferences (Parts 2, 5, and 6 of the Appendix). Moreover, the lessons about U.S. foreign policy have a barely hidden policy agenda (Part 3 of the Appendix). Thus, the data about the Soviet lessons of Vietnam serve as an appropriate basis for addressing once again the basic empirical questions about Soviet foreign policy raised in the introduction. In turn, the answers have implications for policy makers.

Our survey of the Soviet lessons of Vietnam shows that the notion of monolithic Soviet preferences is flatly wrong. When one speaks of Soviet goals, it is necessary to specify the particular individuals, institutions, or media sources, as well as the context. With respect to the implications of the Vietnam War, our analysis shows that for Soviet commentators a tension existed between the goals of "peace" and "national liberation." For some, even though they gave a token nod to national liberation, the central hope encouraged by Vietnam was overwhelmingly for peace. Others attached greater weight to national liberation,[21] or advocated the military strengthening of the Soviet Union (Appendix, 2-E).

Our findings in and of themselves provide little evidence as to which priority would prevail. However, the range of lessons that appeared in the Soviet press suggests a picture of differing policy perspectives competing for attention and support. As Dina Spechler has pointed out, Soviet leaders strongly prefer to display a united front to the West whenever possible. They would certainly not give the appearance of divergent views where these did not actually exist.[22] The substantial differences we found among the left/right orientations of the media implicitly suggest a policy debate covering a significant range of opinion, rather than merely a division over minor tactical items. The com-

[21] For instance, the articles by V. Kudriavtsev in *Izvestia*, February 1 and 5, 1973.

[22] Spechler, *Domestic Influence on Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), 5.

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peting Soviet lessons reveal the same kind of unresolved tensions and unordered priorities among goals that one comes to expect from Western governments with their amalgam of divergent interests.

These findings apply to virtually every issue in the Soviet dialogue on the lessons of Vietnam. Our survey shows, contrary to the contention that there is *a* Soviet view about the role of force in world politics,[23] that this is not the case. Is it the Soviet view that superior military force for (their) good guys produces peace? Or that the imperialists are rethinking the role of force in international politics? Or that the role of force generally has lost some of its value in world politics? All of these were Soviet lessons of Vietnam (Appendix, Parts 2-A, 3-G, and 6-C). Similarly, the picture of imperialism that emerges from our research is scarcely clearcut. Some sources pointed out the unchanged nature of imperialism and of overall U.S. strategy (3-E and 3-H; others stated that U.S. imperialism was becoming more accommodating, and was rethinking its overall strategy (3-H and 3-G).

The disagreements over virtually every aspect of the lessons of Vietnam provide an important implication for Soviet foreign policy in general. They call into question the whole idea of a "general line"—at least as specialists have thought of the term. The Soviet reading of Vietnam was sufficiently diverse to be best depicted, not as a line, but as a platform with something for everyone.

By contrast with those of the Soviets themselves, statements by the Vietnamese which were published in the Soviet press did have a line. Looking beyond the 1973 Paris agreement, the Vietnamese were unanimous in drawing optimistic lessons about the prospects for national liberation elsewhere.

Some individual Soviet newspapers and journals also had lines. Thus, the Americanists writing in *SShA* expressed an institutional interest in good U.S.-Soviet relations. *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* and, to a lesser extent, *Krasnaia zvezda*, gave vent to the military perspective that the "imperialists haven't changed." This traditionalist outlook places them consistently to the left of most of the other media sources. Although *Literaturnaia gazeta* cannot be said to represent an institution, it expressed distinctive views—views that were shared by a "stratum" of Soviet society for whom good East-West relations really matter, and for whom peace and domestic development take clear precedence over foreign policy gains in the Third World. Thus, we can recognize clear policy orientations in a number of the specialized newspapers and jour-

[23] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 21-34.

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nals, and in some cases, the specific institutions with which these media are associated.

Our data also shed new light on the broader issue of the balance between internal and external determinants of Soviet foreign policy. The lessons provide evidence of the reactive dimension to Soviet foreign policy. As those whose view of Soviet foreign policy is mechanistic would anticipate, the Soviet media reacted in a narrowly tactical sense. More significantly, the response of some Soviet commentators to the Paris peace agreement of January 1973 implied a degree of learning that is consistent with a cybernetic approach to Soviet foreign policy. Some Soviet statements even suggested that the international system had been basically altered. Much of the Soviet commentary concluded that the *United States* was learning, and implied that the Soviet Union would adapt its behavior to that fact.

Indeed, what the Soviet commentators learned was largely a function of what they thought the United States was learning. Although, as we have shown, the Soviets did not learn the same things as the Americans, there was some congruence between the rightist Soviet perspective on the United States and the views about U.S. foreign policy held by American critics of the war. Hence, we are able to reject narrow, internally oriented explanations of Soviet foreign policy at a time when such views are once again achieving some prominence.[24]

Our findings also call into question action-reaction, mirror-image conceptions of the impact of external events on Soviet foreign policy.[25] Soviet commentators learned substantially different lessons than American elites and attentive publics—partly because Moscow was on the winning side, and partly because the war was filtered through the internal and external experiences of the Soviet Union. Different perspectives result in different lessons.

Americans drew conclusions from Vietnam that would, for example, warn them about the dangers of a significant military intervention in Afghanistan. The lessons the Soviets drew, however, did not warn them of the dangers of such an intervention by Soviet forces. On the contrary, the frequent assertion that aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had been important in Vietnam may have increased their propensity to intervene in Afghanistan. Similarly, the frequently expressed views that only communists could have accom-

[24] For the most strident statement of this genre, see Solzhenitsyn (fn. 7).

[25] A good example of a view of Soviet-American interactions that emphasizes mirror-image responses to external events is William Gamson and André Modigliani, *Untangling the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

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plished such a victory as Vietnam, and that the political and military doctrine of the Vietnamese communists had been correct, may have added to the sense that a communist leadership headed by someone with "correct" views could reverse a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Both the left and the right sides of the internal Soviet debate may well have concluded that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was called for: the left arguing that the aggressive nature of American imperialism was unchanged, the right stressing that the U.S. had become aware of the substantial domestic costs of American involvement in limited wars. In short, whereas the lessons Americans learned about Vietnam argued *against* intervention, the main themes stressed by Soviet observers may have contributed to their decision to intervene.[26]

This proposition must, however, be qualified: presumably there were those disposed to worry—as one *Krasnaia zvezda* commentator remarked about Vietnam—that "it is easy to begin a war but difficult to end one."[27] And there may well have been others who questioned the utility of force under contemporary conditions, as some had concluded in assessing the lessons of Vietnam.

A view of Soviet foreign policy that emphasizes undifferentiated goals, high purposiveness, unquestioning belief in the utility of force, and the unchanging nature of the enemy is unrealistic. Such a view would not have anticipated the Soviet lessons of Vietnam. Nor is such a view likely to suggest how these lessons might be transferred to other situations. Our analysis is not able to specify which lessons individual Soviet policy makers are likely to have found most compelling in a concrete instance such as Afghanistan. It does, however, reveal that there were major disagreements on many issues relevant to future policy, with each side expressing itself in terms of competing "lessons of Vietnam." Moreover, the structured pattern of the debate in the press shows that one would have to look to institutional positions and individual differences prior to making such an estimate in a concrete circumstance. For scholars concerned with cumulative knowledge about the Soviet Union, this observation, while scarcely novel, warrants considerable emphasis. It illustrates the extent to which Soviet foreign policy is not unchanging and predetermined, but rather contingent upon individual choice, institutional interplay, and changing context.

Persons concerned with the policies that Western states adopt toward

[26] In addition, the thinking exemplified by the two citations of a reverse domino theory (Appendix, 6-E)—one example of a mirror image—may also have added to the arguments for intervention.

[27] *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 19, 1972, p. 3.

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the Soviet Union, moreover, should note that some of the themes which found expression in the Soviet media about the lessons of Vietnam are of the type they would rather not see prevail in the Soviet dialogue—for example, that imperialism has not changed its aggressive nature, and that the Soviet Union's course should be one of greater military strength. Conversely, there were themes that Western policy makers would wish to encourage—such as the lesson that military force has diminishing utility. There is an important implication in this diversity: if Western policy makers lose sight of the range of views embraced within the Soviet policy dialogue, their capacity to influence and shape that dialogue—and hence, Soviet policy choices—will be dramatically diminished.

Appendix

The Soviet Lessons of Vietnam
(Showing which categories are scaled as "left" and "right" lessons, and total number of citations found.)

LEFT/ SCALE RIGHT	NUMBER OF CITATIONS	CATEGORIES
		1. Why North Vietnam Won
		A. Vietnam
	20	1. General
	156	2. Will and courage
Left	82	3. Political and/or military doctrine
	33	4. Fighting a just war
	5	5. Unity of toilers
	15	6. N.V.N. or N.L.F. military strength
		B. Type of aid
	179	1. Unspecified and general
Left	11	2. Military aid
Right	18	3. Economic and material support
	43	4. Moral and political support
		C. Source of aid
	142	1. Socialist (unspecified)
	39	2. Soviet (only)
	2	3. Specific other socialist
	22	4. National liberation movement (including Laos and Cambodia)
Right	21	5. First-World progressive forces
	126	6. Other (including all progressive forces)

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APPENDIX—*Continued*

LEFT/ RIGHT SCALE	NUMBER OF CITATIONS	CATEGORIES
		D. U.S. weakness
	9	1. Domestic disunity
	6	2. Military ineffectiveness
	0	E. Saigon's weaknesses
	0	F. Unjust wars can't be won
	4	G. Overall distribution of power
	10	H. Others
		2. Implications for Soviet Policy Behavior or Socialists
		A. Shifting distribution of power or reduced role of U.S. increases scope of Soviet initiatives
	0	1. Negotiated just settlements
Right	9	2. Other regulated settlements
Left	2	3. Support of National Liberation Movement
		B. Rightness of Soviet policy (unspecified)
Right	13	1. Peace policy (only)
	23	2. Internationalist policy (only)
Left	10	3. Peace or internationalist policy that advances revolutionary interests
	15	C. The greater the cohesion of international socialist (and progressive) forces, the greater the successes
	6	D. Cohesion of socialist (and progressive) forces compels U.S. to behave (or deters U.S.)
	7	E. Strengthening Soviet military is proper course
	3	F. Other
		3. Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy/Imperialist Behavior
Right	5	A. The weaker U.S. becomes, the more reasonable/accommodating it becomes
Left	4	B. The weaker U.S. becomes, the more prone to aggressive acts, more prone to strike out violently, etc.
		C. U.S. is aware that intervention has substantial
Right	15	1. domestic costs
Right	7	2. international costs
	2	D. Faced with an overwhelming coalition, U.S. can be forced to behave

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APPENDIX—*Continued*

LEFT/ RIGHT SCALE	NUMBER OF CITATIONS	CATEGORIES
Left	10	E. Nature of U.S. imperialism is unchanged
Left	17	F. (Substantial) elements in U.S. have not altered their aggressive behavior
Right	26	G. Overall U.S. strategy is being rethought or questioned in U.S.
Left	12	H. Overall U.S. strategy has not changed
		I. Utility of force
Left	7	1. U.S. force is less effective than before
Right	11	2. U.S. is rethinking the use of force
	2	J. Other
		4. Implications for Chinese Policy
	2	A. Chinese strategy and tactics
	0	B. Other
		5. Implications for the Third World
Right	44	A. Optimism about peace elsewhere
Right	30	B. Optimism about *just* peace elsewhere, or about peace favorable to Soviet interests
Left	54	C. Optimism about national liberation struggles
	2	D. Other
		6. Global Implications
	18	A. Evidence of changed distribution of power
		B. Imperialism
	26	1. can no longer determine events within a (Third World) country without cost
	8	2. can no longer determine events within a country
	4	3. can never again determine events within a country without cost
	1	4. can never again determine events within a country
		C. Role of Force
Right	14	1. Decreasing overall utility
Right	3	2. Hard to control

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APPENDIX—*Continued*

LEFT/ RIGHT SCALE	NUMBER OF CITATIONS	CATEGORIES
		D. A people (or N.L.F.) wins (or its will cannot be broken) when it fights for a
	20	1. just cause (only)
		2. just cause and has a domestic base
Left	9	a. led by C.P.
Right	15	b. supported by progressive forces within a country
		3. just cause and has international support from
	9	a. socialist forces
	1	b. international working class
Right	27	c. progressive forces abroad
	2	E. Had imperialists won, they would have perpetrated new aggressions elsewhere
Left	13	F. Overall awareness of nature of imperialism
	30	G. Basic superiority of socialism
		H. The will of a people cannot be broken by
	5	1. imperialism
	18	2. any force
	20	I. Cannot turn back history
	14	J. Other
		7. Implications for Vietnam and Indochina
		A. Unification of Vietnam
Left	1	1. Accelerate unification
Right	2	2. Prevent reverse
	23	B. Future Soviet aid forthcoming
	10	C. Other
	11	*8. Other Lessons*

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TILTING TOWARD THANATOS:
America's "Countervailing" Nuclear Strategy

By LOUIS RENÉ BERES

THE Devil in George Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* observes that "Man's heart is in his weapons . . . in the arts of death he outdoes Nature herself . . . when he goes out to slay, he carries a marvel of mechanisms that lets loose at the touch of his finger all the hidden molecular energies. . . ." Since the dawn of the nuclear age in July 1945, these "hidden molecular energies" have brought humankind perilously close to its rendezvous with extinction. Although the United States may still have it within its grasp to prevent such a rendezvous, our leaders continue to refine policies and scenarios of nuclear war-fighting that can only hasten the eventuality of a desolated planet. At present, these leaders behave as if the requirements of stable nuclear deterrence included preparations for "rational" nuclear warfare.[1] In the words of Leon Sloss, who directed this country's nuclear targeting policy review for the Department of Defense in 1978, "The emphasis has shifted from the *survivability* necessary to assure that we can launch a single preplanned strike to the *endurance* necessary to actually fight a war that may extend over some period of time and involve a series of nuclear exchanges."[2]

To understand this shift in emphasis, we must consider the essential elements, assumptions, and historical roots of what has come to be known as the "countervailing" nuclear strategy.[3] Codified in Presidential Directive 59, which was signed on July 25, 1980, and reaffirmed by President Reagan,[4] this strategy represents the latest retreat from the

[1] The extreme advocacy for such preparations can be found in Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory Is Possible," *Foreign Policy*, No. 39 (Summer 1980), 14-27.

[2] Sloss, "Carter's Nuclear Policy: Going From 'MAD' to Worse"? "No: It's Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary, and Aims to Strengthen Deterrence," *Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 1980, p. 3 (emphasis in original).

[3] The countervailing strategy has, it appears, never been strictly defined. The closest we can come to a definition may be found in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1981*:

> For deterrence to operate successfully, our potential adversaries must be convinced that we possess sufficient military force so that if they were to start a course of action which could lead to war, they would be frustrated in their effort to achieve their objective or suffer so much damage that they would gain nothing by their action. . . . The preparation of forces and plans to create such a prospect has come to be referred to as a 'countervailing' strategy (Washington, D.C.: 1980), 65.

[4] Presidential Directive 59 was clarified by Defense Secretary Harold Brown in his "Remarks Delivered at the Convocation Ceremonies for the 97th Naval War College Class," U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, August 20, 1980, p. 6.

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doctrine of "massive retaliation" first defined by John Foster Dulles in January 1954.[5] It endorses a "counterforce" targeting plan that is designed to fulfill military tasks at a level far exceeding the requirements of "mutual assured destruction."[6] No longer satisfied with a policy of "minimum deterrence," the countervailing strategy envisions a broad array of nuclear retaliatory options within a carefully defined "spectrum of deterrence." Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stated that

> deterrence remains, as it has been historically, our fundamental strategic objective. But deterrence must restrain a far wider range of threats than just massive attacks on U.S. cities. We seek to deter any adversary from any course of action that could lead to general nuclear war. Our strategic forces must also deter nuclear attacks on smaller sets of targets in the U.S. or on U.S. military forces, and be a wall against nuclear coercion of, or attack on, our friends and allies. And strategic forces, in conjunction with theater nuclear forces, must contribute to deterrence of conventional aggression as well. . . . In our analysis and planning, we are necessarily giving greater attention to how a nuclear war would actually be fought by both sides if deference fails. There is no contradiction between this focus on how a war would be fought and what its results would be, *and* our purpose of insuring continued peace through mutual deterrence. Indeed, this focus helps us achieve deterrence and peace, by ensuring that our ability to retaliate is fully credible.[7]

In essence, this countervailing strategy, which is the outcome of a fundamental review of American targeting policy ordered by President Carter, stresses the capacity to employ strategic nuclear forces "selectively." Anticipating intermediate levels of Soviet aggression, it was designed to impress on Soviet leaders the fact that the United States has both the will and the means to make such aggression irrational. It does this by operationalizing an incremental policy of strategic response that will allegedly make Soviet leaders less adventurous.

Former Secretary Brown stated on several occasions that this is not an altogether new strategic posture. P.D. 59 codifies a series of doctrinal modifications that have been underway for at least 25 years. In the Secretary's words,

> The U.S. has never had a doctrine based simply and solely on reflexive, massive attacks on Soviet cities. Instead, we have always planned both

[5] See *New York Times*, January 13, 1954, p. 1.

[6] A *counterforce* strategy emphasizes the targeting of an adversary's military capability, especially its strategic military capability. A *countervalue* strategy emphasizes the targeting of an adversary's cities and industries. *Mutual Assured Destruction* (MAD) is a condition wherein each adversary possesses the ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon the other after absorbing a first strike.

[7] See Brown (fn. 4), 6.

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more selectively (options limiting urban-industrial damage) and more comprehensively (a range of military targets). Previous Administrations, going back well into the 1960s, recognized the inadequacy of a strategic doctrine that would give us too narrow a range of options. The fundamental premises of our countervailing strategy are a natural evolution of the conceptual foundations built over the course of a generation by, for example, Secretaries McNamara and Schlesinger, to name only two of my predecessors who have been most identified with the development of our nuclear doctrine.[8]

The basic shape of the countervailing strategy was outlined by Secretary Brown in his Annual Report to the Congress for FY 1981. There he developed the argument that large-scale countervalue attacks may not be appropriate to deter the full range of potential Soviet threats. Faced with what he saw as a need for deterring Soviet attacks of "less than all-out scale," he proposed options to attack Soviet military and political targets while holding back a significant reserve. Such a strategy, he argued, could preclude an intolerable choice between no effective military response and all-out nuclear war. Instead, we could attack "in a selective and measured way, a range of military, industrial, and political control targets, while retaining an assured destruction capacity in reserve."[9]

At first glance, such a strategy may appear sound and prudent. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that a policy of calibrating U.S. nuclear retaliation to the particular provocation does not support the overall objective of strategic deterrence. Indeed, careful scrutiny of the policy's underlying principles reveals that it actually contributes to the fulfillment of our long-prophesied nuclear annihilation because it is founded upon an implausible set of assumptions and upon a misunderstanding of interactive effects.

Implausible Assumptions and Ignored Interactions

First, current strategic nuclear policy rests on the assumption that the Soviets might have something to gain by launching a limited first-strike attack on the United States or its allies. This assumption overlooks the fact that the Soviets do not share our view of controlled nuclear conflict, and that they are apt to doubt our declared commitment to proportionate retaliation. Faced with great uncertainty about the nature of an American strategic response, Soviet leaders considering the costs and benefits of striking first could not rationally calculate on the basis of strategic self-restraint.

[8] *Ibid.*, 7.

[9] See Brown (fn. 3), 66.

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Sidney Drell has testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, that in order to carry out a militarily effective attack against American ICBMs, the Soviets would have to unleash an attack that would bring about approximately 18.3 million American fatalities. Even so extensive a counterforce assault would be far from disabling, since the remaining American ICBMs would still constitute an assuredly destructive retaliatory force.[10] Moreover, Paul C. Warnke, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has stated that

> scenarios for limited strategic exchange between the two countries are inherently implausible. Any Soviet attack that would leave untouched the majority of our strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would be an act of insane provocation. To have even a theoretical chance of taking out our more than 1,000 land-based ICBMs, the Soviets would have to launch 2,000 to 3,000 accurate warheads of high yield. This could hardly be described as a limited nuclear war. It would deserve and would receive at least an equally massive response.[11]

Second, current strategic nuclear policy is founded on the idea that the Soviets are more likely to be deterred by the threat of limited American counterforce reprisals than by the threat of overwhelming, total retaliation. What this idea ignores, however, is the Soviets' stated unwillingness to play by American rules. Since the Soviet Union continues to threaten this country with all-out nuclear war once the nuclear threshold has been crossed, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to selective counterforce strikes must be very doubtful. Once again, the asymmetry in strategic doctrine between the superpowers impairs the reasonableness of America's countervailing strategy.

Moscow's viewpoint has repeatedly been voiced in Soviet sources of military doctrine and strategy.[12] Bernard Brodie observed in 1959, "Soviet commentary on the limited-war thinking emanating from the West has thus far been uniformly hostile and derisive. Especially derided has been the thought that wars might remain limited while being fought with atomic weapons."[13] More recently, Sovietologist Richard

[10] See Drell's testimony, "Possible Effects on U.S. Society of Nuclear Attacks Against U.S. Military Installations," U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1975), 21.

[11] Warnke, "Carter's Nuclear Policy: Going From 'MAD' to Worse"? "Yes: The Revision of U.S. Strategy Implies a Belief in Limited War," *Los Angeles Times*, August 31, 1980, p. 3.

[12] See, for example, an early article by Colonel V. Mochalov and Major V. Dashichev, "The Smoke Screen of the American Imperialists," *Red Star* (December 17, 1957).

[13] Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 322n.

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Pipes has characterized the position of Soviet leaders: "In the Soviet view, a nuclear war would be total. . . . Limited nuclear war, flexible response, escalation, damage limiting, and all the other numerous refinements of U.S. strategic doctrine find no place in its Soviet counterpart. . . ."[14]

Any remaining doubts about Soviet rejection of the doctrine of limited nuclear war is dispelled by recent writings of Soviet generals. For example, according to General-Major R. Simonyan, an important strategic planner, "the experience of numerous wars attests most clearly to the fact that military conflagrations have hardly ever been successfully kept within their original bounds."[15] Moreover,

> the assertion made by supporters of "limited" nuclear war that it could be kept within pre-planned limits and made "controllable" is altogether false. Every clear-headed person knows that any war unleashed by an aggressor and involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons—even if those weapons were used in limited numbers and against "selected targets"—is fraught with the genuine threat of escalation and development into a strategic (universal) nuclear war with all its fatal consequences.[16]

Third, the countervailing strategy of deterrence is based upon a confusion of the requirement of survivable nuclear forces with the doctrine of employment of counterforce targeting. Although it is clear that a survivable and enduring strategic retaliatory capability is essential to stable deterrence, a provocative targeting doctrine is not only unessential, it is counterproductive. Of course, the Department of Defense and other supporters of the countervailing strategy argue that there can be no reason for making Soviet military targets safe from U.S. ICBMs when comparable targets in this country are at risk from Soviet ICBMs. But this argument is based entirely on the logic of imitation; it does not examine whether the prospective benefits of such a policy actually outweigh the prospective costs. Indeed, considered together with the fact that the United States has not ratified SALT II, the continuing reliance on a policy of nuclear first use, the program to improve long-range theater nuclear forces, and the renewed commitments to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Civil Defense, the American intention to place a large percentage of Soviet strategic forces in jeopardy provides the U.S.S.R. with a heightened incentive to strike first.

[14] Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 30.

[15] Simonyan, "Comments," *Strategic Review*, v (Spring 1977), 100.

[16] *Ibid.*, 107. This view is corroborated by recent remarks of Lieut. General Mikhail A. Milshtein, Director of the Political-Military Department of the Institute on the United States and Canada. See "Limited Nuclear War: The Moscow Approach," *New York Times*, December 7, 1980, p. 8.

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We should not be surprised, therefore, when Soviet spokesmen continue to characterize the countervailing strategy as a move toward an eventual American first strike.[17] In assessing this opinion one cannot ignore the fact that a second-strike counterforce strategy is largely a contradiction in terms. A counterforce capability is likely to serve only the country that strikes first. Used in retaliation, counterforce-targeted warheads would only hit empty silos.

Moreover, what is our purpose in placing Soviet military and civilian leaders in particular jeopardy? Is it, as one strategic analyst has suggested, "to destroy the ability of the Soviet leadership to continue to exercise political control over its domestic and 'colonial' territory—either by killing the leadership itself, making it impossible for the leadership to communicate with its subordinates, or destroying the means (people and facilities) by which the leadership's orders are carried out"?[18] If this *is* the purpose, then it is clearly contrary to the essential rationale of a countervailing nuclear strategy: that is, preserving the prospects for limited, controlled nuclear conflict. Indeed, in view of the United States' current inability to support its countervailing strategy with advanced weapons systems,[19] the personal targeting of Soviet leaders actually increases the likelihood of a Soviet first strike in the near term.

But, we must ask, what about the Soviets? Aren't *their* current deployments and capabilities provocative and destabilizing? Aren't *they* continuing to strive for nuclear superiority that is oriented toward a "win the war" potential and augmented by a far-reaching civil defense effort? Consider the following:

—Soviet missile submarine development continues to be geared to the potential for an effective SLBM attack on American bombers.
—Soviet land-based ICBMs, through continued improvements in missile accuracy, MIRVing, and increased throw-weights, are being geared to a hard target counterforce capability which may effectively threaten America's ICBM force.
—Soviet ASW forces, through the continuing proliferation of platforms and the steady improvement of sensor technology, are being geared to the capability to destroy America's SLBM force.

[17] See, for example, "Soviet Charges Reiterated," *New York Times*, August 21, 1980, p. A8.
[18] Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," *Comparative Strategy*, 11 (No. 2, 1980), 226-27.
[19] See, for example, the concerns of CINCSAC General Richard Ellis, in Drew Middleton, "SAC Chief is Critical of Carter's New Nuclear Plan," *New York Times*, September 7, 1980, p. 19.

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The evidence is hardly encouraging. The steady growth of Soviet military power has fostered legitimate questions concerning Soviet strategic objectives. It may even be true, as the so-called "Team B" appraisal of 1976 concluded, that Moscow's buildup stems from patently aggressive designs. But it is *not* true, even if our "worst-case" assumptions are correct, that American security is best served by acting in an equally provocative or more provocative manner.

In developing a long-term defense program vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration should be guided exclusively by a meticulous comparison of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Such a comparison must take careful note of expected Soviet reactions to American military developments and of the long-range *cumulative effects* of these developments. It would make precious little sense, for example, to substantially increase funding for BMD research and development if the Soviets could be expected to offset the ICBM survivability benefits with a refined offensive strategic capability.

Improving the survivability of the U.S. strategic triad must continue to be an overriding goal of this country's defense posture. But it is by no means clear that this goal will be best served by the mobile, deceptive basing mode of the planned MX system. Again, Soviet countermoves must be anticipated, especially if the future of SALT is in doubt. And it is altogether likely that the search for an associated hard-target kill capacity will do more to undermine deterrence than to provide safety. The fact that the Soviets are already engaged in such a search in in no way supports the rationality of American imitation.

A similar argument may be made concerning renewed American interest in civil defense. If the Reagan Administration's call for funding to implement a "crisis relocation capability" (CRC) were to be subjected to careful scrutiny in terms of expected costs and benefits, it would be revealed as immensely impractical and needlessly provocative. Rather than strengthen deterrence by demonstrating U.S. preparedness (a demonstration that the Soviets no longer seem to need), plans for crisis relocation may underscore Soviet fears of an American first strike. Indeed, even if large-scale civilian evacuation plans were workable, and if a government-directed civilian exodus several days before a nuclear war would not degenerate into chaos, a Soviet nuclear attack could still doom virtually every American.[20]

[20] In this connection, one need only consider the *Proceedings* of a recent conference on "The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War," under the auspices of Physicians for Social Responsibility, Inc., sponsored by the Harvard Medical School and the Tufts University School of Medicine, Cambridge, Mass., February 9 and 10, 1980.

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Fourth, current U.S. strategic nuclear policy completely disregards this country's legal commitments to halt proliferation. According to the terms of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the superpowers are obligated to move expeditiously toward meaningful arms control and disarmament. Article VI of the Treaty stipulates:

> Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In the absence of Soviet and American compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty, it is hard to imagine that non-nuclear-weapons states will continue to bear their restricted condition much longer. Should the United States proceed with its countervailing nuclear strategy, the consequent search for supporting strategic weapons systems would preclude any Soviet-American SALT accord. The resultant spread of nuclear-weapons states would not only create new opportunities for nuclear conflict, but would also heighten the probability of a Soviet-American nuclear war. That is the case because of the increased likelihood of catalytic war (provoked by one or more of the new nuclear powers), of war between new nuclear powers with alliance or interest ties to the superpowers, and of nuclear terrorism.

Fifth, the countervailing strategy of deterrence contributes to the dangerous notion that nuclear war might somehow be endured or even "won." We now have a great deal of scientific and medical evidence to support the conclusion that any nuclear war would have intolerable consequences. One of the first scientists to consider the probable effects of a nuclear attack on the United States was Tom Stonier, a biologist.

> Even before the threat of fallout radiation completely subsided, the country could be thrown into a state of economic and social chaos—including serious outbreaks of famine and disease—and the ensuing shock, loss of morale, and weakened leadership would further hamper relief operations and impede rehabilitation. The effects of this disruption could persist for decades, just as would the somatic damage inflicted on people exposed to radiation. Even individuals who escape the hazards of the explosion and who are themselves uninjured by radiation might carry a legacy of genetic damage, which they would then pass from generation to generation. Perhaps most uncertain, and potentially most disastrous, are the ecological consequences, the imbalances in nature itself, which might well create the preconditions for the disappearance of American civilization as we know it.[21]

[21] Stonier, *Nuclear Disaster* (New York: Meridian, 1964), 24.

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Perhaps the most comprehensive and best-known of the recent studies is the 1975 National Academy of Sciences report, *Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations*. According to Philip Handler, President of the Academy, it takes as its point of departure

> a horrendous calamity: a hypothetical exchange involving the detonation of many nuclear weapons. In the worst case considered, about one half of all nuclear weapons in current strategic arsenals, viz., 500 to 1000 weapons of yield 10 to 20 megatons each and 4000 to 5000 lesser [sic] weapons with yields of 1 or 2 megatons each, i.e., a total of 10^4 megatons (10,000,000,000 tons) of TNT-equivalent are exchanged among the participants. No report can portray the enormity, the utter horror which must befall the targeted areas and adjoining territories. Nor does this report so attempt.[22]

What the report does attempt to portray are the long-term, worldwide effects following the exchange of 10,000 megatons of explosive power in the northern hemisphere, in a plausible mix of low- and high-yield weapons, and at a variety of altitudes of detonation. Merely acknowledging the "unimaginable holocaust" that would occur in the primarily afflicted countries, the report confines its attention to possible long-term effects on more distant populations and ecosystems, with special reference to the atmosphere and climate, natural terrestrial ecosystems, agriculture and animal husbandry, the aquatic environment, and both somatic and genetic effects upon humans.[23]

Although the report concludes that the biosphere and the species *Homo sapiens* would survive the hypothetical strategic exchange,[24] it recognizes that humankind's civilization might not survive such catastrophic insult. This conclusion has nothing to do with the probable social, political, or economic consequences of the hypothesized nuclear

[22] From Handler's letter of transmittal (August 12, 1975), of the report, *Long-Term-Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations*, National Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: 1975).

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] This point, made by Handler in his letter of transmittal of the report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), is by no means uncontroversial. In fact, in the belief that it is an "overstated conclusion," the Federation of American Scientists issued a public declaration that effectively accused the NAS of inadvertently encouraging nuclear war. The Federation, whose membership includes half of America's living Nobel laureates, charged that the Academy had reached a "false conclusion" in suggesting humankind's probable survival. The Federation's statement was prepared by Jeremy Stone, the organization's director, and was approved by a majority of the organization's executive committee. The FAS position is supported by Bernard Feld, Editor-in-Chief of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, who believes that the NAS conclusion concerning the survival of the human race is "too sanguine." See Feld, "The Consequences of Nuclear War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXXII (June 1976), 13.

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exchange (the report deliberately does not address these consequences, which it describes as "entirely unpredictable" effects of "worldwide terror"), but only with the interrelated physical and biological aspects of such a calamity. These aspects include possible temperature changes in either direction, and of different magnitudes; possible major global climatic changes; contamination of foods by radio-nuclides; possible worldwide disease epidemics in crops and domesticated animals because of ionizing radiation; possible shortening of the growing seasons in certain areas; possible irreversible injury to sensitive aquatic species; possible long-term carcinogenesis due to inhalation of plutonium particles; some radiation-induced developmental anomalies in persons *in utero* at the time of detonations; possible increase in the incidence of skin cancer of about 10 percent, which could increase by as much as a factor of 3 if ozone depletion were to rise from 50 to 70 percent; severe sunburn in temperate zones and snow blindness in northern regions in the short term; and an increased incidence of genetic disease that would not be limited to the offspring of the exposed generation, but would extend over many generations.

Predictions of the worldwide consequences of all-out nuclear war between the superpowers are fraught with uncertainty. With this in mind, the participants in the six separate committees that produced the NAS report caution their readers about the limitations of the data upon which their conclusions rest. It would be prudent, therefore, to recognize that the effects expected by the NAS scholars might be only the "tip of the iceberg"—that other, perhaps more significant effects would accompany the exchange. The plausibility of such recognition is underscored by the fact that the magnitude of the war postulated in the report may be much too low. If the superpowers were to exchange between 50,000 and 100,000 megatons of nuclear explosives rather than the 10,000 megatons assumed by the report, global climatological changes would imperil the very survival of humankind. Bernard Feld maintains that

> it is becoming frighteningly plausible to consider the level of nuclear war that would represent the end of humankind: the detonation of one million megatons of nuclear explosives (which may be defined as one "Beach")[25] would result in a global irradiation of around 500 rad.[26] It is very difficult in the present anarchic world, to be sanguine about the fact that we are now about one-tenth of the way toward the possibility

[25] The term "Beach" is taken from Nevil Shute's work of fiction on the aftermath of systemwide nuclear war, *On The Beach* (New York: William Morrow, 1957).

[26] A "rad" is a unit of radiation dose that measures the amount of ionization produced per unit volume by the particles from radioactive decay.

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of this ultimate insult (used also in its medical sense) that would certainly spell the end of humankind on planet Earth.[27]

A second reason why the predicted effects of nuclear war between the superpowers are uncertain lies in the unknown interactions between individual effects:

> In attempting to project the after-effects of a major nuclear war, we have considered separately the various kinds of damage that could occur. It is also quite possible, however, that interactions might take place among these effects, so that one type of damage would couple with another to produce new and unexpected hazards. For example, we can assess individually the consequences of heavy worldwide radiation fallout and increased solar ultraviolet, but we do not know whether the two acting together might significantly increase human, animal, or plant susceptibility to disease. We can conclude that massive dust injection into the stratosphere, even greater in scale than Krakatoa, is unlikely by itself to produce significant climatic and environmental change, but we cannot rule out interactions with other phenomena, such as ozone depletion, which might produce utterly unexpected results. We have come to realize that nuclear weapons can be as unpredictable as they are deadly in their effects. Despite some 30 years of development and study, there is still much that we do not know. This is particularly true when we consider the global effects of a large-scale nuclear war.[28]

Perhaps the most recent authoritative study of the consequences of nuclear war has been offered in response to a request from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for an examination of the effects of nuclear war on the populations and economies of the United States and the Soviet Union. This assessment examines the full range of consequences that nuclear war would have on civilians. In the Foreword, Daniel De Simone, Acting Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, states:

> Two of the study's principal findings are that conditions would continue to get worse for some time after a nuclear war ended, and that the effects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated in advance are at least as important as those which analysts attempt to quantify.[29]

The introduction to the Executive Summary goes on to say:

> Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject. Throughout all the variations, possibilities, and uncertainties that this study describes, one theme is

[27] Feld (fn. 24), 13.

[28] From a skillful summary of this point, in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Worldwide Effects of Nuclear War. . . . Some Perspectives* (n.d., but produced after the 1975 NAS report), 23-24.

[29] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *The Effects of Nuclear War* (Washington, D.C.: May 1979), iii.

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> constant—a nuclear war would be a catastrophe. A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even "limited," could be expected to kill people and to inflict economic damage on a scale unprecedented in American experience: a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a calamity unprecedented in human history. The mind recoils from the effort to foresee the details of such a calamity, and from the careful explanation of the unavoidable uncertainties as to whether people would die from blast damage, from fallout radiation, or from starvation during the following winter.[30]

The Executive Summary also describes the effects of "limited" nuclear exchanges as "enormous." The O.T.A. examined the impact of a "small" attack on economic targets, and found that, "while economic recovery would be possible, the economic damage and social dislocation could be immense." The report continues:

> A review of calculations of the effects on civilian populations and economies of major counterforce attacks found that while the consequences might be endurable (since they would be on a scale with wars and epidemics that nations have endured in the past), the number of deaths might be as high as 20 million. Moreover, the uncertainties are such that no government could predict with any confidence what the results of a limited attack or counterattack would be even if there was no further escalation.[31]

Even these conclusions may be misleading since they stem from the assumed plausibility of *limited* nuclear exchanges. As we have already seen, there is no reason to believe that Soviet objectives would be served by a limited first strike on the United States. Although the Soviet Union would be able to detonate a small number of nuclear weapons over isolated areas in the United States without producing catastrophic effects, there would clearly be no reason for carrying out this type of attack. On the contrary, it would be manifestly irrational.

It is clear, therefore, that the United States has developed a counterforce doctrine which not only understates the potential effects of a limited nuclear war but which also ignores the fact that such a war makes no military sense. There is no clear picture as to what the Soviet Union might gain from the kinds of limited counterforce attacks posited by

[30] *Ibid.*, 3. For additional authoritative information on the expected effects of nuclear war, see "The First Nuclear War Conference," Washington, D.C., December 7, 1978, published as a special report of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*; "An Open Letter to President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev," Physicians for Social Responsibility, *Newsletter*, 1 (April 1980), 1; *Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Attacks on the United States*, a study prepared for The Joint Committee on Defense Production, U.S. Congress, 1979; Kevin N. Lewis, "The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War," *Scientific American*, Vol. 241 (July 1979), 35-47; and Louis René Beres, *Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[31] *Effects of Nuclear War* (fn. 29), 4.

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current American strategic nuclear policy. Indeed, the same American strategic nuclear policy that assumes the Soviets will cooperate in limiting nuclear war advances the contradictory premise that the U.S.S.R. is preparing to *fight and win* a nuclear war. As a result, current U.S. policy has become increasingly committed to the idea that credible deterrence requires the projection of a parallel capacity to fight and win a nuclear war—an idea that is contrary to the assumption of a limited Soviet first strike.

Apart from these contradictory assumptions of current American strategic nuclear policy, the developing emphasis on a "win-the-war" concept of deterrence is inherently destabilizing. There is no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union can be effectively deterred only by the prospect of complete annihilation—i.e., by the predictable outcome of a no-holds-barred nuclear war. In their assessment of the expected consequences of striking first, Soviet leaders are not likely to calculate that the absorption of a less-than-total American nuclear retaliation would fall within "acceptable" levels. Given the prevailing definition of rationality in world politics, they would make such a calculation only in the expectation of an American first strike. Ironically, that expectation is encouraged rather than diminished by the American search for enhanced deterrence through a capacity for nuclear war-fighting.

Sixth and last, America's countervailing nuclear strategy sustains the myth that peace through nuclear deterrence is capable of working for an indefinite period. At one time or another, in one way or another, the manifestly catastrophic possibilities that now lie latent in nuclear weapons are almost certain to be exploited, either by design or by accident, by misinformation or miscalculation, by lapse from rational decision making or by unauthorized decision.

Despite the successful workings of nuclear deterrence thus far ("successful" being defined in the most limited sense: preventing nuclear war),[32] a nuclear war between the superpowers could come to pass in several ways. It might come about inadvertently through the outcome of competition in risk taking. It might begin through the seizure of nuclear weapons by allied countries. It might be provoked by a smaller power (catalytic war) or by war between smaller powers. It might take place as a result of false warnings. Or it might take place because of

[32] Where the workings of nuclear deterrence are considered more broadly in terms of effects on day-to-day life under the threat of nuclear annihilation, they can hardly be termed "successful." For more on these broader considerations, see, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bomb, Dread, and Eternity," *International Security*, v (Fall 1980), 3-23.

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errors in calculating the outcomes of various anticipated courses of action. It might even take place as a consequence of irrationality, through use by unauthorized personnel, or by mechanical/electrical/computer malfunction.

The probability of nuclear war between smaller nuclear powers, or between smaller nuclear powers and one or both of the superpowers, is underscored by the deployment of nuclear weapons to allied countries and by the proliferation of states possessing assembled nuclear weapons or the technology from which these weapons might be manufactured. In the years ahead, the likelihood of a nuclear war that involves "secondary" nuclear powers is apt to be high—not only because of the increasing number of nuclear-weapon states and the corresponding multiplication of existing risks, but also because these risks are certain to be intensified in a milieu of nuclear proliferation.

Creating an Improved Nuclear Regime

AROUSING WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS

Nietzsche, in the long critique of faith in his *AntiChrist*, wrote: "'Faith' means not *wanting* to know what is true." Understood in terms of humankind's continuing obliviousness to its tendencies toward self-destruction, Nietzsche's point suggests not only cowardice, but also an irreversible tilt toward *thanatos*, toward collective disintegration. Unless we begin to act upon the recognition of our current nuclear collision course, there is little hope that humankind can escape the fate toward which it is headed at the present.

Spasmodic instances of awareness are not enough. If we are to prevent a nuclear confrontation, we must immediately begin to contemplate the monstrous wreckage of moral, spiritual, and physical being that would descend in the wake of nuclear war.

The general public throughout the world must experience an aroused consciousness of the threat. Rather than continue to be lulled by officially sanctioned pronouncements about the tolerability of nuclear war, it must begin to confront the image of total extinction. The darkly visionary accounts of life after a nuclear catastrophe must be heeded. In order to return to a safer course, we must learn to understand that the growing number of formulations of a livable post-apocalypse world are totally unrealistic.

PROMOTING WORLD ORDER

A far-reaching and feasible agenda for long-term security must be created. Such an agenda must aim at removing incentives for states to

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acquire, enlarge, or "refine" nuclear forces. These incentives include presumed advantages in terms of strategic deterrence as well as of heightened domestic political support and power over other states.

To develop such an agenda, we require a strengthened regime of international treaties directed at nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament, as well as a generalized renunciation of the time-dishonored principles of *Realpolitik*. A durable system of global security from nuclear war demands not only the customary restraints under international law, but also a drastic transformation of foreign policy processes. In this connection, the United States has a rare opportunity: it can set an example for other states, by considering cooperation in the world interest to be in its own national interest. Fanciful as such a proposal must appear, it is eminently more realistic than a continuation along the present collision course.

How might this proposal be implemented? The answer lies in several interrelated directions. Most obvious, perhaps, is the need for a bilateral retreat of the superpowers from their growing acceptance of counterforce principles, and for a return to the relatively sane strategy of "minimum deterrence." To make such a retreat possible, the Soviet Union and the United States would have to cooperate in the establishment of a more harmonious style of interaction. This would mean, at a minimum, prompt movement toward a new SALT accord; a joint reversal of current trends toward increased military spending; and a joint commitment to the principles of additional arms control and (ultimately) to the jointly planned obsolescence of existing stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons.

The move toward minimum deterrence should be augmented by the implementation of the long-sought comprehensive test ban (CTB) and by a joint renunciation of the right to "first use" of nuclear weapons.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Although we have the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, only a comprehensive test ban can genuinely inhibit further innovations in nuclear weapons. A CTB was first outlined in the late 1950s; its provisions should be agreed upon by all nuclear-weapon states and by the largest possible number of non-nuclear-weapon states. Even if France and China initially chose to remain outside such an agreement (neither France nor China has yet ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963), a CTB's prospective benefits would be significant

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enough to warrant endorsement. Understood in terms of the superpowers' responsibility to make the avoidance of a nuclear war credible in a world of self-assertive states, a CTB could offer a significant starting point for wider imitation and reciprocity.

At the moment, both superpowers continue to be on record in favor of a comprehensive test ban. Former President Carter made such a ban one of the primary objectives of his program for arms control and disarmament. Recognizing the convergence of this country's essential security interests with its legal obligations under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, the former President first announced his commitment to a CTB before the United Nations on March 17, 1977; on October 4, 1977, he told the General Assembly: "The time has come to end all explosions of nuclear devices, no matter what their claimed justification, peaceful or military." In that same month, formal negotiations between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were begun in Geneva on the subject of a comprehensive test ban, and on May 20, 1978, Mr. Carter signed Presidential Decision Memorandum 38, calling for a five-year "zero yield" comprehensive test ban.

In view of the understanding that a CTB would impose an important qualitative restraint on nuclear arms competition, every President since John F. Kennedy has supported a comprehensive test ban treaty that would be verifiable. Nevertheless, although mutual cessation of nuclear testing would contribute significantly to U.S. security by constraining the modernization of Soviet nuclear forces, the Reagan Administration seems ready to abandon the long search for a CTB. This departure from the policies of previous administrations seems to flow from an assumed American inability to detect and positively identify clandestine, low-level Soviet underground nuclear tests by national technical means (seismic and satellite monitoring). Apprehensive that the U.S.S.R. would maintain its nuclear weapons technology base through clandestine testing while the U.S. complied with a test ban, President Reagan fears that a long-term asymmetry in superpower nuclear weapons programs would develop.

There is, however, considerable evidence that such concerns are ill-founded. Virtually all of this country's scientific community now agrees that seismological instruments can identify any nuclear explosion of 10 kilotons or greater. Many scientists argue that these instruments can identify an explosion with as small a yield as one or two kilotons.[33] Such seismological sophistication, together with the current

[33] Dan Caldwell, "CTB: An Effective SALT Substitute," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXXVI (December 1980), 30.

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state of satellite reconnaissance and the August 1980 agreement in principle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain for verifying a comprehensive test ban, would seem to support arguments for a CTB treaty. The validity of this position is corroborated further by Soviet willingness to accept verification measures that include on-site inspections as well as satellite and seismic technologies.

These arguments do not seem compelling, however, to the Reagan Administration, which appears convinced of the Soviet Union's deceptive intentions and of the enduring wisdom of *Realpolitik*. The ongoing reformulation of national security policy suggests widespread rejection of the principles of a CTB. In addition to doubting that the U.S. ability to detect and positively identify clandestine, low-level Soviet underground nuclear tests is adequate,[34] the Reagan Administration is concerned that the Soviets will continue with peaceful nuclear explosions.

Secretary Brezhnev has announced the Soviet Union's willingness to accept a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions in conjunction with a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests, but he has tied this moratorium to a fixed period of time and to a series of continuing negotiations on the issue. The Reagan Administration, disturbed by an alleged Soviet breach of the understanding on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty and by the realization that peaceful nuclear explosions can be used for military testing, seems unprepared to accept these terms.

NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE

The United States and the Soviet Union should take immediate steps to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, i.e., the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in reprisal for non-nuclear attack. At present, both countries reserve the right of first use, although American interest in continuing this right seems to be greater than that of the Soviets. This greater commitment to first use stems from U.S. fears that its conventional forces may be inferior in vital theaters of possible engagement. Faced with growing Soviet military strength, the United States continues to base its deterrence strategy on what it believes to be appropriate responses drawn from a range of available options. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has stated that

> it continues to be U.S. policy that we will resist attacks on the United States and its allies by whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. We have made no secret of our view that conventional forces are an essential component of the collective deterrent, and that any con-

[34] See, for example, Heritage Foundation, "Developing Arms Control Priorities in 1981," *National Security Record*, No. 29 (January 1981), 2.

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> ventional aggression should be met initially by conventional means. We also recognize that nuclear decisions—and especially collective nuclear decisions—would be difficult and could be time-consuming, which makes strong non-nuclear capabilities all the more important. But the United States remains determined to do whatever is required to prevent the defeat of its own and allied forces. Our strategic and theater nuclear forces serve as the ultimate backup to our NATO commitments. Not only do they provide the means to strike NATO-related targets; they also dramatize to a potential attacker that any conventional attack could set off a chain of nuclear escalation, the consequences of which would be incalculable.[35]

But why, we might ask, should the American policy of first use appear threatening to the Soviets? After all, it has always been the official policy of the United States not to launch a first strike, i.e., a nuclear strike as an initial, offensive move of war. Is there anything provocative to a nuclear strategy that does not exclude the *retaliatory* use of nuclear weapons to stave off defeat in a conventional conflict?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that, in actual practice, the distinctions between the "first use" of nuclear weapons and a nuclear "first strike" are likely to be meaningless. Once an adversary had committed an act of aggression, the United States would certainly characterize an intended nuclear response as a "first use" rather than as a "first strike." Since the determination that an act of aggression had taken place would necessarily be made by the United States rather than by some specially constituted central arbiter, certain acts that are judged to be aggressive by the United States might be expected to warrant an American nuclear response.

But doesn't the arbitrariness of the distinction between first use and first strike apply equally to the Soviet strategy of first use? Isn't that strategy as threatening to us as ours is to them? The answer to this question, I believe, is clearly "no," since the asymmetry in conventional forces between the two superpowers provides the Soviet Union with little real incentive to initiate an escalation to nuclear conflict.

Together with the consequences of U.S. inferiority in conventional forces, the American policy of first use is especially unsettling to the Soviet Union since it (1) allows for rapid escalation to nuclear conflict; (2) allows for the possibility of disguising a first strike as a first use, either by deliberately creating conditions that lead to "acts of aggression" or by falsely alleging that such acts have taken place; and (3) joins with a targeting doctrine that focuses on Soviet strategic forces.

[35] Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1979*, (Washington, D.C.: February 2, 1978), 68.

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Hence, the American policy of first use offers incentives to the Soviet Union to undertake a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States. Moreover, this policy creates incentives for *other* nuclear powers to adopt "hair trigger" strategies for protection against possible pre-emptive strikes. These risks are incurred by the United States with little real benefit in terms of deterrence, since any American nuclear retaliation would almost certainly draw a Soviet nuclear response. In view of the enormously high probability of Soviet nuclear counter-retaliation and the terrible destruction that would be visited upon allies "in order to save them," Soviet strategists must entertain grave doubts about U.S. willingness to use theater nuclear forces, in Europe or in any other theater of possible confrontation. Indeed, in the aftermath of an overwhelming conventional assault by the U.S.S.R. against American allies, it might conceivably appear to be rational for the U.S. national command authority to bypass theater nuclear forces altogether, urging instead the immediate resort to a strategic strike.

With these facts in mind, it should be clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union would stand to gain from a joint renunciation of the first-use option. To allow for such a renunciation, the United States must move toward abandonment of the neutron bomb, discontinue NATO plans for the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, redeploy theater nuclear forces away from frontiers, and—ultimately—remove these forces altogether. These steps, of course, must be accompanied by serious efforts to strengthen American and allied conventional forces in order to preserve a sufficiently high nuclear threshold. However expensive and politically unattractive such efforts may be, their long-term security benefits would surely be worthwhile.

There is growing evidence that the Reagan Administration has already begun to fashion a military strategy that would create huge investments in weapons, ammunition, transport, equipment, and supplies, as well as a vast mobilization of manpower and a revitalization of the defense industry.[36] Although this strategy appears to be founded on the presumed plausibility of protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union (a dangerous presumption since it would underestimate the escalatory potential and reduce inhibitions about confrontations between the superpowers), it may have the stabilizing effect of diminishing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and of decoupling nuclear and conventional war. Ultimately, however, that effect will con-

[36] Richard Halloran, "U.S. Said to Revise Strategy to Oppose Threats by Soviet," *New York Times*, April 19, 1981, p. 1.

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tribute to severing the connection between non-nuclear and nuclear warfare only if it is followed by an explicit rejection of the longstanding reliance on theater nuclear deterrence.

For its part, the Soviet Union should parallel American nuclear concessions by accepting far-reaching curbs on its growing capability to deliver theater nuclear weapons. Warsaw Pact forces are currently equipped with tactical nuclear delivery systems, and Moscow has deployed, in the Soviet Union itself, even longer-range systems, with a theater attack capability. These peripheral attack systems include light and medium bombers, the large MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) and IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) force being modernized with mobile SS-20 MIRVed missiles, and submarine and surface ships armed with ballistic and cruise missiles. In pursuit of an overall plan to achieve the equalization of conventional forces in the European theater, the Soviet Union should agree to substantial reductions of Warsaw Pact ground manpower and tank forces.

Although initiatives toward no-first-use appear risky, they are considerably less dangerous than continuing on the present course. Current United States strategic policy heightens the chances for nuclear war—without providing credible deterrence against Soviet conventional attack. The supposedly "tough-minded" argument that increased Soviet adventurism and offensive strategic policy need to be countered by a parallel American response is devoid of logical consistency. Understood in terms of careful cost/benefit calculations instead of the inflamed rhetoric of political oratory, American self-interest points unambiguously to taking the initiative of implementing a no-first-use pledge. Only through such an initiative can the United States hope for a reduction in Soviet conventional and theater nuclear forces and for a reciprocal abandonment of the first-use option by the Soviet Union.

Once agreement on no-first-use has been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, steps should be taken to extend the principles of this agreement to non-nuclear weapons states. Unfortunately, such an extension would have relatively limited credibility, since there would be no concrete set of denuclearization policies to support a commitment by nuclear-weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states. Moreover, a no-first-use pledge to non-nuclear weapons states would do nothing to allay the fears of these states concerning the nuclear intentions of non-nuclear adversary states. Therefore, in the absence of assurances that its own compliance with nonproliferation norms would be paralleled by the compliance of non-

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nuclear adversary states, each non-nuclear weapons state may calculate that the benefits of "going nuclear" would outweigh the costs.

The central problem of extending the protection of no-first-use to non-nuclear-weapons states is not the absence of pertinent declarations or pledges, but the uncertainty of every such state about the intentions of some other states. Although little can be done to relieve this uncertainty as far as it refers to the nuclear-weapons states, some steps can be taken concerning states without nuclear weapons, starting with a cooperative effort by the current nuclear-weapons states and nuclear-supplier states toward the goal of nonproliferation.

To be effective, this effort must be directed at controlling a large number of independent national wills. Such control is an example of the general problem of decision that arises when the benefits of common action are contingent upon the expectation that certain other parties will cooperate. The essential dynamics of this problem were described by Machiavelli:

> The world is a stupendous machine, composed of innumerable parts, each of which being a free agent, has a volition and action of its own; and on this ground arises the difficulty of assuring success in any enterprise depending on the volition of numerous agents. We may set the machine in motion, and dispose every wheel to one certain end; but when it depends on the volition of any one wheel, and the correspondent action of every wheel, the result is uncertain.[37]

In Machiavelli's metaphor, the "enterprise" for which success is sought may be taken to represent nonproliferation; the "parts" of the machine are the non-nuclear-weapons states. Understood in such terms, the metaphor suggests that nonproliferation efforts will remain in doubt as long as they depend upon voluntary compliance by states that expect reciprocal compliance by certain other states. To remove this uncertainty, the current nuclear-weapons and nuclear-supplier states must move deliberately and cooperatively to control the spread of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technologies.[38]

We live at an interface between enduring peace and global destruction. Instead of merely fine-tuning the futile scenarios of strategic bargaining games, the foregoing alternatives to a countervailing nuclear strategy offer hope for a genuinely auspicious nuclear regime. Recognizing the total disutility of a nuclear threat system, this network of

[37] From *The Discourses*.

[38] For a detailed examination of what is needed to achieve such control, see Beres (fn. 30).

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obligations and doctrines is shaped by a new calculus of potentiality—a calculus that rejects current strategic thinking in favor of a new world politics. Without such a calculus, we are likely to experience the moment that prompted J. Robert Oppenheimer, upon witnessing the first atomic bomb explosion in July 1945, to recall a passage from the *Bhagavad-Gita*: "I am become Death, the Shatterer of Worlds."

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Research Note

THE EMERGING IMAGE OF U.N. POLITICS

By WILLIAM J. DIXON*

DESPITE a quarter century of systematic inquiry, our knowledge of the United Nations remains fragmentary, incomplete, and lacking in the coherence necessary for conceptual integration.[1] It might be argued that these difficulties stem from the fluid and variegated nature of the institution itself: the U.N. is not one thing but many, and is quite amenable to diverse substantive foci and theoretical vantage points. Yet a careful examination of the research literature reveals a surprisingly homogeneous image of the U.N. as little more than a passive arena for the political interaction of member states. Not only does such a narrow perspective hinder our collective understanding of the organization, but it may also have some bearing on how this multifaceted institution is interpreted and put to use by national policymakers. In this note, we will consider some of the alternative images available to researchers, and then examine the range of images represented in the empirical literature.

U.N. Research: An Overview

The number of published research studies on the United Nations has remained relatively stable in recent years, possibly signaling an end to the rapid increase in behavioral U.N. research that marked the 1960s.[2] In a survey of 8 professional journals published between 1970 and 1977

* The author would like to thank Chadwick Alger and Janice Love for their encouragement and comments on an earlier version of this paper delivered at the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 1978, under the title "Problems of Empirical Research on United Nations Activities."

[1] This conclusion is reached independently in two reviews not included in the present survey: Robert E. Riggs and others, "Behavioralism in the Study of the United Nations," *World Politics*, XXII (January 1970), 197-236, and Hanna Newcombe, "National Patterns in International Organizations," *Peace Research Reviews*, VI (November 1975).

[2] This increase is documented in the study prepared by Riggs and his associates (fn. 1). It should be noted, however, that the research literature examined here is not directly comparable to the behavioral work surveyed by Riggs. His definition of "behavioralism" encompassed research proposals and purely theoretical studies, both of which are excluded from our review of data-based research.

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we found 41 rigorous empirical studies of the U.N. or related organizations. Not surprisingly, the journal containing the bulk of these studies—almost half—was *International Organization*. The remaining international relations and political science journals carried an average of three articles during the eight-year period.

To qualify as a study of the United Nations, a work had to focus on the U.N. as a whole, on its principal organs or specialized agencies, or on some related aspect of U.N. activities (e.g., a U.N.-sponsored conference). For present purposes, a rigorous empirical study is defined as research utilizing quantitative methods to evaluate or generate testable propositions. The 41 studies selected by these criteria are listed in the accompanying bibliography.[3]

Evidence attesting to the diversity of this literature is displayed in Table 1, which arrays the studies according to organizational units and processes investigated. This dual classification procedure is entirely *ad hoc*, and is intended merely to illustrate the range of interests and substantive foci embraced by the selected works. Where either units or processes remained unspecified or too dispersed to be situated in a single cell, residual categories were introduced. Only one study (Kim), a descriptive and evaluative analysis of the U.N. diplomacy of the People's Republic of China, was assigned to residual categories on both dimensions. It is apparent that most researchers prefer to concentrate on a single process across organizational units rather than on multiple processes in one unit. The most striking feature of Table 1 is that research in the 1970s, as in the 1960s, continued to be focused primarily on voting in the General Assembly.[4] The table is also significant for what is not represented: no studies were found that deal exclusively with the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council, although each is in one way or another incorporated into the "general" category. Taken collectively, the 41 works are neither evenly distributed across organizational units and processes, nor are they clustered in just one or two cells of Table 1. Signs of sustained and cumulative research activity are

[3] Similar criteria have been employed in literature surveys by Chadwick F. Alger, "Research on Research: A Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organizations," *International Organization*, XXVII (Summer 1970), 414-50, and by Riggs and others (fn. 1). These two studies have shown the eight journals examined here to be among the major outlets for empirical U.N. research. These journals (and number of articles) are: *International Organization* (19), *International Studies Quarterly* (5), *American Political Science Review* (4), *World Politics* (3), *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (3), *Western Political Quarterly* (3), *American Journal of Political Science* (2), and *Journal of Peace Research* (2).

[4] This trend was observed by Alger (fn. 3) and by Riggs and others (fn. 1).

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visible in the areas of conflict reduction and perception and attitudes, yet even so superficial an overview as that provided by Table 1 reaffirms Riggs's conclusion that "the literature, with the exception of the voting studies, is largely noncumulative."[5]

TABLE 1

ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS AND PROCESSES STUDIED

	Organizational Units						
Process	*General Assembly*	*Special Agencies*	*Del-egates*	*Con-ferences*	*Caucus Groups*	*General*	*Total*
Influence on Voting	9						9
Voting Alignments	5						5
Weighted Voting	2						2
Conflict Resolution	1					4	5
Perception/Attitudes			2		1	2	5
Negotiations	2			1			3
Support of U.N.						3	3
Programs		2					2
Leadership Selection		1				1	2
Role Taking						2	2
Budgeting		1					1
Interorganizational Relations				1			1
Unlimited						1	1
Total	19	4	2	2	1	13	41

Organizational units and processes aside, how else might we characterize this literature? It is axiomatic that some conception of the world being investigated underlies any scientific endeavor in order to grant coherence and organization to the research problem. Frequently such a perspective remains vague or entirely implicit, though certain dimensions do emerge with sufficient regularity to allow a mapping of the broad outlines. This task is begun in the ensuing pages.

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE U.N.

Two independent dimensions or sets of "alternative conceptions" are singled out for special scrutiny. Both consist of two seemingly opposing, though individually plausible and justifiable, views of the U.N.'s role in world society. More specifically, we are interested in determin-

[5] Riggs and others (fn. 1), p. 231.

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ing if the research literature reflects a common perspective regarding the United Nations as (1) an actor or an arena; and (2) a causal influence or an effect. Both of these alternative conceptions will be explicated more fully below. Before proceeding, a cautionary note is in order. What follows is not an attempt to delineate the conceptual framework or point of view of individual authors. Rather, it is an exercise designed to exhibit certain prevailing characteristics of a narrowly defined body of literature.

THE UNITED NATIONS: ARENA OR ACTOR?

Are international organizations global actors in their own right, or do they merely provide an arena for the political maneuvering of national governments? Perhaps the most appropriate response to this compound question would be a simple "yes." The ambiguity inherent in the distinction between actor and arena has become a fact of life for most students of international organization. The fundamental problem, of course, is that both images are correct. "Depending on the analytical purpose and vantage point, an international organization may therefore be viewed either as an *actor*, along with other actors in the system including the members of the organization, or as one of many possible *structures* through which the members of the system address themselves to tasks and projects which arise from the ends-means relationships of the system."[6] A somewhat different means for coping with this ambiguity has been proposed by Inis Claude; he reserves the actor designation for secretariats or administrative staff, contending that "an international organization is most clearly an actor when it is most distinctly an 'it,' an entity distinguishable from its member states."[7] On the other hand, the manner in which institutional tasks are performed serves as the basis for Cox and Jacobson's distinction between "forum" and "service" organizations.[8]

Regardless of one's preferred definitions or labels, the United Nations and its affiliated agencies quite clearly fill both types of roles. The General Assembly and the Security Council seem the epitome of an arena or forum; yet their actions can, and often do, have significant ramifications throughout the global system. That is true both for ab-

[6] Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (September 1966), 297 n. 2 (emphasis in original).

[7] Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), 13.

[8] Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson and others, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

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stract actions, such as sensitizing members to certain issues, and for more concrete behavior involving the implementation of programs. In answer to those who object to the actor designation on the grounds that the U.N.'s actions are nothing more than a political resultant of the policies of its member states, Oran Young has pointed out that this is really not very different from the manner in which many members' policies are made.[9] The verity of neither perspective is in question: the United Nations accommodates both—depending, of course, on one's analytical purpose and vantage point.

Is the ambivalence between arena and actor mirrored in the empirical literature? It proved to be a relatively straightforward task to group the empirical studies according to actor and arena conceptions, facilitated no doubt by the authors' general concern for precision in expressing the research problem and operationalizing concepts. Of the 41 works examined, 32, or 78 percent, viewed the U.N. as an arena. Most of these (27) limited their consideration to the interaction of national governments, primarily in the context of voting and negotiation. Three (Riggs, Siverson 1973, Suedfeld and others) have assumed a perspective that is more micro-oriented, by investigating attitudes and perceptions of individuals within, or influenced by, the United Nations environment. The remaining two studies creatively conceived of the U.N. as an arena for other international organizations: Haas and Rowe examined the cohesion of regional I.G.O.s in the General Assembly, and Feraru studied lobbying activities of environmentally concerned I.N.G.O.s at the 1972 Stockholm conference.

Two patterns emerge among the 9 studies that view the U.N. as an actor. The first is marked by a paramount concern with the role of the United Nations in regulating international security disputes. Three of the articles (Butterworth, Pelcovits and Kramer, Ruggie) sift through various historical episodes to discover regularities that might explain the U.N.'s involvement, while another one (Siverson 1974) investigates the adversaries' perceptions of United Nations mediation efforts. All four works conceive of the organization in a highly general and undifferentiated manner; quite the opposite is true in the second pattern. Here we find research on programs and activities of individual members and sub-units of the United Nations family. These studies concentrate on program evaluation (Hoole 1977, Ringen), executive leadership (Hoole 1976), budgeting in the specialized agencies (Hoole and

[9] Young, "The United Nations and the International System," in Leon Gordenker, ed., *The United Nations in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

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others), and supranational activities of caucusing groups (Vincent 1970).

The striking numerical imbalance between actor and arena conceptions of the United Nations was not entirely unexpected in view of the preponderance of voting studies. In addition, several authors (e.g., Richardson, Suedfeld and others) approached the U.N. more as a convenient "laboratory" for collecting data on individuals or nations than as an integral component of their research. Nevertheless, the imbalance in the sampled works is quite dramatic. We might do well to reconsider Young's admonition: "The conceptual biases built into our world view should no longer be allowed to blind us to the important intangible and informal aspects of the roles of the United Nations as an actor in the international system."[10]

THE UNITED NATIONS: CAUSE OR EFFECT?[11]

The U.N., we are told, is "the microcosm of the realm of international politics."[12] Thus it is a mirror that unerringly reflects the norms and aspirations, the capabilities and constraints, and the interests and policies which comprise the international political system. In this connection, the United Nations is understood as one manifestation of the larger dynamics and forces that govern world politics. It is a consequent, an effect of its milieu, and, according to Ernst Haas, "hyperdependent."[13]

But, as many thoughtful observers have noted, this view only partially illuminates the interconnection between the United Nations and its environment. More like a prism than a mirror, the U.N. also has certain consequences of its own. Richard Falk, for example, writes of a "refraction effect . . . such that the United Nations setting may be said to influence the ways in which conflicts are conducted and justified."[14] These refraction effects encompass numerous informal and

[10] *Ibid.*, 12.

[11] The labeling of this dimension as "cause or effect" is not meant to imply any strictly causal connection. The label is for convenience of exposition only. The intended meaning of this dimension is presented in the text.

[12] William M. Jordan, "Concepts and Realities in International Political Organization," in David A. Kay, ed., *The United Nations Political System* (New York: Wiley, 1967), 27.

[13] Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations," in Robert W. Gregg and Michael Barkum, eds., *The United Nations System and Its Functions* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968). For a similar conception of the U.N., see Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System," *International Organization*, XXIV (Summer 1970), 389-413.

[14] Falk, "The United Nations: Various Systems of Operation," in Gordenker (fn. 9), 191. Note, too, that such effects are not necessarily in the direction of reducing conflicts; see Harold K. Jacobson, "The United Nations and Political Conflict: A Mirror,

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often overlooked ramifications of U.N. participation, such as expanding the concerns of member states to include a broader range of international problems and encouraging cooperation among governments across conventional political alignments. Alger has designated such outcomes "non-resolution consequences" because they are not products of formal resolutions passed by United Nations bodies.[15] But the impact of the United Nations is not always so subtle or indirect. For example, certain Assembly resolutions may substantially—and directly—influence both the member states and the international system; and we must not ignore the potential long-run significance of the numerous social and economic programs sponsored by U.N. agencies.[16]

Hence, the United Nations must be viewed as one link in a causal chain that is looped back upon itself; it is both antecedent and consequent. Lande has observed that "the character and action of the U.N. surely bear a direct relation to cooperation among its Members, but the Organization itself heightens their cooperation in various ways and affects their behavior and character."[17] To what extent have both directions of this process been subjected to empirical investigation? Explicit recognition of nonrecursive influence is, of course, a matter that is heavily dependent on the scope and nature of the immediate research question. Bearing this in mind, we reread each of the studies to determine which direction of influence was presumed or actually investigated by the researcher. We considered whether the author sought an explanation in terms of the structure, process, or behavior of the U.N. itself; or, on the other hand, whether he or she reached beyond the organization for relevant explanatory factors.

This distinction has not always been easy to apply—in part because organizational boundaries become fuzzy in the case of the United Nations. Attributes of member states, for instance, might be considered either an organizational factor or a characteristic of the organization's environment. In practice, factors not necessarily linked to the organization *per se*—such as national attributes, delegates' personal characteristics, regional politics, or alliance memberships—were considered to

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Amplifier, or Regulator?" in David A. Kay, ed., *The Changing United Nations: Options for the United States* (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1977).

[15] Chadwick F. Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v (June 1961), 128-45.

[16] For examples of resolution and program effects, see Gabriella Rosner Lande, "The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly," *World Politics*, XIX (October 1966), 83-105, and Leon Gordenker, "The United Nations and Economic and Social Change," in Gordenker (fn. 9), respectively.

[17] Lande (fn. 16), 83.

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be exogenous. Thus, a study attributing patterns in voting alignments to distribution of foreign economic assistance imputes explanatory import to exogenous factors. Conversely, research on possible implications of weighted voting in the General Assembly focuses on an endogenous characteristic of the organization. In other words, we are distinguishing between effects *on* the U.N. and effects *of* the U.N.

Delineating the source of influence was most problematic in those cases where the authors' primary objective was descriptive rather than explanatory (e.g., Kim, Newcombe and others 1970 and 1971, Rowe 1970 and 1971). Classification of these studies was based on the perspective that seemed more congruent with the authors' discussion and interpretation of results. Although some indication of the appropriate category was usually evident, the process was of necessity somewhat judgmental, and thus might not be precisely replicated by a different investigator.

When the studies were grouped on this dimension, we discovered that 15, only about one-third of the sample, attributed any causal influence or explanatory import to the U.N. itself. A few of these works explored both endogenous and exogenous effects. Coplin and Rochester, for example, investigated the relative influence of structural (endogenous) and historical (exogenous) factors affecting the consideration and disposition of international disputes by the World Court, the League, and the U.N. Other studies of endogenous characteristics examined weighted voting formulas (Newcombe and others 1971 and 1977); organization roles (Volgy 1974, Volgy and Quistgaard 1975); socializing effects on perceptions and attitudes (Riggs, Siverson 1973); and changes in membership (Rowe 1971).

The majority of works portrayed the behavior of the U.N. or behavior within a U.N. context as unaffected by factors intrinsic to the organization. Several authors explored the link between voting patterns and such exogenous elements as national attributes (Harbert, Moore, Todd, Vincent 1971 and 1973), or foreign aid and trade (Alpert and Bernstein, Rai, Richardson, Wittkopf). Three studies (Friedheim and others, Friedheim and Durch, Løvald) that examined the delegates' negotiating postures on the control and exploitation of the world's ocean resources generally converged on national economic and technological capabilities as the most salient explanatory factors. Other works (Siverson 1974; Suedfeld and others) concentrated on delegate behavior; they assumed a rather different approach by considering the effects of cognitive processes.

Again, much of the empirical literature tends to be clustered on one

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side of our imposed dichotomy. To be sure, this concentration is less acute than on the actor-arena dimension; nevertheless, it signifies that, on the whole, researchers have been more attentive to various effects upon the United Nations than to ways in which the U.N. itself has managed to influence political behavior.

Since the two dimensions were defined to be logically independent of one another, either exogenous or endogenous factors might reasonably explain behavior *of* the U.N. (as actor) or behavior *within* the U.N. (as arena). When these two dimensions are combined, it is possible to discern four distinct images of the United Nations' role in world politics. The logical independence of the dimensions is confirmed by the fact that studies could be identified with each of the four images. Let us examine each of these images more closely before stepping back to consider some overall implications of our findings.

RESEARCH ON THE UNITED NATIONS: ALTERNATIVE IMAGES

It would be overly presumptuous to regard any one of the four images as a conceptual model or framework. At most, they represent alternative research perspectives which, at any given moment, add minimal structure and tractability to the task of understanding the otherwise diverse and loosely bounded field of human activities that constitutes the United Nations. The individual research study, much like a snapshot, sacrifices many aspects of its subject in order to capture certain others. And, like the perspective of the photographer, that of the researcher is not fixed but merely adopted temporarily as a device to highlight chosen aspects of his or her subject.[18] We have proposed only one way of assembling these perspectives; undoubtedly there are others.

By far the most common image of the United Nations is one that combines the characteristics of arena and effect. Twenty-two research studies, just over half of those surveyed, view the U.N. as a centralized and unobtrusive setting for the conduct of international political affairs. In the imagery of the theater, it is a stage—a comparison believed to be quite appropriate by Inis Claude:

> If the image of the stage also suggests that the cast of characters may include stars, prima donnas, and bit players, and that a considerable element of stylization and even artificiality tends to mark their performance, no valid objection can be made. The variant notion of the arena

[18] The photography analogy can be extended even further: just as some photographers are famous for portraits or landscapes, some authors seem to specialize in a particular research perspective.

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> tends to suggest, not improperly, that the performers are frequently engaged in wholly earnest competition with each other rather than in make-believe.[19]

But unlike the theatrical stage, the United Nations has no noticeable effect on the behavior of its actors. The U.N. arena accurately reflects the interaction, bargaining, and alignment of the world at large. Political behavior in the United Nations is one manifestation of a government's overall foreign policy, and as such is subject to the influences and conditioning factors generally thought to be associated with foreign policy formation and execution. For this reason, records of voting or speech-making in the U.N. serve as legitimate indicators of foreign policy behavior. Indeed, the U.N. may be as close as we will come to a laboratory for the study of world politics.

The second image of U.N. politics modifies the passivity of the first by permitting the organization some causal influence of its own. This somewhat different picture of the United Nations is found in about one-quarter of the studies. The metaphor of the stage still applies, but no longer as an unassuming backdrop framing the rehearsed performance of the actors. Instead, the stage becomes an active ingredient, modifying or enhancing the performance in occasionally subtle but important ways, not unlike the effects that proper lighting and creative set design have on a theatrical production. A fundamental assumption of this image is that international behavior is altered in some nontrivial way when pursued within the context of the United Nations. The lack of complete congruence between foreign policy behavior in general and U.N. behavior clearly precludes the "laboratory" approach. Major research questions concern such factors as Falk's "refraction effects" moderating international conflict, and Alger's "non-resolution consequences" accruing from individual participation in U.N. bodies. Institutional or parliamentary procedures are also viewed as potential influences on U.N. behavior.

The remaining two images enable us to conceive of the United Nations as a political actor. The third image, which is represented in only four studies, portrays an organization that is highly responsive to its environment, and whose actions are best explained with reference to exogenous factors.[20] Because problems in the environment supply the impetus for U.N. behavior, the structure of the problem is given greater emphasis than the structure of the organization. More stable aspects

[19] Claude (fn. 7), 9.

[20] The studies adopting this image were Pelcovits and Kramer, Ruggie, Siverson 1974, and Vincent 1970.

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of the environment, such as the level of economic development or the political system of member states, can also influence organizational activities. The impact of the United Nations is more a function of environmental structure and receptivity than of deliberate design or control. Organization theory, particularly the input-output system variety, is an appropriate intellectual tool when the U.N. is viewed from this perspective.

In our final image, the U.N. remains as a global actor, but analytic emphasis on environmental factors in accounting for its actions is reduced.[21] The five studies presenting this point of view posit that organizational structures, goals, norms, and processes exert considerable influence on United Nations behavior. Suitable concepts from organization theory include bureaucratic bargaining, incrementalism, and rationality. Inquiry is directed more toward specific organizational units, such as the specialized agencies, than on the U.N. as a single undifferentiated entity. Because the organizational unit or activity is often the unit of analysis, research is likely to be comparative. Questions concerning both internally oriented administrative behavior and externally oriented programmatic decisions and implementation occupy the research agenda of this perspective. The focus on external behavior presumes that the organization is capable, or at least hopeful, of affecting its environment through programs or policies.

The four images sketched above actually blend into one another at various points. We have attempted to draw them apart as one way to illustrate the range of alternative perspectives available to the empirically minded researcher. Clearly, not one of the four adequately represents the United Nations in its entirety, but neither does the individual research study. The degree of fit between each study and the image associated with it is only approximate. The utility of this exercise, however, is not to be found in our rough procedures for compartmentalizing research studies, but in the resulting profile of the literature as a whole.

The profile that emerges from the foregoing analysis suggests an acute polarization of a collective research effort. The United Nations that is investigated most diligently is a passive arena where political actors, generally representatives of national governments, faithfully pursue their policies and priorities according to the larger realities and forces governing world politics. Moving away from this dominant pattern, we find empirical inquiry focused more on the contextual ef-

[21] The studies representing this image are Butterworth, Hoole 1976 and 1977, Hoole and others, and Ringen.

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fects of the U.N. arena than on either of the actor perspectives. Trend analysis is hazardous over such a short time span, but it is interesting to note that all but one of the articles adopting an image of the U.N. as a causally potent actor in world politics were published during the two most recent years surveyed.

Conclusion

What might account for so concentrated a profile? One possible answer is that the distribution of works is largely an artifact of the journals' editorial policies rather than a true indication of research interests. Upon examination, however, this explanation seems unlikely because of the generally accepted practice of relying on editorial boards and referees.[22] Not so easily dismissed is the possibility that students of the United Nations share a common agenda of research priorities, dictated by the realities of world politics. Hence, we might interpret the distribution of studies across the four images as an implicit assignment of priorities to research problems generally associated with the four perspectives. This explanation is probably correct as far as it goes; but it leaves unanswered questions about how these priorities are recognized and adopted.

A research perspective was described earlier as an abstracted view of one's subject, chosen to facilitate a particular line of inquiry. Let us for the moment reverse this statement to suggest that research questions are chosen according to one's perspective. If this is the logic that directs empirical research, then we find a number of reasons that reinforce one another in explaining the dominance of the first image. First of all, it is the one perspective that most accurately reflects the state-centric view so prevalent in our discipline and in Western society generally. By confining our survey to journals published in the United States, we virtually assured this state-centric orientation. Moreover, the United Nations' most publicized arenas—the General Assembly and Security Council—are both located in the United States. By contrast, in the areas of the Third World where it administers various economic and social programs, the U.N. is more clearly visible as an actor. Could it also be that the size and power of the United States accentuate the arena image while simultaneously overshadowing the actor image? Finally, we might note that the state-centric, big-power view of the world

[22] According to one editor, published articles generally do not differ from submissions in substantive foci and style. Personal communication (November 1975) with John H. Kessel, former editor, *American Journal of Political Science*.

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contributes to the conception of the United Nations as a data depository or "laboratory."

We have examined a fairly representative body of empirical literature and found it to be acutely polarized toward a particular view of its subject: the prevailing image portrays the United Nations as an arena mirroring the exogenous forces of international politics. This image is wrong only in the sense that it is incomplete. There is much more to be learned about the U.N.'s role in the world community, but significant progress seems unlikely until we recognize the implications of narrowly framed research questions and redefine our conceptual vantage points accordingly.

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Review Articles

POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS:

Toward an Expectationist Theory of Democracy?

By NORMAN J. VIG

Robert Skidelsky, ed., *The End of the Keynesian Era: Essays on the Disintegration of the Keynesian Political Economy*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1977, xiv, 114 pp., $21.00.

James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes*. New York: Academic Press, 1977, xii, 195 pp., $14.50.

Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978, xi, 307 pp., $14.00; $5.95 paper.

James E. Alt, *The Politics of Economic Decline: Economic Management and Political Behaviour in Britain Since 1964*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1979, viii, 296 pp., $24.95.

"DID Keynes help save capitalist democracy or did he nudge it towards its doom? A good Marxist answer would be that he did both, and in this case the Marxists are right. Keynes found a way of keeping capitalist democracy working, but only by weakening further the long-term conditions for its survival." So writes British historian Robert Skidelsky in *The End of the Keynesian Era* (p. 33). From a somewhat different perspective, American economists James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner echo this theme in *Democracy in Deficit* (p. 56): "Sober assessment suggests that, politically, Keynesianism may represent a substantial disease, one that can, over the long run, prove fatal for a functioning democracy."

These are haunting thoughts throughout the Western world. The long boom of 1948 to 1970 is over, and with it a political era as well. As stagflation persists, Keynes's most famous observation that in the long run we are all dead takes on new significance. Is it possible that Keynesian short-term management deceived us all? If aggregate demand stimulation provided the ideal rationale for postwar consumer society, did it also produce runaway expectations, deficits, and inflation? If so, did it both create and destroy the fundamental intellectual

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consensus on which democratic politics have rested? Are we doomed, as we appeared to be half a century ago, to collapsing confidence in government, rising group and sectional conflicts, and renewed ideological polarization? Or has the prolonged exposure to Keynesian affluence established a more rational set of political and economic expectations which, if properly heeded by politicians and other leaders, may yet provide a solid foundation for necessary economic adjustments?

These questions are at least implicit in much of the "new political economy" literature. Most of these studies focus on the interrelationships between macroeconomic policies (or outcomes) and democratic political processes. In general, economists entering the field have been most interested in political influences on macroeconomic behavior; e.g., "stabilization policy with endogenous politicians."[1] The "public choice" school, in particular, has sought to extend economic concepts of utility maximizing and preference aggregation to the functioning of democratic regimes and, consequently, to the formulation of economic policies. Political scientists have been more concerned with the impact of macroeconomic policies on voting and other political behavior such as bargaining and coalition formation, but they also stress the institutional constraints on policy making. A third group, composed *inter alia* of political sociologists and post-Marxian theorists, has emphasized the deeper social structural origin of such phenomena as inflation. There is thus still considerable divergence of perspectives, despite lip service to "closing the system" by incorporating each others' variables.[2] Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus that economics can no longer be conceptualized apart from politics.[3]

The books reviewed here develop that fundamental point in various ways. They also fit into a rough pattern corresponding to various stages of a macropolicy cycle. The first three works—by Skidelsky, Buchanan and Wagner, and Hirsch and Goldthorpe—focus primarily on the intellectual, social, and political *sources* of macroeconomic policy: the legacy of Keynes, the decay of status hierarchy, the emergence of new groups and pressures, the incessant demands of voters. Alt's book, on the other hand, concentrates mainly on the outcomes and *consequences* of macroeconomic policies—specifically, on the political

[1] Assar Lindbeck, "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 66 (May 1976), 1-19.

[2] James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, eds., *Theory of Public Choice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 11ff.

[3] It is noteworthy, however, that with the partial exception of the "Post Keynesian" and Marxist contributions, none of the economists writing in "The Crisis in Economic Theory" (special edition of *The Public Interest*, 1980) address questions of political economy.

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impacts of spending, taxation, and inflation, as well as of the "performance failures" of Keynesian management generally. We thus gain at least some insights into the broader questions raised above as well as the different approaches of the new political economists.

Can we go further at this stage? Can we begin to pull a few threads together to help anticipate the downside of politics in the 1980s? As my subtitle suggests, I venture some concluding comments on the potential for theoretical development regarding a phenomenon of rapidly growing interest to both economists and political scientists: political-economic expectations. What do people *think* is going to happen? To what extent do they adjust to or actually *anticipate* governmental performance through "adaptive" or "rational" expectations?[4] How much is *discounted* in advance? How does this affect their policy preferences? How do they respond to economic decline, and what are the implications for democratic stability in the years ahead?

I. The Political Legacy of Keynes

So much has been written on John Maynard Keynes in recent years that it is impossible to say anything without inviting dispute. I have no intention of entering the fray among economists over the true meaning of *The General Theory* or the alleged distortions of its interpreters.[5] Nor is that the purpose of Skidelsky's book. Rather, *The End of the Keynesian Era* is a collection of thirteen brief essays on the political and intellectual significance of Keynes which originally appeared in *The Spectator*. They are written by historians, economists, and social theorists, primarily British. If there is a common theme, it is that Keynes, reacting against the British past and the impending catastrophe of the 1930s, remodeled classical economics sufficiently to permit

[4] For a popular explication of rational expectations theory and an attack on Keynesian models, see Mark H. Willes, "'Rational Expectations' as a Counterrevolution," *The Public Interest* (fn. 3), 81-96. On the distinction between "adaptive" and "rational" expectations and use of the former in augmenting Keynesian analysis, see Thomas M. Humphrey, "Some Current Controversies in the Theory of Inflation," in Ronald L. Teigen, ed., *Readings in Money, National Income and Stabilization Policy*, 4th ed.; (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1978), 134-45.

[5] The most respected treatment is still perhaps Axel Leijonhufvud, *On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), but there is a large recent literature including Sir John Hicks, *The Crisis in Keynesian Economics* (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Milo Keynes, ed., *Essays on John Maynard Keynes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Hyman P. Minsky, *John Maynard Keynes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); Terence W. Hutchison, *Keynes versus the 'Keynesians' . . . ?* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1977); Harry G. Johnson, *The Shadow of Keynes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and William H. Hutt, *The Keynesian Episode: A Reassessment* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979).

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a brilliant, but temporary, political escape. Whatever the success—or even the operational existence—of Keynesian economic management, "Keynesianism" offered a set of political beliefs and symbols that contributed mightily to postwar recovery and stability in the ensuing quarter-century. By the same token, the conditions for its utility have passed, and the myths are now properly exposed. The reality of government intervention and control is now well beyond Keynes.

The authors of the first group of essays in Skidelsky's volume discuss some of the formative influences on Keynes: his rejection of Puritan ethics and scorn for Victorian preoccupations with thrift; his training in, and departures from, the great Alfred Marshall's teachings at Cambridge; his experience in The City and his fears concerning the hegemony of financial interests generally. These influences are the bases of the fundamental Keynesian "laws" regarding consumption and investment, cogently summarized in a chapter by Peter Lilley (in which their rejection by Friedman and Hayek are also explained). Essentially, Keynes argued that as aggregate income increased, consumption lagged behind, resulting in chronic tendencies toward underinvestment and unemployment. Investment risk-taking was shackled by excess propensity to save and by irrational liquidity preferences in times of uncertainty. Government intervention was thus necessary to maintain demand (consumption) and perhaps to supplement investment directly as well; if demand were propped up sufficiently, supply (production) would largely take care of itself (the inversion of Say's Law and fatal error for today's "supply-side" economists).

In a chapter on "The Political Meaning of the Keynesian Revolution," Skidelsky forcefully reminds us of the political functions of these principles:

> First, his view that, if demand was right, supply would look after itself undermined not just Say's Law (which said the opposite), but also the socialist case for public ownership, which rested on the inefficiency and injustice of the allocative mechanism under capitalism. . . . Secondly, it avoided having to choose between capital and labour. Keeping demand buoyant would simultaneously underwrite high profits, full employment and rising wages, thus eliminating or at least easing the conflict over the distribution of wealth. Thirdly, the decision for macro-economic, as opposed to micro-economic, intervention was a decision for indirect and general, as opposed to direct and detailed, economic control by government; for a "managed" rather than a "commanded" economy. Fiscal and monetary leverage by government could be reconciled with economic free will by individuals and groups . . . (p. 35).

In the context of fascism, communism, and—even in Britain—neo-

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Marxist socialism in the wake of the Depression, it was Keynes who provided the real middle way. As Stuart Holland points out in another essay, an entire generation of the British Labour Party was converted to the Keynesian approach, enshrined in Anthony Crosland's *Future of Socialism* in 1956 and to some extent in Labour policies through the Wilson governments. Democratic parties everywhere accepted the possibility of rational economic management to promote continuous growth, full employment, and rising social benefits.[6]

Having said this, Skidelsky and the other contributors to his book turn to the ultimate failure of the Keynesian strategy. Skidelsky himself stresses two fundamental points: Keynes's overestimate of the potentials for rational management by experts under democratic political conditions; and his parallel overestimate of the capacity for market adjustment to macroeconomic leverage, which ultimately resulted in more and more government intervention. These themes are common throughout the rest of the book. In an abbreviated version of his classic article on "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy,"[7] Samuel Brittan emphasizes the pressures of the political marketplace which have led governments to overstimulate demand and to pursue unsustainably high levels of employment.[8] In another essay, Aubrey Jones points out Keynes's anticipation of, but inability to deal with, the "political" problem of wage bargaining and industrial relations; while Robert Lekachman, Stuart Holland, and J. T. Winkler chastise the Keynesians for their failure to see the structural changes at work in modern industrial economies. The theme of these pieces is the declining significance of market allocation as governments have inevitably been drawn into microeconomic control and industrial planning. Winkler, in his essay on "The Coming Corporatism," argues that the result of intervention is neither managed capitalism nor socialism, but rather a new political economy in which "the corporatist state tries to exercise direct control over the internal decision-making of companies and over the bargaining strategies of unions" (p. 82). Harry Johnson and David Calleo each touch briefly on Keynesian shortcomings in the

[6] This is not to say that governments have consistently practiced Keynesian policies. See Andrew T. Cowart, "Economic Policies of European Governments—I: Monetary Policy," and "Economic Policies of European Governments—II: Fiscal Policy," *British Journal of Political Science*, VIII (July and October 1978), 285-312, 425-40; and Charles F. Andrain, *Politics and Economic Policy in Western Democracies* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1980). In Britain, the Conservative governments of 1951–1964 followed Keynesian management doctrines more closely than the subsequent Labour or Conservative governments; see Ait, chap. 2.

[7] Brittan, "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science*, V (April 1975), 129-60.

[8] Brittan's argument is discussed further in part II below.

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realm of development theory and international politics, including *de facto* dependence on the American economic hegemony which was collapsing by the 1970s. Finally, in a concluding chapter Geoffrey Barraclough laments what he perceives to be a hideous misuse of Keynes: the rush toward mass-consumption society, with no regard for either social justice or the exhaustion of world resources.

Skidelsky's little book is scarcely a definitive analysis of the Keynesian era, but it brings together more threads on the demise of the Keynesian paradigm than any other work. To these authors, the legacy of Keynes is ambiguous, whether viewed from the conservative perspective of salvaging the free market or from socialist beliefs in rational planning: the seeds of both are found in Keynes, but the marriage of capitalism and public management has not succeeded in practice. As Winkler, especially, points out, market interventions have been piecemeal and pragmatic, without planning or direction beyond the immediate easing of crises or the protection of existing institutional shares. At the same time, it is undeniable that fiscal and monetary policies have served democratic ends, for politicians and governments have continually tailored them to enhance their support among the electorate. It is this blind spot in Keynesianism that is emphasized most strongly in the revisionist literature: the enormous pressure to manipulate economic cycles for short-term political advantage.[9]

Not surprisingly, conservative economists have presented the strongest case against political Keynesianism on this ground. James Buchanan and Richard Wagner, who are well known for their neoclassical theories of public finance and are leading proponents of the public choice approach to policy analysis,[10] have written a powerful, if flawed, critique of Keynesian theory and its application in the United States over the past two decades. In *Democracy in Deficit*, they trace the acceptance of Keynesian ideas in America—first among the academic economists and students of Samuelson and others, then among journalists

[9] See especially Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and Bruno S. Frey, *Modern Political Economy* (New York: Halstead Press, 1978). For a useful review and critique of the literature, cf. Takashi Inoguchi, "Political Business Cycles: Toward a Reconceptualization," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1980.

[10] See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Buchanan, *Public Finance in Democratic Process* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967); Buchanan and Wagner, *Public Debt in Democratic Society* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1967); Buchanan and others, *The Economics of Politics* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978); Buchanan and Wagner, *Fiscal Responsibility in Constitutional Democracy* (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).

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and the broader public, and ultimately, after 1960, in the highest echelons of the Kennedy Administration. By then, concepts of "functional finance" to achieve macroeconomic objectives had eroded away the "old-time fiscal religion" requiring balanced public as well as private budgets. The results, according to Buchanan and Wagner, are unambiguous: runaway spending, unconscionable deficits, loose money, and rampant inflation. By exaggerating such trends and failing to put them either in comparative perspective or in the context of national income growth, the authors are able to assert that they amount to unmitigated disaster for the American economy.[11] Although such allegations are by no means novel—the recent campaign of Ronald Reagan drew on the same perceptions—Buchanan and Wagner have gone further than other critics in linking macroeconomic performance failures both to Keynesian doctrines and to the institutional setting of American democracy. In the latter regard, they apply public choice theory on a grand scale, raising this book above the recent flood of thoughtless diatribes against the welfare state. Despite its weaknesses, *Democracy in Deficit* presents a lucid argument that deserves attention in the current political-economic debate.

The destructiveness of Keynes, Buchanan and Wagner argue, lay primarily in his theory of debt burden, by which public deficits were seen as costless and involving no real intertemporal transfer of productive resources if debts were owed internally. With the "fiscal constitution" thus altered, there were no longer any limits on public spending so long as government could finance its debt (whether through borrowing or money issue). Without any external constraints, the demands of politicians and the mass public escalated—albeit with some delay in the U.S., given the traditional fiscal impulses of the Eisenhower Administration. Here, then, is the crux of the thesis: Keynesian doctrine, when applied in the real world of competitive democratic politics, produces budget deficits but no offsetting surpluses, as politicians and voters perceive opportunities to maximize their short-term

[11] Buchanan and Wagner state (p. 57) that "public spending—at all governmental levels, federal, state, and local—in the United States amounted to 32.8 percent of national income in 1960; this proportion had increased to 43.4 percent by 1975." This comparison presumably employs a narrow definition of "national income," but the size of the public sector is normally measured in terms of the ratio of total government spending to GNP or GDP. According to OECD figures, U.S. public expenditure (at all levels) amounted to 29.5 percent of GDP in 1962 and 34.0 percent in 1975, percentages considerably lower than those of any other major Western democracy (OECD, *Public Expenditure Trends* [Paris: 1978], Chart I, p. 16). Buchanan and Wagner also do not mention that when state and local government *surpluses* in this period are included, there is very little if any net revenue deficit (OECD, Table 10, p. 40), or that the national debt has fallen as a proportion of GNP.

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interests through increased government spending. Thus, like Skidelsky, Buchanan and Wagner take Keynes to task for failing to appreciate that macroeconomic policy cannot be made in a vacuum by a disinterested elite of experts (though, ironically, the President's economic advisers are in this case seen as having wielded unfettered independent influence in launching the new fiscal regime).

What distinguishes *Democracy in Deficit* is the attempt to explain political pressures through the public choice approach. Public choice theory is based on the premise of classical economics that "man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer."[12] The crucial question becomes how institutions structure the setting in which individuals exercise choice; in this sense, "institutions matter" (a proposition that only economists are still able to dispute). Buchanan and Wagner's analysis then proceeds on two levels. On the general plane of electoral choice, politicians offer that set of programs or policies which can be expected to maximize their utility—i.e., attract the maximum number of votes. The voter, acting no differently than when shopping at the supermarket, "buys" that package of political benefits and costs which appears to give him the most for his effort in voting. This theory of mutual exchange, first elaborated by Anthony Downs a quarter-century ago,[13] is adapted by Buchanan and Wagner to explain the paramount "bias" of democracy without constraining fiscal rules: the tendency to oversupply (or overpurchase) public goods because the benefits of public expenditure are always more visible to the individual voter than are the costs—especially the long-range costs of such effects as inflation.[14]

But why didn't this tendency become evident before the 1960s? This question brings us to the second level of public choice analysis: it was only when the option of deficit finance became available that the full effects manifested themselves. Buchanan and Wagner argue that the particular structure of American fiscal institutions conveys false signals to the public regarding the costs of government programs. Specifically, the possibility of deficit financing makes public goods appear less costly than private goods, because the citizen does not feel that he has to pay. The more complex and indirect the tax structure, the less any

[12] Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1. See also Gordon Tullock, "Public Choice in Practice," in Clifford S. Russell, ed., *Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 31ff.

[13] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

[14] Whether "pure" public goods are oversupplied or undersupplied in this situation is a matter of dispute among public choice theorists; cf. Downs, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy," *World Politics*, XII (July 1960), 541-63; Mueller (fn. 12), chap. 8.

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connection is perceived between public and private finances. For a variety of reasons—high information costs, absence of specific tax prices, uncertainty over future benefits, inability to anticipate the strategic behavior of others—it is rational for voters to discount future costs and benefits in favor of immediate payouts. These pressures are felt not only by elected politicians, but by government bureaucrats and the nominally independent officials of the Federal Reserve Board as well; the latter accommodate deficits by monetary expansion for fear of becoming scapegoats in public opinion. The result is not only inflation, but growing allocation to the public sector, the ultimate concern of Buchanan and Wagner.

The fact that politicians and voters alike conveyed a contrary message in the 1980 election and that the Fed is behaving differently in 1981 suggests some need for reconceptualization. Not only did voting majorities perceive inflation and government spending as overriding problems, but public opinion polls in the U.S. reported majorities of 70 percent or more in favor of the solution preferred by Buchanan and Wagner—a constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget. How do we explain this apparent reversal in the "biases" of democracy and "permissive" fiscal institutions? It would be unfair to blame Buchanan and Wagner for not anticipating the potential for this shift; after all, few of us did. But the electoral outcome indicates that something is wrong with the theory.

I can only suggest several points at which the political analysis appears weakest (leaving it to economists to dispute the fiscal deficit theory of inflation). First, although Buchanan and Wagner make an important argument that the "subjectively determined perceptions of persons" are important, indeed crucial, to political-economic behavior (pp. 130ff), their conception of citizens' preferences is far too static and cramped. The public is viewed as acting only upon the (mis)perceptions created by fiscal institutions and, consequently, as incapable of learning from experience as long as these institutions persist. "Fiscal illusion" explains everything because, given the efforts required to "creatively imagine" the true costs of decisions, it is rational for individuals to remain ignorant (pp. 100-104). In the latter part of this essay, evidence is discussed that casts doubt on this presumption of myopic voter preferences.[15] At this point I need only comment that, if economists wish to analyze the real world of politics, they cannot simply ignore empirical voting research by imputing "rational ignorance" of this kind to the public.[16]

[15] See the discussion of Alt's book in section III below.

[16] In a host of behavioral studies over the past decade, researchers have attempted to

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Second, the political universe is simply too narrowly conceived. All policy direction is attributed to a handful of economic advisers and, ultimately, to the electoral process. Congress is scarcely mentioned, nor are interest groups, parties, or the myriad activities of bureaucracy. The components of the budget—i.e., the purposes of public spending—are not considered important, nor are the new group pressures for equality. In short, most of the political activity of the past 20 years is apparently irrelevant to fiscal outcomes. To this may be added social change and all other non-policy variables, such as the changing structure of industry and the labor force.[17]

Finally, even within Buchanan and Wagner's restricted universe there is little actual policy analysis. The Democratic tax cut of 1964 is pictured as the Keynesian breakthrough, but there is no discussion of its passage or of its specific content or effects (e.g., in stimulating business investment). Although the largest deficits appeared in the 1970s, there is no serious consideration of the Vietnam War, the declining trade balance of the United States, or the fiscal policies of the Nixon Administration. Thus we are left with the notion of a pervasive paradigm shift in macroeconomic policy, without much linkage to decision-making processes or to specific results. The power of academic scribblers—despite Keynes's claim to the contrary—is not so easily established in politics.

II. The Politics of Inflation

The basic message of *The Political Economy of Inflation* is that the *ceteris paribus* assumptions of economic theory will no longer do. In a brilliant chapter John Goldthorpe, the British sociologist, argues that it is the "residual categories" factored out by economists as "irrational"

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document relationships between voting and both macroeconomic conditions and microeconomic motivations. For some of the recent work, see Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (December 1975), 1232-39; Howard S. Bloom and H. Douglas Price, "Comment: Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions; the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession," *ibid.*, 1240-54; Saul Goodman and Gerald H. Kramer, "Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer: The Effect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections," *ibid.*, 1255-65; Henry C. Kenski, "The Impact of Economic Conditions on Presidential Popularity," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIX (August 1977), 764-73; Morris C. Fiorina, "Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science*, XXII (May 1978), 426-43; Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, XXIII (August 1979), 495-527; Kiewiet, "Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues," *American Political Science Review*, LXXV (June 1981), 448-59.

[17] For an excellent discussion of non-policy variables, see Andrian (fn. 6).

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or "non-rational" phenomena which must now become the starting point for analyses of the causes of inflation and other economic difficulties. The Hirsch and Goldthorpe volume originated at a conference on the Political Economy of Inflation, held in 1977 at the University of Warwick. It is the product of a dozen economists, sociologists, political scientists, and historians—all but one of them British. Although some of the papers are a bit dated and limited to the British scene, the principal lines of argument have not lost their relevance as a counterpoint to the macroeconomic policies currently being followed in the major Western countries.

The Political Economy of Inflation does not present a full-blown "structuralist" critique of contemporary economic theory, and there are no Marxist contributions.[18] But the various papers do bring out a wide range of sociopolitical factors that underlie the current malaise of capitalism, particularly inflation. At one pole, the economist J. S. Fleming, author of a leading monetarist study of inflation, gives an essentially economic interpretation which does, however, recognize the impact of numerous exogenous pressures that have induced governments to adopt inflationary monetary policies. Two other contributions represent fairly conventional economic analyses of the relationships between inflation, public spending, and income distribution: economists Alan T. Peacock and Martin Rickets employ crossnational data from 23 OECD countries for 1965–1972 to test for relationships between public-sector growth and inflation, and find little overall correlation (thus raising numerous questions about the validity of theories such as Buchanan and Wagner's); David Piachaud presents a careful empirical study of the distributional consequences of inflation in Britain from 1956 to 1976, which concludes that there are few discernible net impacts on major income groups.[19] Together, these papers illustrate the difficulty of confirming any of the conventional economic theories of inflation in the real world, and the need for more detailed political and institutional analysis on the national and subnational level.

At the other pole, several of the authors concentrate almost entirely on universal political, social, and psychological factors. In a heroic but

[18] For a discussion of recent Marxist theories, see Colin Crouch, "The State, Capital and Liberal Democracy," in Crouch, ed., *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979). See also Andre Gunder Frank, *Crisis: In the World Economy* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), chaps. 2-3, and Manuel Castells, *The Economic Crisis and American Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

[19] Lester Thurow reaches a similar conclusion regarding the distributional effects of inflation in the U.S. See Thurow, *The Zero-Sum Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 50-51.

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somewhat ambiguous chapter on the historical experience of inflations in the 20th century throughout the world, Charles Maier attempts to categorize such experiences into three varieties of descending magnitude: "hyperinflation," "Latin inflation," and "creeping inflation." The point is that while the latter type (defined as inflation under 10 percent) has been present in Western nations through most of the postwar period, inflation has been endemic since World War I and has frequently occurred at much higher levels when political instability or breakdown produced "inflationary social coalitions" with an interest in rapid depreciation (or maximal restoration of production). Unfortunately, the "coalitions" discussed (e.g., industry-labor "producer" alliances in Germany and Austria in the early 1920s) are either so historically specific or else so vaguely defined that no model emerges that is very useful for contemporary analysis of advanced societies. The key swing group appears to consist of "middle-class constituents" (p. 68), who are pictured as being in transition from an inflationary alignment with workers and entrepreneurial speculators in the post-1945 period to a new coalition with business leaders which better protects their interests as savers and consumers. However, Maier suggests that these middle elements may swing either back to the radical left or to the radical right if an effective growth coalition fails to materialize (p. 69).

Milivoje Panić, on the other hand, considers pressures from below to be the overriding factor. For him, global inflation is ultimately a psychological phenomenon rooted in the competitive ethos and distributional inequalities existing within and between nations. The fundamental issue is what Panić calls the "aspirations gap"—i.e., "the gap between the standard of living and the status which people have and those that they would like to have" (p. 141). This is no less than a global extension of the older British sociological concept of relative deprivation, which is now built into the entire process of economic development.[20] People in all societies measure their relative status through reference groups which are better off than they—whether in their own economy or in more advanced societies. Quite apart from absolute levels of real income growth, consumption differentials confer status rewards which are, however, always limited in supply because they are defined in terms of relative scarcity.[21] Panić then attempts to document the hypotheses that inflation rates vary *inversely* with the

[20] Walter G. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). Ted Gurr has also developed the concept in explaining the sources of political violence, in *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[21] See the discussion of "positional goods" in Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

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general level of income and consumption reached by countries *and* with the degree of distributional equality found *within* countries. He finds, in fact, that "there is an inverse relationship between social security expenditure per head and annual rates of inflation" (p. 150). Although some of the statistical correlations are a bit weak (and require careful selection of the data base), they do suggest that some combination of relative excess demand and rising expectations could account for inflationary acceleration as low-status people everywhere demand more (though other structural factors are obviously also involved in such global differences).

Goldthorpe picks up where Panić leaves off in positing the primacy of distributional *conflict* as the underlying source of inflation (presumably through cost-push mechanisms). But in contrast to Panić and most economists, he does not regard the pressures from below as new or irrational psychological expectations bred by rising affluence. Instead, Goldthorpe (like his late colleague, Fred Hirsch) traces the growing "pushfulness" and "distributional dissent" in Britain and other advanced industrial economies to the profound changes in social structure and culture which have undermined the moral order of capitalism. He points to three seminal developments beneath all current trends. First is the "decay of the status order" inherited from the past—i.e., destruction of the normative bases that supported both pre-capitalist and capitalist social hierarchies. As a result, "class inequalities come increasingly to be seen, and to be judged, for what they are—the products of the market economy—without the normative camouflage which the status order previously created" (p. 200). From this perspective, lower-class demands represent a *more rational* assessment of existing social reality. Second, Goldthorpe sees current developments as a logical extension of the historical progress toward realization of broader citizenship rights—in T. H. Marshall's categories, civil, political, and social rights. In the sphere of "social" citizenship, we now see the concept extended not only to minimal social welfare standards but, increasingly, to a "secondary system of industrial citizenship," i.e., to rights in the social workplace. Third, the foregoing is related to what Goldthorpe calls the "emergence of a mature working class," referring to a working class that is almost entirely second-generation or more, largely free of pre-capitalist illusions, largely stable and self-recruiting, but nevertheless "very imperfectly accommodated by the capitalist system *per se*, in that its members lack any value commitment to the basic principle of this system—namely, that the life-chances and welfare of

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individuals are most appropriately determined by the 'free' working out of market forces" (p. 207). It is not that the working class is revolutionary, but rather that it is increasingly capable of engaging in distributional dissent and competition, which limits the ability of governments to restrain its demands through deflationary policies. All in all, then, Goldthorpe suggests that "over recent decades the generally rising rate of inflation reflects a situation in which conflict between social groups and strata has become *more intense* and also to some extent *more equally matched*, with these two tendencies interacting in a mutually reinforcing way" (p. 196).

Macrosociological theories of this kind deserve much more attention among economists and others concerned with "expectational" constraints. But to be useful, they require translation into public opinion data and political institutional behavior; that is, it is necessary to show how polity and economy interact through concrete processes and at different levels. The authors of a third set of papers in Hirsch and Goldthorpe attempt to do this with some success. Their studies break down into two categories which, it seems to me, reflect the two approaches to political economy that now dominate the field: utility-maximizing rational-choice models which are derived from positivist economic theory, and institutional-structuralist models which point in a "corporatist" direction. To varying degrees they encompass all of the theories previously discussed in this paper. Moreover, all of them emphasize the weakness of contemporary governments, or their vulnerability to pressures which can no longer be contained within the traditional frameworks of either market allocation or central economic management.

Samuel Brittan's essay on "Inflation and Democracy" is more effective in bringing public choice theory to bear on policy making than Buchanan and Wagner's cramped interpretation of voting myopia. To begin with, Brittan asks why *governments* (neutrally defined as "a ruler") might find it in their interest to pursue inflation—up to a point —*as a policy*. The most obvious advantage lies in maximizing revenues insofar as inflation works as a tax on nominal cash balances. From there, Brittan moves to an analysis of constraints (both economic and political) that prevent democratic governments from achieving an "optimal" rate of inflation. The most important of these is the temptation to follow policies that produce unsustainably high levels of employment prior to elections. Brittan incorporates William Nordhaus's well-known econometric model of the "political business cycle" to

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substantiate his argument.[22] Given time lags between monetary and fiscal expansion and inflationary adjustments, the voters can indeed be fooled—but only temporarily. In the not-so-very-long-run, the deteriorating Phillips-curve tradeoff between inflation and unemployment comes home to roost in the form of growing stagflation and voter disillusionment. But Brittan does not insist that this is the only—or even the primary—source of accelerating inflation since the 1960s. He is willing to admit the possibility that an autonomous wage-push from labor, departure from the gold standard, "Keynesian" budget practices (which however never fully took root outside Britain and the U.S.), and a host of other exogenous factors have also contributed. While eschewing both the technical arrogance of other monetarists and the simplistic notions of the "vote motive" advanced by some public choice theorists, Brittan holds out some prospect for mutual learning among all sectors as the disillusions of money inflation sink in. But he also warns that failure to learn the lessons of democratic self-restraint first outlined by Schumpeter will eventually lead to collapse.

Lurking beneath Brittan's analysis, of course, is Milton Friedman's concept of a "natural rate of unemployment," which raises the issue of governmental capacities to resist trade-union demands (whether for real or for nominal benefits).[23] In the one paper contributed by a political scientist (Malcolm Anderson), an attempt is made to model government-union interaction in a situation of confrontation (the example used is the British Conservative government's effort to implement its Industrial Relations Act of 1971). Utilizing Brian Barry's partial theory of power as "inducement/coercion" interaction,[24] Anderson postulates that the costs of issuing threats and promises considerably reduce the net gains of obtaining compliance—especially since the available options are not finely graded, but "lumpy"; that is, threats and promises may quickly jump from one level to another (for example, from benefit negotiation to legal suits or arrests). The outcome may be a net loss of power by government at various stages of escalation, since in established democracies coercive remedies are inherently limited. However, the costs and benefits involved are so subjective and so poorly defined that it is doubtful that this approach affords much prospect for

[22] Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economic Studies*, XLII (April 1975), 169-90.

[23] Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 58 (March 1968), 1-17.

[24] Barry, "Power: and Economic Analysis," in Barry, ed., *Power and Political Theory* (London: Wiley, 1976).

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empirical analysis. About all that can be said is that the powers of government are severely limited in conflict situations.

In contrast to these theories, which imply an economic calculus between independent political actors (though not necessarily that "everyone maximizes"), the final two papers concentrate on political-institutional constraints on market behavior, broadly defined. A cogent essay by Richard Portes describes the intricate set of institutional controls employed in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. in order to prevent consumer and labor demands from outpacing real economic growth. Although such controls may not appear relevant to Western systems, the essay serves to remind us of the lengths to which non-capitalist regimes have had to go to prevent creeping inflation. In the two cases in which some of the controls were abandoned (for different reasons) in the early 1970s—Poland and Hungary—the governments quickly lost control of prices and workers' demands. As the present breakdown in Poland illustrates, "de-institutionalization" may occur if controlled sectors are able to assert a claim to corporate autonomy (through, it would appear, the very kind of confrontational dynamic analyzed by Anderson). But here the normal cost-push process was reversed—price inflation largely preceded demands for corporate organization—and it remains to be seen whether such organizations can be accommodated within a revamped system of controls.

Colin Crouch sets out a mirror image of institutional development in capitalist economies, according to which the corporate organization of economic interests has advanced rapidly in order to escape the regulation of the free market and to invoke the powers of the state to pursue further gains.

> The market system can cope with interests only if they are constituted in a particular way; as soon as an economic interest reaches a position where it is able to affect the market, it is free from at least some aspects of regulation. This happens as soon as it is able to overcome the condition of individualization and atomization which is essential to perfect competition; in other words, as soon as the interest becomes organized. In Pizzorno's . . . phrase, organization means a "capacity for strategy," which might be defined as an ability to take action aimed at the direct achievement of goals . . . (p. 220).

> The quasi-political element inherent in decision-making and allocative aspects of economic control becomes increasingly more important than subordination to market forces. The actions of such units necessarily engage the polity . . . (p. 221).

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> The state having once acquired an active role in the economy, for no matter what reasons, there are in-built tendencies for the process to intensify. . . . To the extent that areas of social regulation are at least partly removed from the sphere of the market and located in the polity, social interests will have to take on a political role if they are to influence events. Thus, even if state intervention begins as a response to organization, it is itself likely to generate a further increase in organization . . . (p. 222).

These fundamental propositions, which may be read to encompass theories as diverse as Beer's "collectivist" polity,[25] Lowi's "interest group liberalism" and "state of receivership,"[26] Lindblom's business domination of "public" interests,[27] Janowitz's loss of "capacity for self-regulation,"[28] and the more formal theories of corporatism developed by Philippe Schmitter and others,[29] point to growing structural constraints to economic management as policies are increasingly formulated in separate arenas. But the problem is not simply one of "policy fragmentation" and "political overload." In Crouch's words, "the processes of the organization of interests and their subsequent politicization impose demands for economic resources greater than those which can be satisfied. Unless there is a continuing high rate of economic growth or a major shift in the pattern of effective interests in the society, this can only lead to inflation" (p. 225).

The gulf between economists (including Keynesians) and structuralists is thus virtually complete.[30] Even "monopoly" theorists fail to grasp the political effects of corporatism insofar as they concentrate on phenomena such as administered price and wage setting. Nor do public choice theories which ignore institutions such as these get at the reality of politics.[31] There may be ways forward for transcending the partic-

[25] Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Random House, 1967).

[26] Theodore H. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1979).

[27] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

[28] Morris Janowitz, *The Last Half-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

[29] Special issue on corporatism, ed. by Philippe Schmitter, *Comparative Political Studies*, x (April 1977); Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[30] It is not total, of course, because of mavericks such as John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Heilbroner, and Lester Thurow, plus various members of the "Post Keynesian" school that has recently developed. Cf. esp. Alfred S. Eichner, ed., *A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), and Thurow (fn. 19).

[31] Public choice theory has been applied to a variety of political institutions and processes including bureaucracies, interest groups, and legislatures by others. See Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); William Niskanen, Jr., *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine-

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ularism of interests—such as increased planning and co-determination of management (Crouch, 233ff)—but these are unlikely to be accepted by economists in search of impersonal market rules. It is not surprising, then, that the book concludes with a chapter on "The Ideological Underlay of Inflation" by Fred Hirsch.

Like almost all other contributors to the volume, Hirsch begins with the observation that inflation is technically a monetary problem. But he argues that "technical" changes in the international monetary and banking system—above all, the phased abandonment of the metallic base of currency—have produced "endogenous" constraints on the ability of governments to control money supplies (along with "real economic disturbances" like wars and changes in the terms of trade for such commodities as oil). The motivations behind these changes are, however, themselves to be found in "political and social pressures." Taking a functionalist view shared by several other authors, he argues that "inflation has served as a vent for distributional strife, an escape hatch through which excess demands are automatically channelled" (p. 270). The issue is, then, how one interprets this phenomenon, and that is where ideology inevitably enters. One set of approaches—largely adhered to by economists, but also by many others—treats "such conflict as a political intrusion that destroys the harmony of implicit co-operation through individual pursuit of individual advantage in competitive markets" (p. 270). The other set interprets "political organization of economic power, and the ensuing distributional conflict, as a natural outgrowth of market society" (p. 271). Hirsch brilliantly spells out the policy implications of each set of perceptions at some length (too much so to be summarized here). This issue is the red thread running through all current (and most past) disputes in political economy. It is no longer a dispute between classical economists and Marxists, for it cuts across all theories and models. It does not preclude avenues for "closure"; Hirsch himself suggests that sociopolitical theories such as Goldthorpe's can be given an economic edge, and that certain economic theories (especially the theory of public goods) can be extended to encompass political and ideological conflict.[32] In the remainder of this

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Atherton, 1971); Thomas E. Borcherding, ed., *Budgets and Bureaucrats* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977); Douglas W. Rae and Theodore J. Eismeier, eds., *Public Policy and Public Choice* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979); and Russell (fn. 12). But the emphasis has for the most part been on organizational incentives, log-rolling, coalition formation, and budgetary allocation.

[32] See, e.g., William Loehr and Todd Sandler, eds., *Public Goods and Public Policy* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978). The ultimate problem for Hirsch may come down to Arrow's paradox by which it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of individuals

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essay, I suggest a further area for collaboration: economic and political expectations.

III. The Politics of Economic Decline

A few basic propositions may be derived from the foregoing discussion:

1. Keynesian economic management has failed because it was based on elite presumptions of rational manipulation of aggregate market factors from above which ignored disequilibrating political pressures and structural changes from below (however defined). Political actors have instead manipulated economic policies for short-term advantage, thus progressively undermining the capacity for countercyclical fiscal and monetary control.
2. The macroeconomic performance failures of governments are deeply rooted in the structure and processes of contemporary democratic politics and not only in the "wooly-mindedness" or "irrationality" of individual political leaders or specific governments.
3. Sustained economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s concealed issues of relative income distribution which now confront policy makers as affluence has created rising expectations that can no longer be met simultaneously for all strata of the population. Inflation rather than growth became the vent for distributional pressures in the 1970s.
4. The limits of inflation as a policy by default have been reached: money illusion has faded and the burdens of stabilization must be allocated to different sectors. Unless a new growth coalition emerges quickly, political conflict is likely to intensify appreciably in the 1980s in view of current levels of political organization.
5. Consensual solutions are dependent on political learning at all levels of society and not simply on the restoration of impersonal market rules. Unless rational expectations (defined politically as well as economically) are generated among leaders, organizations, and the mass public, there is little hope for such solutions.

The first four of these conclusions may be well on their way to being accepted as part of a new conventional wisdom in political economy. The last point is much more controversial; its implications are as yet poorly understood. Many economists (and politicians) still reduce it to a problem of scaling down expectations through restoration of market disciplines or some kind of psychological shock treatment, while political scientists and sociologists tend to view political learning as a function of relatively static socialization processes or partisanship. It is in this context that James Alt makes a major contribution in his excellent

into coherent majorities because of intransitivities—in this case including ideological preferences that enter the social welfare function.

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book, *The Politics of Economic Decline*. Alt throws more light on the potentials for "learning" responses to economic crisis than any previous student of postindustrial democracies. In the process, he provides numerous insights that serve to qualify the assertions made in points 1 to 4 above. Indeed, Alt goes far toward developing a more realistic approach to political economy.

The Politics of Economic Decline is a sad story, but not an entirely discouraging one. As Alt points out, Britain has the dubious distinction of being the country with the most prolonged experience of stagflation, and thus provides the leading case study on its political implications. His detailed analysis of policy making, policy outcomes, and public reaction covers the decade from 1964 to 1974, but the interpretation carries forward into the late 1970s (though not, unfortunately, to the 1979 election). The picture which emerges is one of "the politics of disillusion." Nevertheless, it holds out some prospect of a political community adjusting to the new realities of economics.

First, Alt's book is an extraordinarily sophisticated quantitative public-opinion analysis focusing on the response of individuals to economic policies and outcomes. But, in contrast to previous studies of this general nature, it not only covers an awesome range of variables and survey evidence, but also places the statistical analyses in a rich context of institutional and policy description.[33] A preliminary chapter sets out the principal goals and instruments of macroeconomic policy in Britain and traces their outcomes since the 1950s in comparison with other countries. The nature and extent of the "performance failures" is thus laid out at the beginning, providing the rationale for Alt's study: "one has as good a picture as one can get of the failure of a managed economy in Western industrial society. If ever there was a time when people should be aware of economic developments this would be it, and if ever subjective perceptions of economic well-being would have wider political effects, this would be the time" (p. 43).

Second, Alt breaks new ground in rejecting established theories of economic voting behavior. Both the static rational choice models deriving from Downs (and still underlying most public choice theories) and the Michigan psychological models elaborated by Donald Stokes and his associates are found inadequate for explaining the response of voters to economic policy. In particular, Alt takes issue with the hallowed distinction between "position" and "valence" issues which provides the

[33] Compare, for example, the classic aggregate voting studies such as Gerald H. Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65 (March 1971), and others cited in fn. 16 above.

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framework for issue analysis in Butler and Stokes's *Political Change in Britain*,[34] as well as in numerous other studies. He convincingly demonstrates that opinion data in Britain provide little substantiation for the conclusion that voters are motivated primarily by vague consensual images of a few key variables such as the general state of the economy or the relative competence of the competing parties in managing it (pp. 21-22, and throughout). Rather, public perceptions are rooted in a much more complex, differentiated, and dynamic set of *personal* evaluations which frequently involve differences over ends as well as means.

Third, Alt goes well beyond all previous studies in considering the role of (future) *expectations* as a function of (past) perceptions. He builds his case for voter rationality (for the most part) not on the economists' presumption of individual utility maximizing with imperfect information ("rational ignorance") or the structuralists' insistence on class-status needs or group affinities, but on a close empirical analysis of survey data bearing on information feedback from the economy to individuals and its impact on their attitudes toward personal well-being and chances for economic improvement. Perceptions of personal and national well-being are influenced by different factors, and give rise to differentiated outlooks toward the economy at micro- and macro-levels (chap. 5). It is the personal component that is most dynamic and that most influences economic expectations. This does not mean that the individual citizen simply extrapolates past trends or that his expectations are purely a projection of personal experience. In anticipating inflation rates, for example, people exaggerate actual levels and adapt expectations to past errors; but if allowances are made for interval jumps in survey replies, their expectations of future trends are remarkably accurate (pp. 73-75). On other matters, such as real growth rates, the public discounts both past trends and future prospects, thus conforming in a crude way to the rational-expectations model.[35]

Finally, Alt deals with the "supply side" of policy too; that is, the response of government to political feedback from economic outcomes and public opinion. Government is pictured as pursuing certain key targets—real growth, inflation rate, employment, trade balances—which are increasingly inconsistent and subject to political and economic constraints. The issue is how governments make explicit or implicit tradeoffs to find an optimal policy mix. In this context, Alt de-

[34] David Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976).

[35] Willes (fn. 4). Alt discusses several models of expectation formation in chapter 4.

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molishes simplistic notions of a political business cycle by which the incumbent politicians automatically sacrifice longer-term goals to electoral expediency. He reviews a number of cyclical popularity models and finds a partial fit to British data (the Heath government of 1970–1974 being the primary exception). A perennial cycle has been observed since World War II by which governments lose popularity following an election and benefit from a resurgence in partisan support prior to the next election (though the mid-term "troughs" have become deeper and the resurgence weaker with the decline of party identification). The question is then how much of the backswing is attributable to government manipulation of the economy (e.g., reducing inflation or raising disposable income) in the months prior to the election. Tufte, Frey, and others have argued that this is the principal means by which governments re-elect themselves.[36] Alt presents a considerably more complex interpretation.[37] On the other hand, he argues convincingly (chap. 6) that government support is affected by economic circumstances only insofar as objective conditions are mediated through the intervening variables of public perceptions and expectations. This mediation occurs in a highly differentiated and asymmetrical way. For example, inflation rates reduce a government's popularity only if they are significantly higher than anticipated so as to be perceived at crisis level, thus exceeding a *threshold* boundary (pp. 120-22). Moreover, it is primarily *negative* perceptions of this magnitude that affect popularity ratings; positive achievements such as real growth or higher disposable income have a lesser impact. But there is no automatic correlation between the state of the economy and voting, even considering such vaunted predictors as personal disposable income. On the other hand, Alt demonstrates that governments, in Britain at least, have not followed economic policies calculated to maximize their immediate electoral advantage. Applying Macrae's model for predicting a "vote loss function,"[38] Alt shows that recent governments (again, with the partial exception of the truncated Heath government) have acted more in conformity with a "strategic" rather than a "myopic" assessment of voter perceptions (chap. 7). A strategic view assumes that the electorate is "capable of seeing tomorrow's inflation in today's low unemployment" and that the government attempts to maximize its chances of winning over an indefinite time horizon (p. 142). This view also

[36] Tufte, Frey (fn. 9).

[37] See also Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, "Electoral Cycles, Budget Controls and Public Expenditure," *Journal of Public Policy*, 1 (February 1981), 37-59.

[38] Duncan Macrae, "A Political Model of the Business Cycle," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 85 (April 1977), 239-64.

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assumes that the relative vote loss from unemployment and inflation (in Phillips-curve terms) has shifted toward the latter over time. Alt finds that British governments have been sensitive to these shifts—although continuing to give higher priority to controlling unemployment in the early 1970s than administrations in the U.S.—but that they have simply not abandoned longer-term targets to maximize electoral payoff, as the "myopic" hypothesis would suggest.

What about citizens' policy preferences? How well do people really understand economic policy *issues* (as opposed to trends), and what influences their choice among policy alternatives? How do these policy preferences relate to perceptions and expectations, as well as to party identification, education, income, and other social variables? Alt devotes the middle part of his book (chaps. 8-12) to these thorny questions, focusing specifically on preferences regarding policies to control inflation. Interest in this section is heightened by the fact that people in Britain clearly saw inflation as the paramount economic issue by the early 1970s, but that they simultaneously lost faith in the ability of either party to control it: whereas in 1970, 60 percent of the electorate felt that "a government can do a lot to check rising prices," by 1974 only a quarter of the people felt that way (p. 157).

Alt's analysis of the determinants of preference formation on this issue involves a series of complex statistical maneuvers which generally produce consistent but somewhat inconclusive results. First, he reports some interesting data indicating limited public comprehension of the causes and implications of inflation (which is quite understandable in view of differences among economists and other elites). For instance, polls indicate rapid shifts in opinion over what factors are to blame (p. 162), and only about one-fourth of the public seems to perceive any tradeoff between unemployment and inflation (p. 172).[39] But Alt discerns a sizable proportion of "realists" (up to more than 40 percent) in certain categories of the population: people with weaker party identification; with higher education, media exposure, and income; and those for whom the issue has greater "centrality" due to pessimism over the impact of inflation on their personal well-being (pp. 175-78). These factors appear to exert a much stronger influence on policy preferences than partisan cues, class, or other general influences. Those "realists" who perceive tradeoffs are—regardless of party—far more likely to prefer reducing inflation to reducing unemployment (p. 192), although among the general public unemployment is seen as the least desirable

[39] The data here are for 1969-1970. Alt suggests that there may have been changes somewhat later in the 1970s.

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means of combatting inflation (p. 205). Two important sets of conclusions which corroborate more sophisticated versions of public choice theory emerge. First, although most people appear to view counter-inflation policy in terms of universalistic effects on social welfare, policy preferences in the electorate are not "single-peaked" and cannot be ordered along a unidimensional scale of voter preferences (pp. 210-16). Simple spatial models of the vote-maximizing, "median" voter position are thus inadequate, and policy "cycling" is inevitable. Second, people are only as altruistic about reducing unemployment as they can afford to be. That is, they are willing to choose policies which mainly alleviate the suffering of others only to the extent that they do not perceive their own interests to be at stake (p. 184).

The latter point is a theme that runs throughout the remainder of the book, in which Alt addresses the larger implications for British democracy. The results are most paradoxical. Although there are ample grounds for voter response to inflation and other economic problems as "position" issues, "instrumental" voting for parties (i.e., voting in terms of personal economic benefits) actually *declined* sharply between 1966 and 1974, especially among Labour voters (pp. 243-44). The explanation lies in the public's reduced expectations that either party could effectively control the economy, an attitude that both reflected *and contributed to* the decline of parties. For those still supporting the major parties, then, the 1974 elections were largely a matter of retreating to traditional loyalties, with few expectations of improvement. But underneath this temporary reaffirmation of the status quo, Alt sees profound attitudinal shifts in response to economic decline: some hardening of ideological lines between parties, but, even more importantly, a marked erosion of altruistic attitudes toward social welfare spending and the less privileged—particularly among Labour supporters who perceive their personal economic situation to be deteriorating (pp. 258-62). Thus, overall, economic hardship may be seen to have three major impacts at the system level: it undermines instrumental support for parties and furthers party de-alignment insofar as people cease to identify their personal economic fortunes with governmental capacities; it may contribute to ideological polarization if parties retreat to their traditional social bases, while at the same time limiting the appeal of ideologies as people adjust their aspirations to expectations; and it augurs a general shift to the right as public attitudes toward social altruism harden in the face of personal economic difficulty. The implications for the 1979 election and the breakup of the Labour Party could not be more striking.

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The ultimate question, of course, is what this means for governability and social conflict. Rose and Peters, for example, have warned of "political bankruptcy" if present trends continue: declining political legitimacy, manifested in growing popular indifference and evasion of authority.[40] Other analyses discussed earlier in this essay would predict rising class and status conflicts or spiraling frustration as rising expectations cannot be met. Alt's conclusion, while sharing these concerns, is rather different and more encouraging. What he sees in Britain is a "politics of quiet disillusion" as people adapt their expectations to reality. He may be overly sanguine when he states that "popular adaptiveness leads to a situation in which the electorate can take virtually any economic development calmly" (p. 266), or when he suggests that "a slow economic decline could continue without necessarily increasing the number of people who consistently feel that they are becoming worse off." But his argument that "expectations occupy a critical place in the chain of events" (p. 272) is essential to understanding the prospects for democracy as well as the human factors in political economy.

IV. Conclusion

There is widespread agreement that Keynesian macroeconomic levers are no longer effective instruments for stabilization at high levels of employment and output in Western economies. The reason is that "the efficient operation of the levers is itself dependent on their effect on the actions of those whose actions the levers seek to control" (Peacock and Rickets, in Hirsch and Goldthorpe, 126). These actions include the behavior of voters, politicians, and corporate interest groups as well as individual consumers, households, and firms. Such political and economic actors are not passive objects of macroeconomic policy, but active participants in the policy process. They continually adjust to new opportunities and incentives by exercising rational choice based on perceptions, expectations, and preferences. The result again is chronic disequilibrium at the aggregate level—as in Keynes's day. Though the mix of causes and effects is now different, the fundamental issue is one that Keynes identified: uncertainty over the future and its psychological impact on economic behavior, especially investment. For Keynes, the immediate problems were "irrational" liquidity preferences, sticky wages, and falling consumption; for many of today's economists, the

[40] Richard Rose and Guy Peters, *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

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central issues are high taxes, declining productivity, and excessive consumption.

In conditions of uncertainty, expectations become the key variable for they determine the real opportunities people foresee. In adaptive-expectations theory, people adjust future expectations to past performance and experience, either by simple extrapolation of recent trends or by correcting for past errors.[41] Rational-expectation theorists carry the argument a step further and reason that actors utilize "new" information to anticipate the future impact of government policies and proceed accordingly, regardless of the intended effect of the policy; therefore the aggregate effects of policies cannot be predicted by existing macroeconomic models.[42] While this is doubtful in view of informational constraints, the essential point is the same: people behave according to what they expect to happen. Whether this is rational depends on one's assumptions about the conditions of choice, but behavioral patterns and consequences are a matter for empirical research.

The works reviewed here reach widely different conclusions about this process and the interaction between economy and polity. From one basic perspective, the problems originate in the incentives of democratic competition which have induced governments to intervene increasingly in a vain attempt to reduce economic uncertainty by controlling (and distorting) market mechanisms. In this view, decisions are rational if they maximize the marginal utilities of individual actors in free economic markets or in non-market contexts such as elections. But because each person maximizes, his private and public choices will not be congruent: while seeking private gain in the marketplace, he will opt for public policies that promise him the greatest visible benefits at least personal cost. This is the collective-goods problem identified by most public choice theorists. It is more generally viewed as a problem of excess political demand from voters and politicians with short-time horizons and rising expectations. The result is an overload of public benefits, entitlements, regulations, and deficits—resulting in inflation beyond the capacity of economies to sustain. In Brittan's words, "Just as democracy whips up expectations, it reduces the means available for fulfilling these expectations" (Hirsch and Goldthorpe, 176). Unless people reduce their expectations for governmental services and protec-

[41] Alt distinguishes between simple "extrapolation" models and more complex "adaptive" ones, and finds more support for the latter (chap. 4); but others combine the two in the concept of adaptive expectations.

[42] See Willes (fn. 4). Cf. Paul Davidson, "Post Keynesian Economics: Solving the Crisis in Economic Theory," also in *The Public Interest* (fn. 3), esp. 159-62.

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tion, their private expectations will be frustrated as their market behavior undermines all macroeconomic policy. Politics and markets destroy each other. (Marx would be gratified.)

From another basic perspective, current problems and policies are the result of structural evolution in the economy and society, which both produce and necessitate governmental allocation of resources in the interest of political and social stability. Large-scale organizations now dominate both political and economic marketplaces (again Marx would be gratified), inevitably and legitimately invoking governmental control as each sector rationally seeks to defend its own corporate interests. Rationality is defined broadly to encompass the relative distribution of income, power, and welfare among collective groups. As Goldthorpe and others point out, it may be quite rational for unions to pursue real collective gains if the strategic behavior of other groups leads them to expect that others will do the same; from their vantage point, there need be nothing "rational" about the current distribution of resources. It is a question of how far strategic actors choose to push their political and market advantages in what can easily become a zero-sum game. If they do not seek to maximize first-order preferences, it is a function of moral as well as economic constraints. Moral restraint is conditioned by many things, but future expectation of relative gain is probably one of them.[43]

There thus appear to be firm grounds for theories of political economy focusing on the role of expectations (even Keynesians now recognize expectations-augmented demand-pull, while monetarists stress the importance of stable expectations regarding money supply, and supply-siders hope to liberate expectations of profit through tax cuts). But how does all this bear on politics and the conditions for democratic stability? We may well conclude that we are engaged in an increasingly dangerous and unstable psychological game in which voter and other political preferences shift rapidly and unpredictably in response to frustrated expectations and performance failures. The result could be fleeting majorities, policy oscillation, social conflict, and political as well as economic bankruptcy, perhaps accompanied by ever more authoritarian

[43] Cf. Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, "The Structure of Class Conflict in Advanced Capitalist Societies," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Aug. 28-31, 1980. The authors develop a game-theoretic model of structural conditions permitting "class compromise" between workers and capitalists. Although subjective motivations such as "moral restraint" are not considered, the "compromise" depends very much on workers' expectations that profits "delegated" to business will be of benefit to them in the future.

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efforts to restore order. There are plenty of doom scenarios of this kind.[44]

James Alt's research provides some grounds for being more optimistic about the future. His rich empirical findings suggest that people —the mass public who do in fact elect governments—are neither as ignorant nor as "myopic" as other theories imply. By and large, they form realistic perceptions of the economy and expectations of the future. They discount political promises and do not expect governments to solve all problems. They lower their aspirations in line with expectations, and modify their preferences accordingly. Many factors other than the state of the economy affect their personal sense of well-being.[45] Obviously we cannot assume too much elasticity between popular preferences and governmental effectiveness in delivering the goods. Alt's work does not yet reveal the limits of tolerance or the critical thresholds and boundaries of people's adaptiveness; that is the research agenda for the future. But he has demonstrated a "political learning curve"—at least in Britain—that allows room for maneuver and change in public policy. In doing so, he has directed attention to a fundamental point: in politics, as in economics, it is expectations that count.

[44] For examples written from different perspectives see, e.g., Robert Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: Norton, 1974); Michel Crozier and others, *The Crisis of Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1975); and Alan Wolfe, *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1977). Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the 'Governability' of Democracies," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 51 (October-December 1980), 393-410.

[45] On this fundamental point, see Rose and Peters (fn. 40), 244ff, and Richard Rose, "Ordinary People in Extraordinary Economic Circumstances," in Rose, ed., *Challenge to Governance: Studies in Overloaded Polities* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980).

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IMPONDERABLES OF THE HOLOCAUST

By HENRY L. MASON

Uwe D. Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich*. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1979, 382 pp., DM 20.00 (paper, reprint from 1972 edition).

Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*. The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1969–1980, 10 vols.*

Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust*. New York: Free Press, 1979, 468 pp., $15.95.

Jacob Presser, *Ondergang*. The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij - Martinus Nijhoff, 1965, 2 vols., 1094 pp., f. 29.50.**

Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die Sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978, 445 pp., DM 41.00.

GEORGE Steiner reminds us that "the world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside reason."[1] Nevertheless, numerous attempts have been made to unravel that world's incomprehensibility. After the considerable impact made by the large-scale coverages by such authors as Raul Hilberg and Lucy Dawidowicz,[2] more narrowly focused studies have been appearing, many in languages other than English. Relying chiefly on five such studies, but giving attention also to other writings, the present article will examine several of the major imponderables of the Holocaust.

The first is the development of consensus among the various German elites—a consensus through which the Final Solution became possible. The second concerns the incremental kind of decision-making that led to the efficiently implemented mass annihilation of the Jews. Third is a passive mood toward the disasters befalling the Jews that prevailed on the part of the entire universe of bystanders; in the case of the Netherlands, for example, this passivity, in spite of an unusually low degree of anti-Semitism, resulted in an unusually high degree of Jewish

* The total number of volumes is actually 17, since most of them were issued in two parts. Several volumes are still to follow, including one on the Dutch East Indies and an Epilogue (scheduled for 1983 and 1985, respectively). The work has also been published by Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague) in an edition containing additional reference materials.

** A much abridged English translation was published in 1969, under the title *The Destruction of the Dutch Jews* (New York: Dutton).

[1] Steiner, *Language and Silence* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 123.

[2] Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961); Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975).

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victimization—in contrast to the so-called Danish reversal, where the bystanders did care. Finally, there is the unimaginable predicament experienced by the victims and their "governments," the Jewish Councils (such as the Amsterdam *Joodsche Raad*), who never had a chance to develop workable responses to such a catastrophe.

Although Hilberg's work does reflect the concerns of the political scientist, one must credit Helen Fein with being the first scholar to apply social science concepts systematically and rigorously to a great variety of Holocaust topics, especially those relating to the interactions among killers, victims, and bystanders. She succeeds in developing worthwhile hypotheses and generalizations that are at best hinted at in other writings. Uwe Adam's book is an imaginative, profound, and fair analysis of the development and culmination of the anti-Jewish measures in Germany, an effective complement to H. G. Adler's differently focused volume.[3] Christian Streit's monograph, originally a doctoral dissertation at the University of Heidelberg, deals primarily with the responsibility of the German army for the second Nazi holocaust, the killing of the Soviet prisoners of war. With his description of the monstrous nature of Hitler's East War, he contributes substantially to our understanding of the collaboration of the older German elites with the Jewish Holocaust as well as with the East War. The accomplishment of Louis de Jong, the long-time director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, in his multivolume depiction of the Dutch experience in World War II, has not been paralleled in the literature of the war as to scope, depth, and readability. Extensive parts of many of his volumes are devoted to the fate of the Jews in the occupied Netherlands and the locales of annihilation in the East, and also to the desertion of the Dutch Jews by most of their compatriots, from the highest officials to the man in the street. The late Jacob Presser, also writing for the Institute for War Documentation, published his remarkable, scholarly volumes in 1965; he did not have at his disposal all the materials available to de Jong. Nevertheless, as a Jewish survivor of the occupation, Presser could provide emotional and experiential insights not matched even by his colleague.

I. The East War and the Swaying of the German Elites

Hitler's war against the Soviet Union is described by Streit as "the most monstrous war of conquest, enslavement, and annihilation in

[3] Adler, *Der Verwaltete Mensch; Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1974).

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modern history. . . ." This "ideological war of destruction" involved the army as well as the SS, and was based on much more than mere "calculations of power politics" (pp. 21-26, 304-5).[4] The East War originated the "interlocking of planning for war and race politics": Hitler's geopolitical schemes, Germany's "turn toward the East," and the actions against the "world enemy," the Jews, were linked (Adam, 23, 159, 333).

The war for the conquest of "Germany's India"[5] resulted in a less well-known Nazi holocaust, the annihilation of the Russian prisoners of war. The majority of these prisoners were disposed of in premeditated fashion by outright killing immediately after capture or by "natural means"—which was the term the German killers used for starvation, freezing to death, or exposure to epidemics. More than three million Soviet prisoners had been taken during 1941; 60 percent of them were dead by February 1942. Of a total of 5.7 million Russian soldiers captured in the East War, 3.3 million (57.8 percent) died at the hands of the Germans. As Streit shows, the German army fully cooperated with this operation, which was permitted to continue until 1943. Germany's desperate labor shortage then led to a change of policy, as a result of which some 1.5 million Soviet prisoners were still alive by 1945.[6]

THE ESSENTIAL COOPERATION OF THE OLDER ELITES

Neither the East War nor the Jewish Holocaust could have been implemented without the cooperation of the older German elites. All the non-Nazi elites—not just the army, but also the civil servants, the diplomats, and the industrialists—collaborated in the shift from conventional war to the annihilation tactics of the East War as well as in the

[4] Streit credits Ernst Nolte with being the first historian to depict the real nature of the German East War, in *Der Faschism is in seiner Epoche* (Munich: Piper, 1963); it had been ignored in the traditional coverages of World War II. It has been "virtually an article of faith" that the German *military* operations against the Soviet Union had been "basically normal," that the German army's hands had remained clean (Streit, 21).

All translations from the German and Dutch in this article are the responsibility of the present author.

[5] Sebastian Haffner, *Anmerkungen zu Hitler* (Munich: Kindler Verlag, 1978), 22.

[6] During World War I, only 5.4% of the millions of Russian prisoners of war had died in German captivity. The death rate among the millions of French prisoners captured by Hitler's armies during the "normal" war of June-July 1940 was even lower (Streit, 10, 135-37, 172). De Jong concluded that of a total of 5.5 million Soviet prisoners, 1 million were liquidated by the *Einsatzgruppen*, and 2.3 million died from hunger, cold, and disease (VIII [1], 52). Although Streit's (and de Jong's) statistics have been disputed by some, as expected, there appears to have been no real challenge in Germany to Streit's main thesis concerning the involvement of the German army in the killings. Note, for example, Klaus Harprecht's favorable review article, "Eine traurige deutsche Wahrheit," *Merkur*, XXXIII (December 1979), 1233-40.

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implementation of the Final Solution. The German elites, in spite of their divergent interests and ethics, "could agree on the destruction of the Jews" and were fused "into a machinery of destruction."[7]

Streit provides a convincing account of this fusion. Hitler is seen as quite "pragmatic." He realized how much he needed the older elites, and he was aware at what point they no longer followed him. Hitler's "concrete" plans tended to be mere fantasies: "The question of the mediation between the ideal and reality remained open." The fantasies could be pushed toward realization only if there was a consensus between the Nazis and the older elites on a particular issue. Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler doubted that the older elites would countenance a real East War or a "final" Final Solution. Only after the great victories in the West and the sensational successes of the early stages of the Soviet campaign in summer 1941 did the older elites cave in. As the East Empire seemed assured in all of its grandeur, the army and others felt that they had to "out-Hitler" (*überhitlern*) the Party and their non-Nazi rivals so as to secure an appropriate role in "Germany's India." Colonial rule would benefit all the loyal elites—even if a brief interlude of "dirty work" had to be tolerated in connection with the East War's methods and the measures against the Jews (Streit, 27, 53, 296-300).

The most complete elite fusion contributing to the Holocaust was Himmler's Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), created in September 1939. It was an amalgamation of the political and other police from the old bureaucracy and the leading SS elements among the Nazis. This most "creative" of all Nazi governmental innovations—which apparently was to be the model for the structures of the Third Reich after the victory—saw to it that the unthinkable crimes of the Final Solution were carried out with "bureaucratic meticulousness and Prussian discipline."[8]

The other Holocaust elite—after the invasion of the Soviet Union—was the German army. During and after the Polish campaign of 1939, the army, with an outspokenness unparalleled in its history,[9] had been a fervent critic of the SS outrages against Jews (and others)—outrages

[7] Hilberg (fn. 2), 33; Andreas Hillgruber, "Die 'Endlösung' und das Deutsche Ostimperium," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, XX (January 1972), 143-48, 152.

This superb journal, published by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte at Munich, will be referred to as *VJhefte ZG* in the citations to follow.

[8] Hilberg (fn. 2), 181; Hans Buchheim, "Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer," *VJhefte ZG*, XI (October 1963), 365-69; Buchheim, *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, I (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1967), 226-27, 313; Adam, 239, 252.

[9] Helmut Krausnick, "Hitler und die Morde in Polen," *VJhefte ZG*, XI (April 1963), 204.

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that were mild when compared to what was to follow. General Blaskowitz, the army commander in Poland, for example, strongly protested police and SS actions against Jews in November 1939; in February 1940, he cited the psychological harm to his troops who had to watch "these crimes" passively: "extreme brutalization and moral depravity" would ensue for all Germans. Blaskowitz reported that "the attitude of the soldiers toward the SS and police ranged from disgust to hatred."[10]

This mood of protest lasted through the French campaign, but the army began to give in to Nazi demands in the spring of 1941, and particularly after the early victories of the Russian campaign. Not only were the SS *Einsatzgruppen* (mobile task forces, or killing commandos) permitted to operate virtually on the frontline (they had been totally banned during the French campaign), but the directives pertaining to them, and to their cooperation with the army in measures concerning the East War and the Final Solution were implemented with a much greater degree of brutality and of direct army involvement than had originally been assumed. Where the pre-invasion arrangements seemed to involve the army mainly as a *Mitwisser* (accessory) in the "dirty work," the actual post-invasion implementation placed the army into the position of active *Mittäter* (accomplice) (Streit, 14, 31, 56, 106).

Other German elites caved in. The Foreign Office worked diligently at its task of transferring as many Jews as possible from the territories of the Axis allies to the gas chambers. Industrial firms, from small shops to I. G. Farben, established direct relationships with both the Jewish and the Soviet prisoner holocausts; many became part of the killing process (de Jong, VIII [2], 815; Streit, 216, 219, 251). A study of the German civil service shows that this elite did manage to preserve some of its traditional ethos and ethics under the Nazis—except on Jewish issues, where "profound and penetrating concessions" were made.[11] An analysis of the churches in Bavaria demonstrates a similar phenomenon: "defense of the church," in the narrowest sense, absorbed the clergy's energy and daring, while they avoided the Jewish issue; the clergy dared to influence the public on the former, but almost totally ignored the latter.[12]

[10] B. A. Sijes, *Studies over Jodenvervolging* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1974), 46-47.

[11] Hans Mommsen, *Beamtentum im Dritten Reich* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 120-22.

[12] Ian Kershaw, "Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung," in M. Broszat and E. Fröhlich, eds., *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979), 316-17.

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THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC

The paucity of studies of German public opinion during 1933–1945 with respect to the anti-Jewish measures has often been noted. The author of one survey at our disposal, on attitudes in Bavaria, observes that "dynamic" haters of Jews (as opposed to "latent" ones), were but a small percentage of the population. Yet the number of "real friends of Jews" was even smaller. While Nazi "race" theories were certainly not widely accepted, they nevertheless played a role in deepening and strengthening latent anti-Semitism. Drastic anti-Jewish actions, particularly if visible on the streets of Germany, did not go over well: the *Kristallnacht* of November 1938 apparently led to a considerable loss of prestige for the Party, and in 1941 the introduction of the star, to be worn by all Jews, caused some embarrassment among the German public. Yet, the study's basic conclusion is that "the Jewish question played only a very subordinate role" as the war dragged on. When the deportations began, in fall of 1941, the public hardly took notice. By 1942, the Jews were no longer an "actually existing and visible group of people" for most Germans. Even before their deportation, the 200,000 remaining German Jews had "disappeared from the range of vision of the German population; as a pauperized and ostracized fringe group, they lived at the periphery of society."[13]

The Nazis treated the Final Solution as the most top-secret of all the secrets of the Third Reich. Evidently, they did not expect popular support for the mass murders. Hitler went out of his way to make it possible for ordinary Germans to assume an "unknowing" stance or to convince themselves that the Jewish measures were less serious than rumor had it. Even when eye-witness reports about the horrible truths of the East did filter through, "if one tried hard enough, one could remain 'unknowing' or at least pretend to be 'unknowing,' even to oneself; and most Germans did precisely that, as did most citizens of the other European countries. . . ."[14] According to the author of the Bavarian study, it is impossible today to answer the question whether the German public knew, or suspected something, about the extermination camps—they were certainly not an "open secret" such as the killing centers of the T4 ("euthanasia") program had been. But there may have been "different degrees of knowledge." Indifference toward the

[13] *Ibid.*, 343-47. The basic indifference of the German public with respect to the measures against the Jews is emphasized also by Marlis G. Steinert, *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen* (Düsseldorf and Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1970), 236-63.

[14] Haffner (fn. 5), 176.

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Jewish fate in the East was the decisive phenomenon: "People had their own worries." The reports from the East, in any case, contained no concrete details; they were just "dark suspicions."[15] In one view, "even the most sensitive persons" considered the rumors about the killings in the East as either exaggerated or reflecting unauthorized acts by underlings.[16] Thus, the "dirty" work could be continued.

II. The Drift to Total Annihilation

The Holocaust represents an unprecedented case of human hubris.[17] Only the Jews, and none of the other "racial" enemies, were selected for *total* annihilation. According to one high Nazi official, to eliminate fifteen million Poles "is not worthy of a cultural nation." The Russians were spared for purposes of slave labor (with the exception of most of the prisoners of war), and the killing of the Gypsies was certainly not implemented on a total scale. The relatively small number of blacks and other non-white "lesser breeds" or "half-breeds" were not bothered.[18]

INCREMENTAL DECISION MAKING

There is general agreement that the Final Solution was not planned, at least not to the extent of the ultimate phases of the mobile killings and the killing centers. Hilberg emphasizes that his "implementation model" is a heuristic device to depict the annihilation process, but decidedly does not describe a premeditated process applied by the Nazis. The implementation of the Holocaust developed "blow by blow," without a "master plan."[19] Adler finds that the "decision-making road" to the Final Solution is still mysterious—partly because, as Herbst points out, the decisions on the major phases of the Final Solution were transmitted only orally, in face-to-face communications between only two persons.[20]

[15] Kershaw (fn. 12), 337-40.

[16] John S. Conway, "Frühe Augenzeugenberichte aus Auschwitz," *VJhefte ZG*, XXVII (April 1979), 260-61. In 1979, the American-made TV series "Holocaust" provoked a fervent discussion in the Federal Republic, which was centered on the extent of "knowing" on the part of the wartime German public. Cf. P. Märthesheimer and I Frenzel, eds., *Der Fernsehfilm "Holocaust"* (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Verlag, 1979).

[17] Cf Erich Goldhagen, "Weltanschauung und Endlösung," *VJhefte ZG*, XXIV (October 1976), 379-405; Alexander Bein, "Der Jüdische Parasit," *VJhefte ZG*, XXIII (April 1965), 121-49.

[18] Jacob Robinson, *And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 93-99, 309.

[19] Hilberg (fn. 2), 640; Presser, I, 6; Adam, 17, 229, 357.

[20] Adler (fn. 3), xxvii, 29; L. Herbst, "Die Krise des Nationalsozialistischen Regimes am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. . . ," *VJhefte ZG*, XXVI (July 1978), 354.

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Uwe Adam provides a convincing account of the incremental development of the annihilation process. During the invasion of Poland, the five *Einsatzgruppen* on the scene were supposed to "annihilate" the Polish leadership as well as "elements undesirable from the RSHA's point of view" (*staatspolizeilich unerwünscht*). On September 27, 1939, Heydrich reported that all but 3 percent of the Polish intelligentsia had been annihilated. After that, the *Einsatzgruppen* began to concentrate on the Jews, but due to protests by the army, Himmler temporarily suspended further killing actions. They were resumed on a relatively "minor" scale as the army moved away from Poland to get ready for the attack in the West. In late September 1939, Hitler discussed the "Jewish problem" with Rosenberg: his "ultimate goal" still seemed to be "a Jewish reservation under German supervision near the Russian border"; he also had an "immediate goal," which involved concentrating all the German Jews in occupied Poland. A year later, in fall of 1940, Eichmann talked about a similar "immediate goal," but a "distant plan" (*Fernplan*) of his referred to the African island of Madagascar, where all the world's Jews would be shipped to be "agriculturally active" under German supervision. Gradually, the term "final solution" (*Endlösung*) replaced "final goal" (*Endziel*) in the language of the RSHA—but for the time being, it still meant the expulsion and isolation of the Jews (Adam, 247-49, 257, 304).

In Adam's view, the decision for a Final Solution "in the sense of a total, organizationally and technically conducted killing" had clearly not yet been taken before or during the first phase of the war against the Soviet Union. That phase did include quick and ruthless exterminations "under the cover of war" by the *Einsatzgruppen*, but not yet a plan for total extermination. In July or August 1941, the RSHA was still making plans for a general solution of the Jewish question after the war (final victory was expected within a few months) which did not seem to assume the total physical annihilation of the Jews. Likewise, in October of 1941, high Nazi officials still discussed "shoving" the Jews "over the Urals." The *Judenpolitik* was "wavering" and "aimless" during the summer and fall of 1941, but a turning point was indicated on October 23, 1941, when all emigration of Jews from the German sphere was stopped. The first mass deportation of German Jews, to the Łódź ghetto, was undertaken on October 14, 1941; on October 24, 1941, the deportation of some 50,000 German Jews to Minsk and Riga began; the latter group was killed on arrival by *Einsatzgruppen*.

According to Adam, the ultimate Holocaust decisions must have

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been reached between September and November of 1941. The reasons were complex, relating to several "interdependent events." The immediate cause was Hitler's command, in September 1941, to make Germany-proper *judenrein* (clean of Jews) while the war was still going on, even though the "shoving over the Urals" had become impossible because of the stalled advance of the German army. The transports from Germany were bound to get bogged down, since there were already far too many Jews in the Eastern ghettos. In this impasse there developed "a way out . . . which was unique in its monstrousness." Further, after Hitler had found it necessary to stop the T4 ("euthanasia") killings in August 1941, the T4 staff of killers had been kept intact and was available to carry out new tasks in the East. It was "hardly accidental," therefore, that the decreed clearing of the Jews from Germany, the termination of T4, the stalled advance of the German army, and the beginning of "technical and organizational annihilation" in Eastern extermination camps occurred at the same time. What may have been among the earliest fantasies and ravings of Hitler became a reality at this tactically favorable moment. The Wannsee Conference, originally called for December 9, 1941, and actually held on January 20, 1942, merely served to coordinate the implementation of what had just been decided, with the various SS and ministerial bureaucracies in attendance (Adam, 305-15).

Martin Broszat, the director of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* at Munich, concurs with Adam's analysis. He emphasizes how little we still know about the origin of the ultimate murderous phases of the Nazi policies against the Jews. In any case, the annihilation was put into effect not as a result of one decision, but in a sense incrementally (*stück- und schubweise*). In spite of the large-scale killings in the East by the *Einsatzgruppen* in summer and fall of 1941, Broszat, like Adam, does not believe that the total annihilation of the non-Eastern Jews or the Jews in the ghettos had already been decided on at that time. The deportation of the German Jews had reached the planning stage in the summer of 1941, and was carried out from mid-October 1941—but the assumption continued to be that the German Jews would "merely" have to perform hard labor in Eastern ghettos and camps (where, to be sure, many were expected to die from "natural causes"). When 20,000 German Jews were suddenly squeezed into the Łódź ghetto in October 1941, its German commandant protested furiously to the RSHA and insisted that his ghetto did not have "the capability to absorb" additional people. This type of "vehement controversy" could hardly have

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taken place if the policy of total annihilation had already been a settled matter at that time. The first large-scale killings, says Broszat, occurred mainly as "a way out of a dead-end street"—to make space in the ghettos. But, "once started and institutionalized, the liquidation practices as such became dominant and led in fact to a formal and complete program." The first extermination camp was opened on December 8, 1941, at Chelmno, for Jews (mostly women and children) from the Łódź ghetto, clearly to "provide breathing space" (*Luft machen*) after the transports from Germany had been dumped there. What had started as an improvisation to accommodate Hitler's sudden whim of making Germany "clean of Jews" before there was space in the "Urals," gradually turned into the regularized practice of annihilation. By late 1941, more and more German officials were willing to use the extermination camps in order to be able to "absorb" the ever-increasing shipments from the West. Annihilation became the "simplest solution," and with the establishment of six extermination camps, "massive experience with institutionalized ways of killing" was attained.[21]

Streit makes an additional point that confirms the incremental nature of the Holocaust decision. The all-encompassing killings could not have been planned with any degree of certainty before the invasion of the Soviet Union, because it was not known how far both high- and low-ranking army leaders would be willing to go with respect to the "dirty work." The original agreement between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the army had not included the wholesale execution of all Jews—only of the Soviet Jews who held state and Party positions. When the *Ein-*

[21] Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlösung,'" *VJhefte ZG*, XXV (October 1977), 746-56. On July 16, 1941, a RSHA leader in Poland suggested to Eichmann that those Jews who could not be used for labor might be killed—some "quick-working" device for killing should be found, and then what sounded "fantastic" could well be made "thoroughly feasible." See Hilberg, *Documents of Destruction* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 87-88.

The following book was published after completion of the present article: Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges; die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981). This huge, amply documented work—another publication of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte—is likely to remain the definitive analysis of the phases of the Holocaust affected by the *Einsatzgruppen*. Krausnick and Wilhelm fully support Streit's conclusions, particularly those relating to the active collaboration of the German army with the *Einsatzgruppen* in the killing of more than two million Russian and Polish Jews. In an interesting concluding note, Wilhelm agrees generally with Adam's and Broszat's "incremental" theory, yet he warns that the Final Solution must not be seen as merely the result of improvisations and reactions to lower-level crises. Without Hitler's constant, "prophetic" guidance in the direction of the total destruction of world Jewry, the "incremental" actions of the lower echelons might have had very different outcomes (pp. 622-36).

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satzgruppen, beyond anyone's expectation (Poland!), had no problem with the army in their first killings, they proceeded to a much more extensive elimination of Jews than had previously been considered feasible. Moreover, the surprising extent of the army's receptiveness to mass killings led to the realization that the army would also not be opposed to an ensuing "sharp turn" against the German and other non-Eastern Jews. Hitler dared to proceed to total annihilation only as a result of the unexpected cooperation of the army after the first phase of the Soviet invasion (Streit, 28, 126-27).

IMPLEMENTATION: "COOL" TACTICS AND "COMMONPLACE" PERPETRATORS

However unplanned and incremental, the Holocaust turned out to be the Germans' most efficient effort during World War II. Hitler's tactical sense with respect to Jewish issues never seemed to fail—as it did on so many other issues. The tactics of "implementation in stages" (*Etappensystem*) and the various techniques of divide-and-rule deceived both the victims and the bystanders; the chief result was the avoidance of "great shocks" even during the most shocking stages of the Final Solution. The *Etappensystem* was described as "always creating the illusion that the worst had been reached, always causing disenchantment because things became even worse; yet, even with each disenchantment [the Nazis] were able to bring about a new illusion that the end of the measures had been reached" (Presser, II, 155). Divide-and-rule meant splitting the Jews into temporarily privileged (i.e., temporarily non-deportable) and non-privileged ("Auschwitz material") groups; there were all kinds of ways by which the Germans could accomplish this.

The frugality of German manpower used for the Final Solution is striking. For example, a staff of about 20 Germans administered the deportation of more than 100,000 Jews from the Netherlands. The huge Westerbork transit camp was run by a handful of German SS, assisted by Dutch police and Jewish administrators. The four "pure" extermination camps (Belzec, Chelmno, Treblinka, Sobibor) operated with particular efficiency, even more so than Auschwitz and Majdanek (which were killing centers as well as "ordinary" concentration camps). At Treblinka, for example, only 90 minutes elapsed between a train's arrival at the ramp and the complete annihilation of all the Jews on it. In "high season," three to five trains, each holding 6,000 people, could be "taken care of" (*abgefertigt*) at Treblinka per day. Of the total of at least 390,000 Jews who were brought to Belzec during its nine months of operation, there is only one known survivor. There

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are four survivors from Chelmno, about forty from Treblinka, and about fifty from Sobibor.[22]

A most telling quality of the German implementation of the Final Solution was its "coolness." The Dutch deportations, for example, took place in a "businesslike, calm and orderly" manner—"as a normal and smooth social process" (de Jong, V [2], 996-98, 1046-47). Although many of the "actions" in the Eastern ghettos and elsewhere were characterized by public scenes of utmost brutality, even the ultimate procedures at the extermination camps could reflect that "coolness." The Nazis had learned all kinds of lessons from the failure of the T4 ("euthanasia") killings. It was the bystanders among the German officials and the German public who brought about the abandonment of T4 in 1941.[23] It was the bystanders who were made unperceiving, and therefore ineffective, when the Final Solution was implemented "coolly" and "noiselessly."

With respect to the perpetrators down on the "firing" line, there is general agreement on perhaps the most shocking of all Holocaust phenomena: that "ordinary" men and women were involved. The commanders of the *Einsatzgruppen* were for the greater part persons with academic background. One of them, Otto Ohlendorf, held a Ph.D. degree in jurisprudence and had been research director of the Institute for World Economy at Kiel. Another, Ernst Biberstein, had been a Protestant pastor. Among the other *Einsatzgruppen* commanders there was a physician, a professional opera singer, and a large number of lawyers. Hans Biebow, the brutal commandant of the Łódź ghetto, had been a successful coffee merchant at Bremen.[24] De Jong considered the German implementors of the Dutch deportations "if anything, normal persons" and certainly not criminal types. In normal times they probably would have behaved normally. Willi Zöpf, the head of the Dutch program, had no particular qualms about his duties, yet he was not particularly interested in them either. He devoted much energy to his hobbies—classical music, the cinema, and "natural medicine"; he was a talented composer. Ferdinand aus der Fünten, the genuine anti-Jewish activist in the Netherlands, had been a bookkeeper in Cologne —the typical "little man," who tackled the deportations "not without

[22] Adalbert Rückerl, *NS-Vernichtungslager* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977), 13, 69, 206-7, 226-27; de Jong V (2), 996-98.

[23] Klaus Dörner, "Nationalsozialismus und Lebensvernichtigung," *Vjhefte ZG*, XV (April 1967), 147-49.

[24] Hilberg (fn. 2), 187-89; Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat* (New York: Stein & Day, 1977), 284-85.

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feelings of guilt, yet with a certain amount of pleasure . . ." (de Jong, V [2], 989-95).

Adalbert Rückerl, the chief German prosecutor for crimes against Jews, provides a description of the lower-level German personnel in the "pure" extermination camps. Many of them were former T4 employees who had been transferred as a group to the East after the "euthanasia" killing centers had to be disbanded. Their subsequent duties had included ambulance service and aid to victims of air raids. In the Eastern killing centers, they were given SS uniforms and were called *SS-Gefolge* (retinue), although their pay and other support continued to come from T4 headquarters in Berlin (including a daily extra allowance of 18 marks for the extermination duties). Most of them were poorly educated and had been policemen, medical auxiliaries, or artisans in civilian life. Virtually all of them came from regular lower middle-class homes. They had volunteered for T4 without knowing about its purposes—they had to be "reliable party comrades" and had been attracted by T4's close connection with the Führer's chancery, which sounded "safe" and "exciting," however secret. By the time they were transferred to the East, most of them were between 30 and 40 years of age. They insisted, after the war, that the tasks ahead in the East had been described as "touchy" (*brenzlich*), but that they had not been informed that they would have to engage in the mass-gassing of Jews. Rückerl finds that, as a whole, they were neither monsters nor mere passive tools of a distant machinery of terror; hardly any of them would have become criminals in a normal society.[25]

Rückerl notes that only very few of these men refused to carry out their tasks. At the same time, and contrary to the conventional wisdom about the Nazi state, not a single case is known to him where a refusal to participate in the killings notably affected the standing of a non-Jewish official, let alone endangered his life.[26] The T4 personnel, including the physicians, had gotten used to the "euthanasia" work without any great difficulties, and they soon got used to their much enlarged jurisdiction in the East. After the war, they stated that they had never been particularly anti-Jewish. The mood of these killers is said to have been "cold" rather than emotionally fervent.[27]

[25] Rückerl (fn. 22), 47, 67, 72-74, 122-26, 134, 187-88, 206-7, 295-97.

[26] Adalbert Rückerl "Für und Wider die NS-Prozesse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Essays über Naziverbrechen* (Amsterdam: Wiesenthal Fonds, 1973), 235.

[27] Dörner (fn. 23), 151; Rückerl (fn. 22), 303.

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III. Bystanders "On Another Planet"

Postwar criticism of the bystanders has been severe, on account of both their lack of concern for the fate of the Jews and their inability to imagine what was happening. The Nazis were annihilating the Jews as if they were co-inhabitants of an "otherwise vacant planet."[28] In Steiner's words, "Treblinka *is* both because some men have built it and almost all other men let it be. . . ."[29]

Of all the occupied countries, the Netherlands presents the cruelest paradox. On the one hand, its large Jewish population was thoroughly assimilated and integrated into Dutch life, with relatively little anti-Semitism prevailing; on the other hand, Jewish victimization during World War II was more severe in the Netherlands than in any other Western European country (including Germany itself); in some respects, it approached the Polish-Jewish disaster. The explanation for this paradox lies to a considerable extent with the Dutch bystanders. When the occupation began, Dutch officials continued to work as efficiently as ever and with the easy controls of a traditionally bureaucratized society—even when their work extended to all the phases of the implementation of the Final Solution as it was being played out in the Netherlands. The Dutch public, partly because of the Germans' tactical skill, tended to ignore what was happening to their Jewish countrymen; even the final deportations went over rather "noiselessly" and did not "make waves" (de Jong, V [1], 516).[30]

The Dutch officials, and others, caved in on Jewish issues from the very beginning of the occupation. In 1940, even before the Germans made any demands, the more prominent Jews were pushed into the background—or out altogether.[31] When the Germans required the reg-

[28] Arthur Morse, *While Six Million Died* (New York: Random House, 1967), ix.

[29] Steiner (fn. 1), 156.

[30] Of a total of 143,000 Jews who lived in the Netherlands when the Germans invaded, 107,000 were deported. Of those deported, 5,200 survived, including 4,000 who were sent to the "privileged" camps of Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen. The main deportations to the East took place between July 1942 and July 1943: 43,000 from the Netherlands to Auschwitz (85 survivors), and 34,300 from the Netherlands to Sobibor (19 survivors). *Not* deported from the Netherlands were 10,500 Jews who were married to non-Jews; 22,000 Jews (including 8,000 children) who were able to remain undetected in "underground" hiding; and 3,000 Jews who had submitted to "de-Jewing" procedures —a phony but sometimes life-preserving bureaucratic enterprise conducted by one of the German officials. "Half-Jews" and "quarter-Jews" were also not deported to the East, but many "Christian Jews" were (de Jong, VIII [2], 673).

[31] For example, an editor of a scientific journal was asked to resign; Jewish first-desk players of the Concertgebouw Orchestra were seated in the back; trade unions got rid of Jewish functionaries (de Jong, IV, 752).

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istration of the Jews, the Dutch bureaucrats enforced it strictly. Dutch civil servants pioneered in producing a falsification-proof identity card and a convenient system of tagging the Jews in the population registers. In November 1940, the Germans decreed the dismissal of all Jewish government employees (including judges and teachers); the highest Dutch officials, the Secretaries-General of the various Ministries, cooperated with distributing the Germans' "Aryan declaration" among all the civil servants. The Dutch Supreme Court had ruled that there was no legal ground to refuse to sign that statement, and the legal advisor of the Secretaries-General had stated that the Germans had the right to remove the Jewish civil servants (de Jong, IV, 758-65, 781-84; Presser, I, 69).

Some 16,000 Jewish refugees from Germany were the first to be thrown to the German wolves by the authorities who had granted them asylum, with one non-Nazi political leader describing them in unfavorable terms, and the Secretaries-General reportedly indulging in anti-Semitic jokes concerning "that lot" (de Jong, IV, 754, 767). On November 1, 1941, the Germans asked the Secretaries-General what they intended to do if the *Dutch* Jews were to be deported from the country; the Secretaries-General replied that such action would cause their immediate resignation. In late February 1942, the Secretaries-General suddenly were informed by the Germans that the Dutch Jews could not qualify as Dutch citizens and were therefore outside their jurisdiction. The Secretaries-General protested this pronouncement, but they did *not* resign when the Germans proclaimed the deportation of all the Jews in the Netherlands on June 29, 1942 (de Jong, V [2], 996, 1021-22).

Although there had been some news leaks from the East, the Dutch public hardly took notice; they probably hardly knew what was befalling their Jewish fellow-citizens—even when they observed the processions of heavily laden Jews, guarded like dangerous criminals by Dutch and German police, trek through the streets to the station (usually in the middle of the night). One got used to the idea that the Jews were receiving the blows, and one was happy not to be a Jew. The real tragedy of the Jewish fate was not perceived. The "Aryans" did not know and did not want to know; the Germans made it easy for them not to know (de Jong, VI [1], 34, 243; VII [1], 417; Presser, II, 126-27). As young Moshe Flinker observed in neighboring Brussels, the Jews were being "shoved off," but the non-Jews continued their parties and their fun.[32] The Dutch resistance to the occupiers did grow grad-

[32] Flinker, *Young Moshe's Diary* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1965), 71.

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ually, but it became a real challenge to the Germans only after 1943—after most of the Dutch Jews had long been deported and gassed.

The Dutch, of course, were not the only bystanders who "lived as if on another planet." Wasserstein, Feingold, Morse, Laqueur, and others have depicted the Anglo-Americans as typical passive bystanders to the Holocaust. Government leaders, officials, the general public, as well as Jewish communities are included in this indictment.[33] "No one spoke of the Jews" in Western Allied circles.[34] The Soviets were worse than passive.[35] "Deputies" abounded among the neutrals—not only Pius XII, but also the various national Red Cross societies and the International Red Cross, the Swiss, and the Swedes were disinterested in the fate of the Jews.[36]

REVERSALS

The passive role of the various kinds of bystanders becomes even more depressing when one looks at the "reversals," the occasions when some bystanders did attempt to block the processes of implementation of the Final Solution. Too infrequently did the life forces rally to oppose the Nazi's death forces—but when they did, they were relatively successful.

The most significant reversal took place in Denmark. The Danish officials and the Danish public insisted from the beginning of the German presence in the country that it would be "un-Danish" to surrender any Jews (Danes as well as German refugees) to the Germans. "The

[33] Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970); Morse (fn. 28); Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). Concerning the various Jewish groups in the United States, cf. Helen Fein, "Socio-Political Responses During the Holocaust," in Byron L. Sherwin and Susan G. Ament, eds., *Encountering the Holocaust* (Chicago: Impact Press, 1979), 93-99. The role of American Jewry is also emphasized in the additions to the paperback edition of Feingold's book (New York: Schocken, 1980), where his earlier harsh indictment is considerably softened.

[34] Feingold (fn. 33), 35, 306. Allied intelligence agents, who were interested in everything else in occupied Europe, were never dispatched to keep track of the Final Solution, let alone to try to prevent it (de Jong, VII [1], 359). Presser suspects that if the Germans had offered the remaining Jews to the Allies in late 1943, the Allies would have refused to accept them (Presser, II, 135).

[35] Erich Goldhagen, "Der Holocaust in der Sowjetischen Propaganda und Geschichtsschreibung," *VJhefte ZG*, XXVIII (October 1980), 502-7.

[36] Rolf Hochhuth's passionate condemnation of Pius XII, in his play *The Deputy* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), is balanced somewhat by Meir Michaelis's treatment of the Pope in *Mussolini and the Jews* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). A fair coverage of the Swiss meanderings with respect to the admission of Jewish refugees is provided by Carl Ludwig, *Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933 bis zur Gegenwart* (Bern: 1957). De Jong is among numerous writers who have condemned the International Red Cross for its almost total lack of concern for the Jews' disasters (VIII [2], 862-64).

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firm stand of the Danes, leaders and people as one, on this question" was the decisive factor in Denmark, states Leni Yahil. In the face of this kind of consensus, the Germans who were in Denmark behaved most untypically: when Hitler's order to deport the Danish Jews was issued, "there did not appear to be anyone in Denmark willing to persecute the Jews." All the leading Germans in Denmark "cabled or flew to Berlin, or did both" attempting to prevent the anti-Jewish measures.[37] In Helen Fein's conclusion, the Germans' "response capacity" was affected by the Danish consensus: "The Danish context enabled them to act out beliefs opposing Nazi persecution that they might have suppressed elsewhere" (p. 150). Approximately 90 percent of the Jews in Denmark were thus able to escape to Sweden. There is plentiful evidence that German officials had informed the Danes about the precise time of the planned round-up of the Jews; that the German army, navy, and police were not really interfering with the mass escape to Sweden; and even that individual Germans, including soldiers, assisted with some of the escape maneuvers. Moreover, the 800 Jews who had not been able to escape from Denmark—older persons and youths from an orphanage (typical "Auschwitz material")—were sent to the "privileged" camp at Theresienstadt, where, as the only national group, they were exempted from the weekly death transports to Auschwitz, and thus survived. Also, Danish officials were granted the right to visit the Danish Jews at Theresienstadt, a privilege never granted to any other group. The Final Solution was not "final" in Denmark because the Danes, and in consequence even the Germans, behaved neither as bystanders nor as perpetrators. Of course, there were only 8,000 Jews in Denmark (as opposed to 143,000 in Holland)—but there were even fewer in Luxembourg (3,000) and Norway (1,700), and 2,000 of the former and 700 of the latter were exterminated.[38]

Other reversals did occur: in Budapest during the summer of 1944, when an energetic American (Robert Pehle of the War Refugee Board) and a heroic Swede (Raoul Wallenberg of the Swedish legation in Budapest) undertook measures that led to the saving of tens of thousands of Jewish lives; in Italy and the regions occupied by the Italian army, where until the fall of the Duce there was an almost total lack of cooperation with, and even effective opposition to, the Germans' Final Solution; in Bulgaria and, after disastrous beginnings,

[37] Yahil, *The Rescue of Danish Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 61, 152-54.
[38] *Ibid.*, xviii, 268, 504.

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even in Rumania and Vichy France, where Jews who were fellow-nationals were not surrendered to the Germans.[39]

In 9 of the 22 states or regions occupied by or allied to the Germans, fewer than half of the Jewish residents were killed. What makes for the differences in Jewish victimization is, in Fein's view, one of the central questions of the Holocaust. What are the circumstances under which "good" people (the bystanders) let, or did not let, the Germans carry out "the most colossal piece of 'dirty work' in history . . . ?" Where the Germans did succeed, it was "because of the lack of counter-authorities resisting their plans, *not* because of the repression of such resistance." It was never necessary "to coerce anyone to do the 'dirty work.'" We know today how many of Hitler's orders were in fact "averted, subverted, or countermanded" (xv-xvi, 33, 90-92). Most of the bystanders who might have been able to produce reversals lacked the "higher" powers to match the "inspiration" of the perpetrators. There were "deputies" everywhere, and they were so dominant that merely normal behavior toward the Jews by some bystanders was later classified as "heroic."[40] As they implemented the Final Solution, the Nazis feared nothing more than people "making waves"; cooperating native officials and indifferent publics saw to it that no one made waves. De Jong wonders what would have happened if various Dutch elites had been less cooperative. *If* the Secretaries-General had resigned, as promised, when the Germans announced the deportation of the Dutch Jews; *if* the Dutch Supreme Court had ruled that the constitution did not permit distinctions between Jews and non-Jews; *if* the churches had, literally, opened their doors as places of refuge for those being deported—these and other acts of defiance would have created immense "waves," thus hampering the "noiseless" implementation of the Final Solution (de Jong, VI [1], 312; VII [1], 355; VIII [2], 866).

IV. Cohen versus Visser—The Predicament of the Jewish Councils

"Not knowing"

Many of the victims of the Holocaust were ignorant of the fate awaiting them. Presser described the Westerbork inmates' fears about the

[39] On the Budapest reversal, see Wasserstein (fn. 33), 243, 268-69; a more extensive treatment appears in Randolph L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 2 vols. The Italian attitude is depicted by Michaelis (fn. 36).

[40] Feingold (fn. 33), 307; Yahil (fn. 37), 64.

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East, the life "beyond Westerbork" from where "came not a single noise or rumor, not a single sign of life." Even the most pessimistic did not anticipate what was in store for them immediately upon arrival at the end of the line, at Auschwitz or Sobibor. As late as March 1944, that elite of Jewish elites at Westerbork, the camp physicians, did not believe the rumors about mass gassings. In 1944, most of the Hungarian and Slovakian Jews did not realize what Auschwitz signified even as the trains were taking them there. Many Warsaw Jews did not know what Treblinka meant when they arrived there, and residents of the Łódź ghetto had no concrete information about Chelmno—although both death camps were located close by and had been in use for a while. Hardly any German Jew could imagine what the Final Solution really involved—Auschwitz stood for nothing, and the term *Vernichtungslager* (extermination camp) was not known until after the end of the war.[41]

De Jong insists that at least the Jewish leaders should have "known." Like so many of the bystanders, the Jewish leaders were "totally deaf" with respect to a number of alarm signals which did trickle through (de Jong, VII [1], 368). "One of the most gigantic hoaxes in world history" was put over on a people noted for its intellect.[42] The hoax was successful largely because the truth was too monstrous to be believable, and also because of the Jews' utter isolation from the non-Jewish world —a consequence of astute German tactics, from requiring Jews to wear the identifying star to instituting the Jewish Councils.

THE ROLE OF THE JEWISH COUNCILS

The members of the Jewish Councils cannot be dismissed as mere Quislings. For example, that archetypical Jewish Council, the Amsterdam *Joodsche Raad*, was headed by two men of considerable prewar eminence. Professor David Cohen, of the University of Amsterdam, had long concerned himself with the fate of the German-Jewish refugees; he had been offered escape to England, but had opted to stay with the refugees. Abraham Asscher was a prominent businessman and a leader of the Liberal Party; during the occupation he displayed considerable courage—confronting Goering personally and exchanging blows with German soldiers and police. Yet, however, well-intentioned,

[41] On "not knowing" on the part of the Jewish victims, see Presser, II, 333: de Jong, VII (1), 334; Rückerl (fn. 22), 202, 334; Adler (fn. 3), 479; Trunk (fn. 24), 419; Conway (fn. 16), 275-76; Leonard Tushnet, *The Pavement of Hell* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 22-23, 45, 54-57.

[42] Hilberg (fn. 2), 207.

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Cohen and Asscher were wrong in their analysis of German aims and tactics, as were most leaders of Jewish Councils.

The Germans wanted the Jews to be helpless and isolated, and they used the Jewish Councils to accomplish both. It was through the "autonomous," quasi-governmental Jewish Councils that the Germans attempted to legitimize the ultimate crimes of selecting victims for deportation, and of deportation itself. The Jewish Councils offered the illusion of Jewish autarchy and security within a legal order. The result was a lack of apprehension among the Jews that served the German need "to eliminate the Jews in orderly stages." The Jewish Councils appeared to offer a chance for coexistence, particularly after the Germans had made a welfare class out of the Jews. Under the illusion of order and legality, charges Fein, the Jewish Councils inhibited the Jews "from initiating a social defense movement before there was any threat of deportation." Collective means of coping were ignored (Fein, 126; de Jong, VII [1], 377).

Instead of the defense movement, there were ever-escalating actions that helped to implement the Final Solution. For example, in October 1941, some 50 Jewish typists, dispatched by the *Joodsche Raad* at the request of the occupation authorities, appeared at German headquarters with their own typewriters, tables, and chairs. In record time they produced a complete file of all Jewish persons in the Netherlands from the data of the Dutch civil authorities. Four of the typists remained at German headquarters to keep the names and addresses up to date—until September 1944, when they themselves were deported on one of the last trains. The German supervisor considered them the best workers on his staff (de Jong, V [2], 1000-1001; VI [1], 258). The *Joodsche Raad* contributed to Jewish "not knowing" and other misperceptions by publishing an official Jewish newspaper, the *Joodsch Weekblad*, replete with German releases, editorially supported German threats, and pitifully useless "Jewish" news. The ultimate took place on June 2, 1942, a Sabbath, when Cohen and Asscher were called to the German headquarters at 10 p.m. They were informed that a *polizeilicher Arbeitseinsatz*, i.e., deportation under RSHA auspices, would be required for all Jews in the Netherlands, and that the *Joodsche Raad* would have to "prepare" 600 Jews per day for deportation. Cohen and Asscher hesitated for four days. They considered resignation, and they also attempted to reduce the number of "preparations" to 350 to 375 persons per day. On June 30, 1942, they accepted. Henceforth, after Berlin had decided how many Dutch Jews could be transported each month to

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the killing centers (depending on the overall capacity of the gas chambers and the availability of railroad cars), the Jewish Council did the rest. It was authorized to hand out temporary "safe permits" to those who "in the judgment of the *Joodsche Raad* were indispensable for the communal life of the Dutch Jews." Those not found "indispensable" were shipped to Westerbork and from there to the East. The Germans periodically instructed the *Joodsche Raad* how many of the "safe" permits could remain valid—35,000 as of July 30, 1942; 17,500 as of September 25, 1942; and then, gradually, down to 0 in 1943. The system worked smoothly, and the first two trains went East from Westerbork as early as July 14, 1942. From then on, some 4,000 Jews from the Netherlands were "rolled off" weekly to Auschwitz and Sobibor.[43]

After the war, the Jewish Councils generally were found not guilty with respect to *knowingly* participating in the killing of their fellow Jews.[44] With hindsight, it is easy to see how dreadfully wrong their tactics had been. They thought that they could save many lives through their favorite devices of *redden en rekken* (rescue through delay); in fact, it was German logistic bottlenecks rather than the Jewish Councils' devices that explain the relative gradualness of the killings. The Jewish Councils also hoped that their tactic of rescue through labor would be effective even beyond their delay; they did not realize that the Germans (those Germans, that is, who predominated) preferred dead Jews to hard-working Jews. The Jewish Councils' ultimate sin was that they were willing to sacrifice some Jews, as selected by them, to save the majority—which inevitably shrank away; in the end their cooperation brought on the doom of the selectors themselves, the Jewish Council leaders. "They are shooting another class of Jews (non-Germans, non-Magyars, non-Warsaw, non-urban, non-bourgeois, non-productive, non-law-abiding, etc.)"—that fatal rationalization reveals the frightful predicament of the Jewish Councils (Fein, 317-18).

[43] At Westerbork, the Dutch transit camp, the Jewish camp administration picked the individuals to be deported to the East from the "Auschwitz material" available, in accordance with the "batch of Jews" specified by the Germans for each train (de Jong, VIII [2], 716-719; Presser, I, 263-64).

Presser observed that the greatest blow the Jews inflicted on the Nazis may well have been the rolling stock taken from the German army for their transportation to the East (II, 370). The first 50 trains, during November 1941, started rolling at the very moment when the German army was attempting its final offensive near Moscow. At the time of the attack on Moscow, as 50,000 Jews were transported to the East, the German army needed 240,000 freight cars daily, but only 124,000 were available (Streit, 353). Later, at the very height of the Stalingrad crisis in January 1943, Himmler requisitioned numerous additional trains from the army for the Jewish transports—for which freight cars were almost always used (Rückerl [fn. 22], 115-16).

[44] Trunk (fn. 24), 567.

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VISSER'S STAND

Lodewijk Visser had been the chief justice of the Netherlands Supreme Court until the Germans forced his resignation. He was the one prominent Jewish leader in the Netherlands who publicly denounced Cohen's and Asscher's *Joodsche Raad* strategy. In retrospect, he did so for the right reasons. He recognized that the Dutch Jews would have to remain close to the non-Jewish Dutch, officials as well as the public. He realized that the Jewish Council's tactics, short range as well as longer range, would fatefully weaken the bonds between non-Jews and Jews, leaving the latter isolated in the face of their German tormentors. The Germans, argued Visser, were indeed the most powerful actor in the occupied Netherlands, but there was another power reality which was perceived by the Germans—the Dutch public's attitude of hostility toward the occupier. Through the isolation fostered by the *Joodsche Raad*, the Jews were relinquishing the benefits that could have accrued from that reality.

The Germans appear to have been aware of the threat in Visser's stand. They did not care to touch him directly—too many "waves"—in spite of his various rebellious acts, from objecting to have a "J" put on his identity card to setting up a rival Jewish organization which refused emphatically to have any dealings with the Germans. The Germans instructed Cohen to advise Visser that all contacts between his (Visser's) organization and Dutch officials would have to cease, or else severe punishment would be imposed on Visser. While the ensuing correspondence between Cohen and Visser was coming to a head, Visser died suddenly of a heart attack, on February 17, 1942. It is significant that, when one of the Secretaries-General contacted the Germans immediately after Visser's death on an issue the Germans knew had been prompted by Visser, the Germans replied—for the first time in such drastic fashion—that the Dutch Jews were no longer any of the Dutch officials' business. The isolation of the Jews had become complete (de Jong, V [1], 486-88, 550-53; V [2], 1020-21; Fein, 271-72).

Fein's conclusions about the general role of the Jewish Councils support Visser's stand. The first necessity for the defense of the Jews, "for both principled and tactical reasons," should have been the avoidance of isolation. That could have been accomplished only by the kind of Jewish leadership "that retained bonds to native leaders." "Jewish isolation was the most highly linked intervening variable leading directly to Jewish victimization"—and it was in areas of highest Jewish victimization such as in Poland and the Netherlands that the Jewish leader-

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ship followed the most isolating strategies (pp. 71, 127, 141, 312-13). A square in the heart of Amsterdam's old Jewish quarter has since been named in honor of Visser. That old quarter might not be so totally devoid of Jewish inhabitants today if Visser's strategies had prevailed.

Trunk calls the Jewish Councils "the products of times without analogy": theirs was "perhaps the most excruciating moral predicament encountered by a representative body in history."[45] Many of the Jewish Councils saw no way out of the predicament: subject to continuous terror, false promises, and lies, they had no time to think, they were not "masters of their decisions."[46] They did the best they could. "In another time, in another place, could or would the noblest of us have done otherwise?"[47] No realistic "definition of the situation" was ever available to the Czerniakovs and Rumkovskys, the Cohens and Asschers (Fein, 198). To cite the Supreme Court of Israel, these "puny people" should not be condemned "because they did not rise to a high moral level at a time when they were being persecuted by an authority whose supreme aim was to deprive them of God's image."[48]

The Holocaust was possible because of the age-old traditions and consequences of anti-Semitism. Yet, anti-Semitism alone in no way explains the Holocaust. In order to understand the adoption of the annihilation policy and its implementation, a variety of factors must be taken into account. Such factors are called "imponderables" in the title of the present essay, rather than determinants, not only because causation is so complex and moral judgment so difficult; the more one studies the Holocaust, the more one is convinced that it will remain basically incomprehensible with respect to the quantity as well as the quality of its inhumaneness.[49]

Hitler's East War made for an environment of unprecedented brutality. Because of the politics of the East Empire, the German army and other older elites were dragged into the "dirty work" which soon included the war against the Jews as well as the East War. According to Streit, Hitler would not have dared to proceed to the ultimate stages of the Final Solution without having swayed the non-Nazi elites; great

[45] *Ibid.*, 420-21, 437. [46] Adler (fn. 3), 113. [47] Tushnet (fn. 41), 208.
[48] Judge Landau's opinion, as cited by Trunk (fn. 24), 568.
[49] Currently, neo-Nazi propaganda tries to convince us that the Holocaust did not really take place, or that it was less gruesome than presented in the "Jewish media." Actually, none of the current TV series or best-selling novels comes even close to depicting the real drama of the Jewish fate during World War II. The horror and scope of the Holocaust are *understated* in most of the historical, literary, and popular coverage of the present period.

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care also was taken to keep the German public "not knowing." Moreover, these ultimate stages could not have been specifically planned or decreed; they seem to have required the incidental, perhaps even accidental, outcomes of the incremental decision making posited by Adam and Broszat. Also accidental, in a sense, was the availability of the low-level implementors whose "spiritual" suitability for the tasks at the killing centers had been tested and developed in the T4 enterprise.

Neither the bystanders nor the Jewish victims were able to develop effective responses to the implementation of the Final Solution. As shown by de Jong and Presser for the occupied Netherlands, government officials at every level—usually not Nazis—were in effect collaborating with the Germans in all stages of the Holocaust except the final one at the killing centers. De Jong and Presser (and many others) have also demonstrated that similar charges could be levied against members of Jewish Councils, Jewish camp administrations, and the Jewish police. Of course, we are judging bystanders and Jewish "officials" with the benefit of much hindsight, and we must grant the very basic point that "knowing" was beyond the capacity of many bystanders and virtually all the victims. Raul Hilberg and Hannah Arendt were probably the first scholars to emphasize the interactions among killers, bystanders, and victims—Arendt doing so in a particularly provocative manner.[50] Could the Danish reversal have been attempted in the Netherlands? Would Visser's response have been more adequate, ultimately, than Cohen's and Asscher's? The works of Fein and de Jong stand out for their balanced judgment on the social and moral complexities of these interactions, which are the most imponderable of the Holocaust's imponderables.

[50] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963). Arendt was vehemently attacked for describing Jewish victims as "accomplices of the hangman" and Jewish Councils as "the very cornerstone" of Nazi Holocaust policies. Cf. Hans E. Holthusen, "Hannah Arendt, Eichmann, und die Kritiker," *VJhefte ZG*, XIII (April 1965), 181-84; also Robinson (fn. 18), throughout.

The following bibliographical essay came to my attention only after completion of the present article: Konrad Kwiet, "Zur historiographischen Behandlung der Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, XXVII (No. 1, 1980), 149-92. Kwiet provides an exhaustive and carefully focused survey of Holocaust literature, with emphasis on German research. Special topics covered by him include German decision making, the behavior of the non-Jewish bystanders, and Jewish reactions.

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DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT, BREAKDOWNS, AND FASCISM

By PETER H. MERKL

A. James Gregor, *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979, 412 pp., $27.50 ($9.75 paper).
Anthony James Joes, *Fascism in the Contemporary World: Ideology, Evolution, Resurgence*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978, 234 pp., $17.50 ($8.50 paper).
Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978, 336 pp., $8.50 (paper).
Gino Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, 280 pp., $17.50 ($5.95 paper).
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1978, 687 pp., $35.00.
Raymond Grew, ed., *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, 418 pp., $27.50 ($6.95 paper).
Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978, 676 pp., $20.00.
S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations*. New York: Free Press, 1978, 338 pp., $15.95.

THE ideal course of development, particularly in the national self-images of the Western world, leads from authoritarian forms of government under the impact of the industrial-urban transformation to democratic self-government. Actually, many states, East and West, developed by a process of fits and starts, and experienced spectacular breakdowns and atavistic regressions that are not easily fitted into a generalized model. A strong ideological undercurrent throughout the social sciences, moreover, has long suggested that the stubborn historical facts of the transformation be simplified by a kind of retrospective teleology: instead of reconstructing history year by year in all its ambiguities of situation and anarchy of social forces, we look back and assign meaning only to those powers and events that contributed to history's *progress* toward the relative social equality and national integration of today's nation-states.[1] This developmental ideology, especially in the form of liberal beliefs or of implicit faith in the victorious

[1] This teleological assignment of meaning is quite different, for example, from Max Weber's advice to construe meaning from what each set of contemporaries demonstrably thought and intended to promote.

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progress of the revolutionary working class, is so deeply embedded in our subconscious that it often takes an *Ideologiekritik*—in the Marxist sense of the word—to remind us of its presence.

There can be little doubt that this preconceived perspective gets in the way of objective analysis—not only of democratic development in general, but of its breakdowns and moments of stagnation in particular. Historical objectivity is spooked by the myth of the one and only "true course of revolution," and therefore other popular, revolution-like outbreaks are considered to be mere "reaction" if they opposed or ignored the advance of the organized working class or even just of one of its sectarian movements. Nonrevolutionary change can hardly compete for attention with the drama of violent revolution. The cultural roots of national development are polemically misunderstood (or simply written off) as determinants of crises and of achievement in development. Political implications of successive waves of social mobilization are overlooked. And the revealing drama of democratic conflicts and breakdowns, of structural weaknesses and defensive strategies of semi-democratic regimes, is not appreciated in our unseemly haste to get to the *telos*, the functioning modern democracy. The black-and-white dichotomy of teleological thinking has little patience with in-between stages such as oligarchic democracy or attempts at tutelary dictatorship.

A Fascist Developmental Dictatorship?

An appropriate target of critical historical revision is the breakdown of (barely democratic) Italy in 1922 and the rise of Mussolini's fascist dictatorship. Since the resulting regime fought on the side of the Axis for most of World War II, there is added reason to beware of distorted perception. Among various revolutionary, mass-mobilizing, modernizing regimes, Italian fascism has drawn more passionately negative comments than many others; it has been depicted mostly as a "reactionary," anti-socialist, or even totally unprincipled, opportunist, and altogether very oppressive regime. In *Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship*, A. James Gregor, well-known from his earlier explorations of Italian fascist ideology, now offers us an iconoclastic reinterpretation of Italian fascism, which is at the same time also a major new departure in the theory of political and economic development. As for the iconoclasm, the author guilelessly suggests that competing interpretations of the same historical sequence may not necessarily be incompatible. In this case, however, there soon emerges a

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consistent picture of Mussolini's movement and regime as the logical product of the "crisis of historical Marxism"—a marriage in fact of its legitimate offspring (though a black sheep of the family), *revolutionary syndicalism*, and the nationalist reaction to Italy's predicament in the encounters with the disintegrating Ottoman and other empires of the period, beginning in 1911 and ending with the great crisis of 1917–1918. Unlike orthodox socialism or political liberalism, revolutionary syndicalism and intellectual nationalism together were capable of producing a revolutionary program to cope with the traditionalist, retarded Italian industrial environment and the threat of dependency on foreign plutocratic interests, much as Lenin's Bolsheviks undertook to reorganize the even more backward society of Russia into one of national independence and rapid development. Revolutionary syndicalism, which after 1911 became more and more nationalistic, already contained all the ideas that Mussolini later propounded and attempted to put into practice.

Considered from this angle, the alleged zigzag course of Mussolini from left to right becomes a mere function of our assumption that policies can indeed be defined on a left-right axis, as suggested by a century or more of political liberalism and orthodox socialist interpretation. In other words, the perception of Italian fascism has during the last half-century been captured by the point of view of liberals and of one of the early 20th-century factions of the Italian Socialist Party, both of which condemn the heresy of another socialist faction, the fascists. The argument is not entirely new, but has perhaps never been as convincingly propounded as in Gregor's book.

This *Ideologiekritik* is not only well documented, but is also followed by chapter and verse of Mussolini's development policies. It begins with the "domestication of labor" through force and social welfare policies that indeed set off Italian fascism from any orthodox socialist position, though admittedly not from communist positions ranging from Lenin to today's Poland. In Italy, as in the communist countries, low consumption was expected to pay for modernization. Other policies were aimed at the expansion of the economic capabilities of the nation—for instance, electrification, the expansion of the public transport infrastructure, and public enterprises in key industries—and at the creation of the "closed industrial state" that was independent of foreign capital, imported energy, and even foreign markets. Autarky, modernization of the economy, and rationalization of the bureaucracy went hand in hand with a policy of national *sacro egoismo*, accompanied by the "orchestration of consensus" that is familiar to students of

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fascism: the manipulation of the masses, the charismatic myth of *il duce*, and the "corporate" organization of economy and society. Fascist education and cultural policies—or, for that matter, Soviet education—fit this interpretation of the mobilization of the masses for national modernization. The belief in a revolutionary elite, of course, is also common to Mussolini and Lenin.

The reader is left to wonder what may still be intact of the conventional image of Italian fascism after Gregor's persuasive interpretation. There is plenty, it would appear, if we recognize the not-so-subtle qualitative differences that distinguish fascism's approach from the ideas and suggested policies of prefascist Italy or the Bolshevik policies of the same era. It is not just a matter of violence or brutal repression—which have certainly not been absent in communist regimes from the Soviet *gulag* to Pol Pot's Cambodia—nor of some very disagreeable people. There is, above all, the fascist political culture which deliberately idolized inequality, brutality, warlikeness, and the enslavement of "inferior" breeds in a manner that is totally foreign to traditional Italian moral values and to Soviet communism before World War II as well. There are also the policies to match this political culture: foreign adventures and colonialism, and domestic policies aimed solely at the gratification of the whims of the dictator and his rather nonmodernizing elite of Blackshirts, not at national mobilization for development. The fascist evocation of the greatness of the Roman Empire was conspicuously devoid of the universal moral virtues and belief in law that made Rome great in spite of human imperfections.

There remains the model of fascism as a developmental dictatorship, as "the first revolutionary mass-movement regime which aspired to commit the totality of human and material resources of the historic community to national development," as Gregor put it in an earlier work.[2] The policies in question clearly mark a route to industrial development that involves a minimum of dependency. This perspective also avoids the exclusive comparison by Dahrendorf[3] with the development of social classes and the political economy of Britain and France—the frontrunners whose development occurred before 20th-century "logistic, communications, information, and control capabilities . . . made centralization a functional adjunct" to rapid development (Gregor, 304). It is also plausible to consider the techniques of mass mobiliza-

[2] A. James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

[3] See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Democracy and Society in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). German liberal writings on German development of the past have tended not to compare their subject with later arrivals to development.

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tion and regimentation—including ideological and patriotic indoctrination, manufactured charisma, and compulsory mass organizations in Italy and the Soviet Union, and later imitators of both—as a major catalyst of accelerated development. Lacking a sizable proletariat and capitalist bourgeoisie, and therefore having little basis for Marxist development, Lenin's Russia nevertheless succeeded in organizing itself for rapid development. Marxism as such was as irrelevant to the tasks that faced the Bolsheviks as it was to Italy's revolutionary syndicalists.

Gregor's point of departure is based on his superb knowledge of Italian political theory; the book under review does not extend to a pragmatic examination of "fascist development" beyond Italy or the Soviet Union. Other scholars, however, have examined additional countries—ranging from Nazi Germany to the Guomingdang[4]—with varying degrees of success. Among these is Anthony James Joes, whose volume on Italy and ten other countries bears a spirited introduction by A. James Gregor. Joes quotes Gregor frequently, but his work lacks both the emphasis on political theories and the detailed consideration of economic policies that would bear out Gregor's thesis. Instead, Joes essentially provides a series of historical accounts around his "model" of fascism—nationalism, developmentalism, statism, authoritarianism, elitism—a model that is rather too broad, lacking in analytical specificity, and often ignored by the author himself.

For example, Joes does not sufficiently emphasize the mass-movement character of Mussolini's party, the *duce*'s distinctive techniques for mobilizing the masses, and the significance of demobilized veterans and officers. Consequently, when the author describes Spain and Eastern Europe, not to mention the Third World, he does not seem to notice the lack of a fascist mass movement in several allegedly fascist regimes. In some cases, there is also a lack of analytic depth, for example, regarding the complexity and explosiveness of ethnic politics in the successor states and, in the case of Hungary, the impact of the communist (Bela Kun) interlude. Furthermore, he should have considered, as in Italy, the intimate relationship between the threat of revolutionary violence *from* the left and the legitimacy of fascist violence *against* the left, and ultimately against any resistance to the fascist struggle for power. He also does not show much real appreciation for the crucial timing of fascist revolution at the precise point where democratic mass participation is in the offing for a society in cataclysmic

[4] See also A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Nazionalfascismo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen," *Journal of Asian Studies,* XXXIX (November 1979), 21-37.

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transition. After all, European fascism is a perversion of incipient democracy.

The problems of equating fascism with developmental dictatorships are compounded when the author discusses Third-World countries. His model completely disappears between the "fascist-flavored propaganda equating people, nation, state, party, and leader" (p. 119) of single-party movements like Nkrumah's and the military coup that overthrew him. Fundamentally different kinds of military dictatorships and leaders are listed—though not exactly examined—as if they were the same, and their leaders are tainted with having received colonial or neocolonialist "training" to boot: contemporary Egypt and Argentina, Kemal Ataturk and Auguste Pinochet, Mussolini and Nkrumah. In the majority of examples, Joes simply neglects to prove his case of conformity to the "fascist model" because he remains at the most superficial verbal level, giving undergraduate lectures rather than attempting vigorous analysis. It is possible that fascist developmental dictatorships may indeed be found in the Third World, but hardly in this fashion.

Joes's superficiality should not detract from the force of the arguments by other scholars to the effect that, at least in the West, the fascist "revolutions" of several nations may have been their peculiar way out of a social and cultural impasse of modernization. Historians of German national socialism have long argued over whether Nazism was a purely reactionary, backward-looking phenomenon, or whether it also exhibited some stridently modernistic, progressively innovating features. Marxist stereotypes of the only true course of revolution aside, and discounting for the moment the frequent discrepancies between Nazi propaganda and policy outcomes,[5] some telltale indications of the role of Nazism in long-range patterns of German modernization do exist: the deliberate destruction of remaining aristocratic privileges in army and society, the smashing of the old sectarian parties and associated groups, and the corruption from within of the seemingly indestructible codes of the military and the civil service obviously made it much easier to build up something new after 1945 than it had been in 1918. One could even argue that the colossal Nazi mania that led Germany into starting World War II and besmirched its collective (and all-too-rigid) national pride with unconscionable genocide was precisely what destroyed the barriers to cultural and political moderni-

[5] For example, Nazi stereotypes on the role of women or on the superiority of rural life greatly differed from the actual developments in female employment and patterns of urban migration in the Third Reich.

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zation after 1945. It is possible that fascism and aggression constituted a violent way out of a fatal "double-bind" of cultural modernization: World War I had caused educated Germans to resist Western-style democracy as an alien corruption of the true German ways, thereby compounding the difficulties already inherent in modern development. Sometimes the only way to get rid of faulty principles may be to carry them to absurd lengths.

Mobilization, Violence, and Collective Action

In order to understand the dynamics of democratic breakdown, we need to explore the processes of social and political mobilization, of violent movements and collective action, and of leadership behavior in political coalitions or in conflicts. These subjects are covered in *From Mobilization to Revolution* by Charles Tilly, whose trailblazing empirical work on strikes in 19th-century France and changing forms of collective violence in 19th-century Europe has already left its imprint on several disciplines, most notably on social science history.

The author engagingly calls his book a "stone soup" of pebbles boiled in water and laced with "soup makings" from intellectual passersby. But the reader soon realizes that the pebbles are precious stones and the soup makings juicy morsels of choice meat from some of the best-picked-over carcasses of sociological thought. One criticism that might be made concerning this theoretical-empirical *tour de force* is that Charles Tilly does not always stir his pebble soup long enough for the flavors of his theories and ruminations to blend, and for the soup to acquire the *haut goût* of compelling reinterpretation. The book begins with a lengthy and critical survey of current theories of collective action as an antecedent to presenting the author's own—a blend of group interest, organization, and mobilization. Occasional lumps in the mix, such as Tilly's questionable definitions of power and repression (p. 55),[6] serve to add character to this powerful broth of theory and empirical research.

A particular merit of this presentation is that it places modern collective violence (1830 to date) into the context of associational life and collective action[7] and compares it historically with the "reactive" com-

[6] The problem with defining power as "the extent to which the outcomes of the population's interactions . . . favor its interests . . ." is merely one of formulation: power may be the capacity to influence outcomes, but it is hardly the "extent" to which the outcomes are favorable to the group. Most people would define it still more broadly; the same is true of "repression."

[7] See also Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

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munal violence of earlier times and the encroachment of the nation-state and national markets upon longstanding communal rights and immunities.

Less convincing is Tilly's linkage of mobilization and revolution: in his eagerness to differ with "tension release" models of revolution, he presents an "idealized revolutionary sequence" in which changes in popular consciousness—generational or class-specific—are curiously missing (pp. 216-18). He might be writing of a *coup d'état* or a civil war between rival contenders for the throne, rather than, say, the shattering of a whole mental world of prerevolutionary or prewar values, styles, and codes of conduct. Mobilization, after all, requires a breaking of the mental ties that bound together the previous social order. All great revolutions and revolutionary periods involved an escalation of states of mind described more tellingly in Peter Weiss's *Marat/Sade* than in this theory of revolution. Ultimately, there is less of a sense of purpose than there are multiple directions, with but one seemingly barred forever: a return to the past or under the yoke of the sacral rites of the *ancien régime*. He who would write of an experience as deeply stirring as a real revolution, passionate and scalding to the senses of many contemporaries, should not fail to stir his broth enough to evoke the incredible heat as well as the nourishment—or fatal poison—that such events may bring.

The watchword in this study, as well as in those yet to be discussed, is *mobilization*, that curious term borrowed from military language and denoting the dramatic coming into motion of populations at rest. As long as it is only "social mobilization" (Karl W. Deutsch), its political consequences are ambiguous. In the uprooting and social migration of peasants, a "political mobilization" inevitably aims at collective action, the generation of movements and campaigns, and frequently the implied withdrawal of loyalties from a hitherto legitimate regime challenged by the threat of revolution. Political mobilization is the dynamite that can explode under the ramparts of ancient kingdoms as well as under the national foundations of modern bureaucratic authority or elective democracy.

Social Mobilization and Revolutionary Coalitions

An excellent investigation of the impact of social mobilization is Gino Germani's *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*, an original contribution to a not so original subject—fascism and development. The author primarily compares his native fascist Italy with his

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adopted Peronist Argentina, throwing some sidelong glances at other Latin American countries and Franco Spain.

The bulk of the book is devoted to an analysis of Perón's "national populism" (a phenomenon expertly dissected in the social and historical context of the "second wave of social mobilization"[8] after the crisis of 1930), the differential development of the various sectors of Argentine society, several failed attempts at "fascism," and military dictatorships. Germani suggests that a headstart on industrialization and economic development (at least before the 1930s) and the beginnings of representative democracy were among the conditions that made Argentina ripe for Juan and Evita Perón.

The demagogue skilfully combined the need of the oligarchic elites to maintain their position and the new mobilizability of the masses who wanted to participate. His *ad hoc* coalition of urban *descamisados* and rural *caudillos* is reminiscent of Hitler's bringing together of conservative and *Reichswehr* interests with his rather proletarian stormtroopers, or Mussolini's combining the interests of established landowners with those of his Blackshirts.[9] The Peronist revolution also had nativist overtones, with the older creole culture triumphing over the European cosmopolitanism of Buenos Aires and the littoral. Furthermore, it had "fascist" antecedents such as military coups involving Maurrassian doctrines, corporatism, a massive electoral fraud, and violence. In applying the label of "fascism," the author does not always adhere carefully to his own definition; he does not always require a massive fascist movement.[10]

Shades of Gregor's thesis are present, too. In the case of Peronism, Germani can point to the anti-imperialist and nationalist feelings that link a certain type of fascism to underdevelopment and to quasi-colonial revolt against a predatory bourgeoisie that has allied itself with foreign interests.[11] Moreover, a strong syndicalist tradition and a Sorelian pride in strike action link the Peronistas with Italian fascist doctrine, if not with Italian practice. But Germani is far from equating

[8] The first wave was that of the years of national foundation, beginning in the 1880s. According to the author, similar sequences can be shown in some other Latin American countries, acompanied by extraordinary population growth and outward expansion.

[9] The pre-1933 SA had a far higher membership of workers and peasants than it had of the old middle class of shopkeepers and well-to-do farmers; of Mussolini's Blackshirts, a plurality were agricultural laborers.

[10] A "fascist" movement began to exist in Argentina only after October 17, 1945, when a general strike served to create a Peronist workers' party.

[11] The nationalist preoccupation with foreign exploiters of Italian and German fascism is akin to the sense of *dependencia* of nationalist and Marxist spokesmen for the less developed countries, including those in the communist orbit.

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every military coup or influence with fascism (see, for instance, pp. 25-27), even though he associates "classical fascism" with Franco Spain and the Chilean coup of 1973 (p. 26); that is, cases of "demobilization" of the middle and lower classes by military intervention. The really classic case of Italy does not fit this model, and there are many other differences as well. Germani's analysis of the cases of Italy and Spain lacks the richness of demographic documentation that make his treatment of Argentine development so convincing. However, he does contribute excellent insights into the political socialization of youth in the fascist movements and regimes of these countries.[12]

The definition of fascism as a model of developmental dictatorship leads to confusion in view of the background of widely varying practices, movements, and regimes. It intensifies the concern of many historians and other social scientists that the label "fascism" has been too indiscriminately—and often polemically—applied. Worse yet, considered from the logic of research, a concept of fascism (or of neocorporatism, development, or change) that "explains" such a wide variety of movements and regimes the world over must of necessity lose most of its explanatory power. It explains little that we did not already know—except perhaps that Mussolini, aside from castor oil and union-busting, was just another well-intentioned tinhorn dictator of a less developed country anxious to catch up.

One can, of course, also approach the impact of mobilization on established regimes from the point of view of the weakening and breakdown or the defensive strategies of the regimes. We still do not have a good comparative treatment of the breakdown and defense of autocratic regimes, although the subject has been thoroughly explored with regard to some countries. But now there is at least one major study of the breakdown and defense of democratic and quasi-democratic systems on two continents, Europe and Latin America.[13]

The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's *Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* is a *tour de force* that has been long in the making. It examines studies of comparative fascism, but from the perspective of the defenders of

[12] See also his chapter on a similar subject in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 339-79.

[13] It would be instructive if the effort undertaken by Linz and Stepan were to be duplicated by other scholars with respect to Japan, Turkey, Lebanon, the Philippines, South Africa, and other countries.

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democracy against fascist assault, so to speak. Linz, in the first of the four-volumes-in-one,[11] sets forth the theory of the functioning and breakdown of "competitive democratic regimes" with due emphasis on leadership conduct, system support, and, where appropriate, party cohesion; he inquires into their impact on the legitimacy, effectiveness over time, and accountability of democratically elected governments. The role of political violence and the differences between loyal and disloyal oppositions in the breakdown are thoroughly explored, as is the defection of supporters and the polarization that often precedes it. A valuable model is presented in the first volume; in the second, third, and fourth volumes, the reader may wish that there were tables of contents as well as introductions and conclusions.

The model is followed by essays on all the European countries usually covered by surveys of the rise of fascist movements and/or regimes: Italy, Germany, Austria, and—less typically—Finland and Spain.[15] The outstanding panel of country specialists, fortunately, did not press their multifaceted accounts too tightly into the Procrustean bed of the theory, even while observing it closely. Historians may criticize the selective treatment of the complexities of each case in about 35 pages or less, and take issue with the authors' interpretations—such as Paolo Farneti's assertion that the triumph of Italian fascism was really just "the crisis of the Liberal-parliamentary state." Karl Dietrich Bracher's similar thesis[16] regarding the rise of the Third Reich evidently provided the original intellectual impulse for this endeavor.

The book's contributor on Germany, M. Rainer Lepsius, is careful to state that the Weimar breakdown "was more than . . . the dissolution of a political system"; he refrains from providing "a systematic analysis or a general interpretation" (p. 34). Instead, his treatment concentrates on the "crisis" of Weimar in the original Greek sense of the term, as a time of making painful decisions among several competing images of political order, one of which is constitutional democracy. The failure of the Weimar Republic, according to the author, was not so much a failure of its democratic leaders (many of whom were ill or dead by the early 1930s) caused by the insoluble problems of economy and society. Rather, it was a case of erosion of popular and elite

[14] The book is also available in four separate paperbacks: one theoretical, and one each on Europe, Latin America, and Chile.

[15] The absence of the important fascist movements of Hungary and Romania and of the smaller ones of Western and Northern Europe is logical: These countries either never had a functioning democratic regime or, if they did, it never broke down except as a consequence of Axis conquest.

[16] Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republic* (Villingen: Ringverlag, 1955).

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support for the democratic system, a vacuum which the Pied Piper and his brown movement could fill without serious obstacles.

By way of contrast, Walter B. Simon maintains that the death of Austrian democracy was caused by the two extremist wings who brought about the polarization that proved fatal to the republic. Finland experienced only a partial breakdown and crisis, according to Risto Alapuro and Erik Allardt, from which the country was eventually saved by a moderate depression-era coalition of Social Democrats and Agrarians. As in Austria, the interplay of class struggle and national aspirations confused the alignments but the extremist Lapua challenge (1929–1932) remained a mere episode.

In Spain, as Juan Linz explains, the democratic breakdown was all the more complete and lasting. The democratic-republican regime was unstable and inept in the extreme. Spain is a particularly interesting case because of the role of the army (in addition to that of the monarchy), the chaotic party system, the intellectuals, and the centrifugal forces tearing at the fabric of Spanish national unity. Linz draws comparisons with the Weimar Constitution and its initially strong and then fading popular support, and notes the shadings of semi-loyalty and disloyalty to the democratic system among parties and groups there. The story of the Spanish *Falange* as such pales into insignificance in the setting of unbridled violence, military conflict, and economic harassment. Linz sees the role of the Spanish army in the civil war—unlike military pronunciamientos in Latin America—as similar to that of the Weimar *Reichswehr*: indifferent toward the fate of the republic, but for the most part equally reluctant to become involved in antirepublican conspiracies of any political color. In the end, Franco's military uprising, unlike its 19th-century Spanish or contemporary Latin American equivalents, was based on an independent military that followed its "professionalism" (Stepan), much as some of the most recent coups in the developing countries have done. By that time, the democratic regime had already deteriorated of its own accord beyond the point of restoration.

Latin American Oligarchic Democracies

It is one of the great virtues of this analytic work that it includes European cases right along with those of developing societies in Latin America, and on the same terms. Especially in light of Germani's description of Argentinian politics and the rise of Perón, the two contributions on that country are valuable in rounding out the picture. Peter

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H. Smith describes the 1930 breakdown, engineered by an oligarchy-backed military coup, of what was by then a well-established, if "limited," constitutional democracy (p. 5). A crisis of legitimacy and the high-handed conduct of government leaders invited an authoritarian solution. (Following the fall of Perón in 1955, there was another unstable period during which a democratic regime failed to be established. It, too, began and ended with military coups that had broad popular support.) The political mobilization, unrest, and electoral frauds of the 1930s eventually brought on Perón's military coup, to clean out the abuses of a corrupted form of democracy that was in economic bondage to British interests. In 1966, after a prolonged "mass-praetorian" phase, the political vacuum of "the Bracher-Linz model" of regime breakdown (p. 159) again caused a highly professionalized army to intervene and to bring about a new (bureaucratic) authoritarian solution. Guillermo O'Donnell concludes that it is precisely the professionalism of the military amid a modernized society that, while making praetorianism less likely, can nevertheless trigger coups by the military as an independent force and in coalition with presumably apolitical technocrats, planners, and administrators.

Complementing the example of Argentina before 1930, there is Colombia's "oligarchic democracy" between 1910 and 1949—a system of competing oligarchies against a background of gradual modernization and mobilization, described by Alexander W. Wilder. Colombian democracy collapsed amid escalating violence, polarization, coups, and a revival of church-state conflict. In the essay on Brazil before 1964, Stepan analyzes another case of a competitive, if imperfect, "quasi-democracy" that was destroyed by a military coup (with encouragement by the United States) amidst accelerating social and political mobilization, declining economic growth, and erosion of system support. The collapse was preceded, among other things, by the military's fundamental change in attitude toward political intervention and takeover in the face of an attempted revolution from both above and below by the civilian government; there was a growing conviction on the part of the military that it could take the government from President Goulart and turn it over to an existing political opposition. The fact that a coup intended to defend legality and the democratic constitution against leftwing mobilization actually ushered in prolonged military dictatorship and bureaucratic authoritarianism is symptomatic of the choices that confront many of the more developed Third-World countries.

Peru's was perhaps the least democratic of the systems whose break-

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down is discussed here. (Unfortunately, Uruguay, Bolivia, and the Central American countries are not covered.) Julio Cotler, the author of this chapter, notes that Peru is probably the best example of a repressive oligarchy linked with economic *dependencia.* The country's brief period of experimentation with competitive democracy ended with the planning- and development-minded "institutional military government" of 1962; after further social and political mobilization, the military coup of 1968 finished it off entirely. In the opinion of the military, party competition and grassroots mobilization had simply been too turbulent for sound economic development, and foreign economic interests had contributed decisively to the failure of civilian governments.

Arturo Valenzuela contributes a book-length study of the breakdown of Chilean democracy, a regime that had long been admired for its stable, if oligarchical, democratic-competitive government. The author describes the mediating structures of political competition in mid-century Chile up to the time when the rising tide of social and political mobilization swept away the oligarchic dams. Political polarization and the ascendancy of an ideological center party—shades of Giovanni Sartori's theory of centrifugal multi-partyism—had weakened the democratic system and critically reduced the options of the civilian leadership even before the economic crisis and Salvador Allende's plans of fundamental reform. According to the author, the Allende forces were quite unlikely to accomplish what they had promised; they merely managed to trigger a broadly based countermobilization that in the end undid the progress of decades and blocked the advance of the Chilean working class for the foreseeable future: "Democracy is a system difficult to create, perhaps more difficult to preserve" (p. iv).

It appears that the only trail to a democratic future for these developing societies may be the one followed by Venezuela. Daniel H. Levine recounts that country's emergence in 1958 from a seemingly endless series of dismal dictatorships. Somehow, these helped to create the effective central state authority (Juan Vicente Gómez, 1908-1935) and the mass parties and associations (especially Acción Democrática and Copei in the 1940s) that eventually became the mainstays of competitive democracy. The process involved, first, national unification and the growth of an effective state bureaucracy; then, the organizational revolution and the transfer of power from the old traditional elites to elective politicians; and finally, the great leap into an independent development of infrastructures, based mainly on oil exports: Venezuela is a textbook case of step-by-step progress.[17]

[17] See also the phases of political development (the last step is the "potentiation of

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The secret of Venezuelan democracy, moreover, seems to lie in the successful and disciplined aggregation of the mobilized group interests by the duopoly of the two major parties and their allies—even though they have as yet to attract the support of the masses who migrated to Caracas and other urban centers. This system differs from the old model of oligarchy, but also falls short of the new leftist type. The kind of leaders and parties characteristic of "oligarchic democracy"—including those of 19th-century Venezuela—were probably incapable of this feat, as are most mobilization movements of today. Venezuela's civilian leadership steered a middle course between oligarchic repression and the potential chaos of social and political mobilization, which has enabled the country to maintain competitive, democratic politics while others have had to lean on the crutch of military or bureaucratic authoritarian rule.

At this point analysis may develop into prescription, even though the proliferation of democratic failures hardly gives cause for optimism. The problem of harnessing successive waves of social and political mobilization into an effective—but open and competitive—system of political organizations seems to have been the major challenge to both contemporary Latin America and Europe in the 1930s. In this respect, fascist regimes from Mussolini to Perón succeeded all too well with a system that was ruthlessly repressive of pluralistic interests and symbolically expressive of national aspirations at home and abroad. An effective and promising development policy is no more unlikely than a dozen other logical policy choices these regimes may have taken up in the course of the struggle for power or of governing their countries. Third-World countries must not necessarily go fascist or Leninist in order to develop, but the imperatives of development are so compelling that even a Lenin or a Mussolini could not ignore them.

It may be well to remember that many knowledgeable Latin American writers trace their countries' problems with democratic development far back into the history—to the beginnings of independence, the imperial period, or the conquest of indigenous populations. As for Europe, Karl Dietrich Bracher attributes the antidemocratic attitudes during the Weimar Republic to, among other things, a delayed German nationalist reaction after having been conquered by Napoleon. Some American wartime interpretations even invoked German traditions as far back as Luther and the Reformation. In other words, our

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capabilities" and "exploitation of resources" in an independent fashion) in Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics*, 2d ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press [Holt, Rinehart], 1977), 15-23.

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search should not be limited to the political alignments of the democratic breakdown in question; we need to see a country's development over long periods of time and through successive stages of cultural, social, and political evolution.

Crises, Problems, or Critical Changes?

Two recent books have taken this long-range view, each in its own way. One is Raymond Grew's *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*, a collection of national historical essays that attempt to apply the analytical theories put forth in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*.[18] The redoubtable historians represented in Grew's volume have struggled valiantly and with impressive skills and resources to overcome major difficulties inherent in such a concrete application of heuristic theories. In most particulars, the results are gratifying, but with regard to the theory they are disappointing. The stubborn facts of each country's history tend to triumph over the developmental model in almost every case.

The problems begin with the fact that concepts of "crisis" vary widely; the word appeals to one's sense of the dramatic and seems persuasive, but does not live up to its analytic promise. Grew admits quite freely that a "crisis" or "area of critical change" might be "any serious threat to the functioning of a political regime" (p. 10), "an important change in the way politics worked," or categories of typical "problems governments face" (p. 11)—in addition to more conventional definitions, such as breakdowns or near-breakdowns of government, as in "the Dreyfus crisis."[19] We cannot even be sure whether it is the state, the particular regime or government, or the country that is "in crisis"; nor do we know the exact nature of a "crisis" that can take such different forms and originate from such differing causes, foreign or domestic. Consequently, each contributor comes up with his own concept—a catalog of recurrent problems, unique disasters, or resolvable dilemmas that will not recur once they are "solved." Frequently one crisis is said to lead to another, or attention is focused more on overloads than on the types of problems. The functional model underlying the catalog of crises thus threatens to recede and disappear until nothing remains but a fleeting inspiration, the smile of the Cheshire

[18] Leonard Binder and others, eds., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[19] The concept of crisis used in Gabriel A. Almond and others, *Crisis, Choice, and Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) is far more concrete, and the contributors to that volume adhere to it much more closely than those of the present symposium.

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cat. Grew himself concludes wistfully that "crisis" is merely a metaphor, although the "categories of crises" afford us a good analytical handle (p. 16). Elsewhere he says that the "concept of crisis may be too limited to describe all the political processes, too ambiguous to permit precise dating, and too broad to allow one often to declare any crisis resolved" (p. 305). Eventually, he comes to grips with the "categories of crisis" in the 16 countries discussed; he also notes the startling absence (for development theory) of a more or less uniform sequence in which states "resolve" their crises of identity, legitimacy, and so forth (pp. 28-30). To be sure, there may be overlapping, recurrent, and even perennial crises of any category, and one may relate their resolution to the broadest goals of modernization—increased capacity, equality, and differentiation, or to social policy areas. Passages of this kind make the political comparativist regret the absence of formal comparative conclusions based on common measurements. The crises-and-sequences scheme, in particular, fails to shed much light on the democratic breakdowns and fascist episodes in most of the countries under discussion. The editor himself, writing on Italy, offers us no less than four competing interpretations of the nature of Italian fascism (p. 272). Other writers, at best, have linked it to questions of identity and legitimacy.

The developmental histories of the respective countries differ widely, as do their starting points. In discussing Russia and Poland, for example, the authors go back to dynastic history, whereas the cases of Spain, Germany, and France start with Napoleonic times, as if the absolutist eras had not effected considerable political development. Important factors of political development, such as parties, organized interests, the bureaucracy, and the army are treated differently by the various contributors; so is the importance of international situations—a discrepancy noted by the editor (p. 10).

There is much to be learned from the various authors of the national histories. Keith Thomas (England) is refreshingly sceptical about developmentalese jargon, and states his preference for a history of the *problems* (rather than "crises") of identity, distribution, and so forth. Aristide Zolberg (Belgium), the only political scientist of the group, tellingly separates the set of "crises" before and after the onset of mass politics which, for example, turned the linguistic division of Belgium from a "crisis of penetration" into one of identity. J. Rogers Hollingsworth demonstrates the advantages of comparative awareness and of an integrated social science approach in discussing the United States,

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perhaps the most dissimilar case of the 16 countries. David D. Bien, Keith Thomas, and Raymond Grew himself remind us that the mid-17th century witnessed major turning points; for example, in France there was an upsurge of taxation and governmental intervention just when in England the central government and other public authorities retreated from most local and public functions, including the police, postal service, and road maintenance—even leaving colonial rule in India to a charter company operating for profit.

John R. Gillis (Germany) makes the excellent point that notwithstanding Ralf Dahrendorf's thesis and that of many others, German problems were not as different from those of today's developing nations as exclusive comparisons with the frontrunners of development, England and France, have suggested. He relates the startling reversal of sequence—German crises since the early 19th century have almost always begun with a problem of penetration—to the perennial German difficulties of reconciling state and nation, and of overcoming the division between state and society. Even totalitarian penetration, Gillis suggests, ultimately failed to bridge the gap.

This gap ought to be (but is not) even larger in Russia, where, according to historian Walter M. Pintner, the unbroken tradition of the autocratic tsarist state has endured to this day in spite of the strong Western influences on Russian society and culture ever since Peter the Great. Except for rare lapses in the 17th and early 20th century, this autocratic state survived as long as it could meet its twin problems of mobilizing national resources ("distribution") and supporting a huge military force for "penetration" and security. This, rather than the participation patterns of 20th-century Western governments, is still the *raison d'être* of the Soviet state in the age of rockets and atomic warheads—a model *sui generis* of modernization without participation. Poland's development took the opposite course, that of a weak state unable to resist either powerful neighbors or egotistical noblemen who utterly dominated the peasants and the urban bourgeoisie. The process of building a modern state in Poland was completed only after the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian bureaucracies had penetrated the resistance of Polish feudalism in the 20th century. Crises of participation and distribution still continue as strikes over distribution problems are once again challenging the authority and penetrative capacity of the communist state. The long Polish struggle for external liberty in priority over internal liberalization holds a mirror to many a postcolonial society to this day.

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Legitimacy, Identity, and Development

The historic patterns of national development may also be approached from their origins in various ancient or medieval civilizations and traced to the edge of modernity, each in its characteristic form, as Reinhard Bendix has done in his awkwardly titled *Kings or People*.[20] This author who, in his studies on nation-building and citizenship,[21] already made a highly original and widely read contribution to our understanding of political development, has here undertaken another attempt to penetrate the mysteries of unique patterns of development.

Bendix takes as his point of departure the evolution over millennia of the nearly ubiquitous institution of kingship in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In particular, he probes the religious foundations—Christian, Islamic, and Confucian—and explores their early tribal or feudal concomitants and the external circumstances influencing the different versions of early kingship in China, Japan, Russia, Germany, and England, as well as in the Arab world of earlier centuries. Religion, feudalism, and exogenous factors played a major role in each of the cases mentioned, but the differences between, say, Western Europe, Russia, and the Far East are dramatic. In a chapter on kingship and aristocracy, the author demonstrates the uniqueness of each cultural region, and of the development of countries such as England and France before the 1500s. He shows how, starting in the 16th century in England, France, and Germany, and later in the other regions, the old societies were destroyed by major economic changes, social and political mobilization, and by the revolutionary growth of a broadly based "intellectual elite" of popular modernizers. The latter brought about the "intellectual mobilization" that initiated the decline of traditional kingship and the rise of popular government. The impact of the international situation and, in particular, of foreign "reference societies" on a country's modernization are considered in some detail. The book closes with a chapter on the Chinese and Arab revolutions of the 20th century, exploring comparatively the widely diverging patterns by which these formerly monarchic societies have gradually turned toward forms of popular government.

Some of this is familiar (though well retold); but a great deal is new and, in this context, a welcome change from systems-oriented schemes of development. In comparison with most of the standard literature,

[20] The title suggests a focus on the source of political authority, but the book is really a comparative and descriptive history of major political cultures. It does not attempt to relate culture to democratic breakdowns, or even to democracy.

[21] See Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

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the author often seems to go too deeply into the particulars of religious conceptions and idiosyncratic peculiarities of centuries long gone. But that is precisely his point: he emphasizes the uniqueness of national (or cultural) developments and, in spite of recurrent comparisons, their distinctive and enduring rationales, and the different exogenous factors that distinguish, say, Russian from British history.

For comparative sociologists and political scientists who have observed recent developments in the field of comparative history with mixed feelings, Bendix provides a solid sense of historical reality. Here is comparative history or historical sociology at its best—concrete and yet of a scope that reveals the effect of the sweep of centuries on complex national evolutions. Above all, the author shows the impact of the conflict of ideas and values on traditional and modern minds, and often within the same minds.

Even the final glance at 20th-century China and at the Arab revolutions—both examples of popular government without democracy—gives priority to the idiosyncratic cultural contexts. Monarchies have survived in different forms in the Middle East and North Africa, along with nationalism and a renewed religious basis of authority, to form new political cultures that are strikingly different from what we ethnocentrically persist in considering "the" modern society. Why indeed should Iran become another Sweden, or China follow the dismal example of the Soviet development, or of France? Reinhard Bendix has helped us to see the unique in political cultures without forgetting to draw illuminating comparisons.

Structural Changes and Revolutions

While Bendix primarily compares political cultures, S. N. Eisenstadt has contributed a similarly wide overview; he emphasizes political structures and their processes of violent or gradual change over the centuries. In *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, he distinguishes between the character and sociohistoric conditions of "true revolution" and the processes and conditions of nonrevolutionary social change in modern society. Looking askance at the many myths of revolution, he questions the assumptions of structuralists and Marxists about the only true course of revolution, as well as the common failure to distinguish it from mere protests, rebellions, and conflicts endemic in modern society. Important differences among traditional societies, between monism and pluralism, patrimonial and tribal states, city states and empires—and, of course, between the nature of inter-elite

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and group conflicts—play major roles both in revolutions and in non-revolutionary change.

Great revolutions, however, seem to do best in empires with a clear center-periphery differentiation. Change is more difficult in a monistic or patrimonial polity, especially on an imperial scale. If the center monopolizes political power and religious orthodoxy, political and religious heterodoxy at the periphery may constitute the fulcrum for the strata and oppositional elites that will eventually unhinge the whole empire. Eisenstadt covers the Russian, Byzantine, Chinese, Japanese, and Islamic empires, as well as Western Europe.[22] Although modern revolutions are different, he considers them to be "rooted in the tradition of chiliastic outbursts, of rebellions, and of the more central movements of reform and heterodoxy" of earlier days (p. 173). His description of socialist/communist movements mentions social justice and eschatology, but not classes or the class struggle. Along with the coalescence of future-oriented reform movements that is called the "tradition of modernity," Marxism has been exported from the familiar European scene to non-Western countries where it has no need of a bourgeoisie and an industrial proletariat locked in deadly struggle, but benefits greatly from Lenin's emphasis on revolutionary organization. The symbol of the "true revolution" carried by eager intellectuals has done well without proletarian class struggle in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Russia, China, and even in patrimonial Mexico.

Inevitably, Eisenstadt also gets around to "the failure of many societies both to achieve the breakthrough to modernity *through this process* and to effect revolutionary-type social and cultural transformations" (p. 197); he mentions Germany, Italy, many Eastern European societies, and Japan, as well as Spain (p. 206), precisely the countries with a fascist-type *ersatz* "revolution" that may have helped with their "non-revolutionary" or "non-coalescent" (Spain, Latin America) passage to modernity. The processes and outcomes, of course, have differed considerably as various elite coalitions, the state, and the military have each left their marks. Evidently, "the interaction between the structural and the cultural characteristics of [these] societies and historical frameworks" (p. 204) required a fascist kick in the pants—perhaps even Mussolini's castor oil—to vault the great hurdle to modernity.[23]

[22] See also Eisenstadt, *The Political System of Empires* (New York and Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963).

[23] Specifically, the earlier stirrings of revolution (1848) in these countries were not strong enough to be successful. The author also raises the question of how Scandinavia, Switzerland, and the Low Countries managed to partake of revolutionary modernity without an upheaval of their own. The answer may lie in a learning process dating

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It is difficult to do justice to the complexity of the arguments of Eisenstadt's profound and comprehensive treatise with mixed metaphors.

Concluding Remarks

Do these varied discussions and contributions add up to an answer to our original question about the progress of societies from authoritarian antecedents to democratic self-government? Yes and no. The broad, interpretative perspectives of Reinhard Bendix and S. N. Eisenstadt obviously address other dimensions than those of A. James Gregor, Gino Germani, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. And yet, with the help of the historical connections discussed by Charles Tilly and the contributors to the volume edited by Raymond Grew, there is a world-historical linkage, a view of the cultural evolution of human societies, in which the 20th-century preoccupation with democracy seems to be a minor concern when compared with the millennial continuities of the great world religions and the political civilizations they spawned. From a Toynbeean perspective, however, we can also see more clearly the enormous impact on the traditional past of such events as the emergence of modern states, the Industrial Revolution, and the massive waves of popular mobilization that ushered in our age of popular revolutions and popular (though not necessarily democratic) governments. Does it matter, then, whether Mussolini's fascist autocracy was a developmental dictatorship, or whether or not all developing societies have to pass through either a "real revolution" or a bone-crushing fascist or communist dictatorship that enforces the necessary sociocultural change? It does indeed, if we care about individual freedom and dignity, and even more if we question the actual outcome of these brutal dictatorships. For there is no evidence so far that, short of foreign intervention, any fascist or communist dictatorship ever ended of its own accord once it had accomplished these sociocultural changes. On the contrary, even the fascist dictatorships toppled by World War II seem to have left behind a legacy of neofascist movements and of terrorism seemingly spawned by precisely the brutal aspects of these developmental dictatorships. Worse yet, it takes little imagination to picture how any ruthless dictator of a contemporary developing country might use Gregor's thesis to justify the unspeakable treatment he is meting out to some of his own countrymen.

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from Napoleonic times, not very different from the one whereby Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe, and Japan acquired modernity after 1945.

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

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

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